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INTRODUCTION 
 
Policymaking in contemporary parliamentary democracies appears to be dominated by cabinets. 
The vast majority of legislative proposals originate in governmental offices, and most of these bills 
are eventually enacted (see Andeweg and Nijzink 1995: 171; Gamm and Huber 2002: 323). 
However, the legislation sponsored by governments is often modified during the lawmaking process. 
This observation is so trivial that it does not seem to be worthy of any further investigation and 
indeed, with very few exceptions, scholars interested in legislative processes pay relatively little 
attention to the changes made to bills in parliamentary systems. Comparative studies often describe 
legislative institutions in parliamentary countries as ineffectual vis-à-vis cabinets throughout the 
lawmaking process, while rational choice literature focuses more on the formal rules regulating 
amendatory activity than on amendatory activity in itself1.  
On the one hand, typically motivated by the normative question of whether ‘parliament 
matters’, over the last decades comparative research has characterized legislatures in many 
parliamentary countries as weak institutions (see, for example, Mezey 1979: 36; Blondel 1995: 250). 
In fact, over the past century the expanding scope and complexity of governmental tasks and the 
growing size of state bureaucracy have prompted ‘modern’ parliaments to devolve increasing 
powers to the prime minister and the cabinet (Bagehot [1872] 2001; Bryce 1921; Cox 1987; Wheare 
1963). As a result of such delegation, in contemporary parliamentary systems legislative activity 
revolves mostly around government bills. Thus, since the inter-war period a long line of scholars 
have diagnosed a decline of parliamentary principals vis-à-vis cabinets as their agents (see, for 
example, Bryce 1921: 367-377), and legislatures have even been defined as mere ‘rubber stamps’ 
for decisions made elsewhere, or ‘talking shops’ tamely approving legislation laid before them by 
governments for ratification (see, for example, Johnson 1982).  
On the other hand, most of the time the rational choice literature has just focused on the 
formal rules regulating the lawmaking. In particular, the type of amending rule employed in a 
legislature has primarily been studied as one of the institutional factors constraining actors’ 
behaviour. In line with the fundamental idea that outcomes are produced by a combination of 
individual preferences and insitutional rules (see, for example, Plott 1976), this strand of research – 
and more precisely social choice theory – considers amending rules among the procedures that 
allow to translate legislators’ preferences into collective choices, thus shaping the legislative 
                                                 
1
 The terms ‘amendatory activity’, ‘legislative review’ and ‘parliamentary scrutiny’ are used interchangeably 
throughout the text. Also the terms ‘legislature’, ‘parliament’ and ‘assembly’ are used in an interchangeable manner. In 
addition, I use the terms ‘multiparty government’ and ‘coalition government’ interchangeably to refer to instances 
where the cabinet ministers belong to more than one political party.  
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outcomes (see Rasch 1995, 2000)2. Being typically interested in the level of similarity between the 
proposer’s ideal point and the final legislative outcome, social choice works take the preferences as 
constant and study how changes in the rules affect this similarity. Since the distance between the 
proposer’s ideal point and the final outcome depends on the particular rules employed, any 
reduction or increase of this distance will be the consequence of some change in the institutional 
rules (see, instance, Baron and Ferejohn 1989).  
Remarkably, the theoretical models built within this framework allow us to evaluate the so 
called agenda setting power: the closer is the final outcome to the proposer’s ideal point, the 
stronger is the proposer in setting the agenda (see, for instance, McKelvey 1976). However, at least 
in their baseline formulation, these models are not particularly useful for studying the 
transformations undergone by government legislation in parliament. Indeed, the distance between 
the proposer’s ideal point and the final legislative outcome does not necessarily result in observable 
modifications to the initial bill. As I will show, if political actors knew perfectly each other’s 
preferences as well as all the implications of the legislative rules, and if their utility derived simply 
from the legislative outcome, in parliament we would observe no changes to government bills. The 
proposer would present a bill corresponding to the best policy she can obtain given the present rules 
and the distribution of political preferences among the actors, and such a proposal would be 
approved in parliament without any change. This would happen under any amending rule. 
Therefore, we would not see any transformation in parliament even in presence of a huge distance 
between the proposer’s ideal policy and the final outcome. 
Nevertheless, legislation is often amended in real-world parliaments. How can we account for 
the amendments successfully made to government bills during the legislative process? What affects 
their number and importance? Moreover, is it posible to explain successful amendatory activity in a 
way that is also consistent with the theory? As outlined in the literature, three fundamental 
considerations may help us answer these questions and improve the explanatory power of standard 
models. 
First, for the actors involved in the parliamentary process the political utility may not depend 
entirely (and, sometimes, hardly depends) on the policy implications of the legislative outcome, i.e. 
on the actual consequences of the law finally approved. The parliamentary arena is not simply a 
place for passing bills into laws, but also an important venue where political actors send signals to 
the electorate, in particular to their own respective constituencies. More precisely, introducing a bill 
has also a position-taking utility (Mayhew 1974; Huber 1996): hoping for future electoral rewards, 
                                                 
2
 For introductions to social choice theory, see for example Riker (1982) and Sheplse and Bonchek (1997).  
 6 
political actors may want to propose policies that appeal to their own voters even when they know 
in advance that such bills will be amended during the legislative process. 
Second, the level of information at political actors’ disposal throughout the legislative process 
may be somehow limited. In particular, actors have rarely complete information about other actors’ 
preferences and perfect information about the actual effects of the laws (Krehbiel 1991). 
Third, in presence of at least one of the previous two circumstances the particular institutions 
that regulate the legislative process will affect the amount of changes made to bills in parliament. 
Relying on these considerations, it is possible to identify the following three major sets of 
(non-mutually exclusive) theoretical explanations of the modifications made to governmental bills 
during the legislative process: 
I) Explanations based upon the conflict. Since legislation is introduced (also) as a means 
of communicating with the electorate, cabinet ministers can propose their own ideal 
point in order to appeal to their own respective constituencies. As a consequence, the 
dissimilarity between the initial governmental bills and the laws finally approved in 
parliament – i.e., the amount of modifications made – indicates true conflict among the 
actors (and the positions they take before the voters) participating in the lawmaking 
process.   
II) Explanations based upon the lack of information. If the level of knowledge in the 
cabinet is relatively low and governmental bills reflect such lack of information, the 
following parliamentary step allows actors to learn and to correct the initial proposals 
by amending them. 
III) Explanations based upon institutional changes. Legislative outcomes are affected by 
the type of amending rule employed as well as by other institutional arrangements. The 
more restrictive the rules, the lower the possibility of altering legislation in parliament. 
Most of all, any change of amending rule from the open rule type to the closed rule 
type will decrease the amount of modifications made to government bills3. 
As pointed out before, very few studies try to explain how much laws are altered in the 
legislative arena and why (the only important exception is Martin and Vanberg 2005). In the present 
work, I analyze the modifications made to government bills during the legislative process as an 
outcome itself – that is, as a dependent variable. In particular, based on the three major sets of 
explanations introduced above, I present a conceptual framework where to locate existing and 
original theoretical explanations of the occurence of changes to governmental bills in parliament. 
                                                 
3
 As I will explain in the introduction to the first chapter, my research design does not allow to test the effect of 
different amending rules on parliamentary scrutiny of government legislation. Neither is possible to assess the impact of 
alternative institutional arrangements, with the exception of the 1993 reform of the Italian electoral system. 
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Hence, I empirically evaluate the hypotheses derived from the literature against evidence from Italy 
(1987-2006), in which regard – as far as I know – no research has ever sought to explain successful 
amendatory activity by testing a set of alternative hypotheses. 
The literature on post-war Italian politics has emphasized the wide-open amendment process 
for virtually all legislation (Hine 1993; Hine and Finocchi 1991; Manzella 2003; Predieri 1975), 
together with the difficulties of the government in controlling the legislative process (Allum 1973; 
Blondel 1988; Cazzola 1975; Predieri 1963; see also Mezey 1979 and Norton 1994) and the 
strength of Italian parties in it (Di Palma 1978; Furlong 1990). It has been argued that, due to the 
complex array of procedural opportunities at Italian legislators’ disposal, the Italian parliament may 
encourage extensive amendatory activity, to the extent that it seems reasonable to talk of an 
‘amendment culture’ (Cocozza 1989: 242). Indeed, the standing orders of both Italian chambers 
grant all the actors involved substantial amendatory powers. On the one hand, the government and 
the referral committees succeed in getting almost all of their amendments passed. On the other hand, 
the standing rules enable opposition parties to considerably delay legislation and provide individual 
MPs (also from the majority) with significant power to table amendments. As Capano and Vignati 
(2008: 38) recently argue, the Italian legislative process is characterized by a series of potentially 
‘nested amendatory games’, whereby the government’s strategies and tactics overlap and conflict 
with those of opposition parties and those of members or groups within the parliamentary majority. 
In the literature, the largely unrestricted Italian amendment process has been commonly 
considered either as part of the consensual legislative style that according to the prevailing view 
characterizes Italian lawmaking, or as one of the major reasons of the growth of public debt in Italy. 
As for the former interpretation, a long line of scholars have emphasized that longstanding 
rules of procedure provide many groups with vetoes throughout the entire legislative process 
(Allum 1973; Blondel 1988; Cotta 1990; Di Palma 1976, 1978; Furlong 1990; Hine 1993; Hine and 
Finocchi 1991; Manzella 2003; Spotts and Wieser 1986). In particular, although public debate and 
election time are characterized by harsh political confrontation, the actors involved in the 
lawmaking adopt a consensual approach from the introduction of bills, through the amendment 
process, to the final voting. In addition, recent studies on Italian legislative process have shown that 
the consensual style of Italian lawmaking seems to have persisted even after the end of the so called 
First Republic (Capano and Giuliani 2001a,b; 2003a,b). Remarkably, since the 1990s, a number of 
works have highlighted a strengthening in the concrete legislative powers of the Italian executive 
(Capano and Giuliani 2001b, 2003b; Zucchini 2005, 2006). Yet, this happened because Italian 
governments began to adopt circumventing tactics – that is, a variety of techniques to circumvent 
the ordinary legislative process. More precisely, they make increasing use of delegating laws, 
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decree-laws, and maxi amendments. However, this does not imply that the Italian parliament is now 
less able to influence the legislative process through the institutional means traditionally at its 
disposal, most of all its amendatory powers. 
Concerning the latter interpretation, the analyses of Italian legislative outputs have always 
emphasized the huge quantity and the particularistic nature of the legislation produced by the Italian 
parliament (Cantelli, Mortara, and Movia 1974; Di Palma 1978; Bonanni 1983; Motta 1985). It has 
been shown that Italian negative financial outcomes are among the direct consequences of this type 
of legislation – that is, micro-sectional laws serving specific constituencies. More in particular, 
many scholars see the amending power of the parliament as a crucial factor explaining the growth 
of public debt in Italy (Tabellini and Alesina 1990a,b; Alesina and Perotti 1999; Masciandaro 1996). 
In any case, a line of research explicitly studying amendments as a dependent variable is 
lacking in Italy. Existing Italian works focusing on amendments are largely descriptive in nature 
and ambition (see, for example, Di Palma 1978 and Capano and Vignati 2008). So far, no studies 
empirically evaluating a set of alternative explanations of the modifications made to bills are 
available.  
Before reviewing the literature on the topic, let me emphasize that the primary interest of the 
present work is in the transformations undergone by government legislation during the 
parliamentary process. In other words, I try to explain why and to what degree governmental bills 
are altered in the legislative arena. To this purpose, I focus on the amount of observable changes, 
and neither amendatory activity per se nor the approval of amendments are the concern of this work. 
Indeed, as for amendatory activity, the efforts made by parliamentary groups and individual 
legislators in preparing and submitting amendments are only partially related to the modifications 
we observe in the course of the parliamentary process: the changes actually carried out are just a 
part (a small part) of the overall number of amendments presented to governmental bills. A couple 
of considerations may help us understand this. On the one hand, quite trivially, not all the 
amendments which are tabled can succeed in assembling the majority of parliamentary votes 
necessary for their approval. On the other hand, not all amendments are introduced with the aim that 
they will be approved: as commonly acknowledged, a large portion of amendments is presented for 
obstructionist or merely expressive purposes. With regard to obstructionism, time is an extremely 
scarce resource in the parliament, and opposition parties may present a huge number of 
amendments to block government bills or to get some concessions from the majority. In a recent 
contribution on Italian amendatory process, Capano and Vignati (2008: 50-52) show that during the 
1997-2006 period the same parties submitted thousands of amendments when in the opposition, and 
very few while in government. Concerning the expressive function of amendatory activity, Di 
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Palma (1978: 91-93) analyzes Italian legislation from 1948 to 1972 and finds that amendments were 
primarily presented by members of small parties at the most visible stages of the legislative process. 
Similarly, Mattson (1995: 481-482) argues that the members of all West European parliaments 
often table amendments simply as a way to attract media attention and communicate with their own 
electorate – that is, as a means of showing their constituents what they are doing for them4 . 
Importantly, they may be willing to do so even knowing that their real chances of success are scarce. 
Hence, there seems to be a fairly weak relationship – if any – between amendatory activity and the 
changes to government bills which we observe in the course of the legislative process, and the 
reasons that induce political actors to engage in amendatory activity do not appear useful for 
explaining the size of the actual transformations. Indeed, as Di Palma (1978: 93-96) shows, it is 
precisely on the bills that receive the largest number of (presented) amendments that amendments 
are the least likely to be accepted.  
In addition, studying the conditions under which presented amendments are more likely to be 
approved does not help in understanding how much governmental legislation is modified during the 
parliamentary process. In fact, arguing that the amendments proposed to certain types of bills have 
higher success rates does not necessarily imply that those bills are actually more changed: some 
amendments might have high probabilities of being approved because they are minor or even 
irrelevant (see Weingast 1992)5. Instead, certain bills might be substantially altered also when the 
success rates of the amendments presented to them are very low. 
All that said, both amendatory activity and the approval of amendments seem to reflect 
different logics than the subject of the present work, and therefore the factors which may account 
for the presentation of amendments and their success appear unlikely to explain the actual 
transformations experienced in parliament by government legislation. As a consequence, in the 
following pages I will not consider hypotheses explaining why certain types of bills are subjected to 
more (proposed) amendments, or why some parties or individual legislators are more likely to 
submit amendments, or why certain types of amendments have higher probabilities of success.  
In the first part of the present work I will discuss a number of theoretical explanations of the 
changes made to governmental legislation during the parliamentary process. More precisely, in 
Chapter 1 and 2 the accounts which are based upon position taking and conflict will be examined. 
In particular, the second chapter deals with Martin and Vanberg’s (2005) influential hypothesis, 
according to which governmental bills are altered in parliament because coalition members monitor 
                                                 
4
 This is especially true for opposition representatives, who - unlike their colleagues from the majority - cannot show 
their electorates the results achieved and the benefits distributed by the government. 
5
 Providing evidence from the 98th U.S. Congress (1983-1984), Weingast (1992: 156-159) shows that, although 
amendments opposed by the proposers of bills have relatively high success rates, many of these changes are rather 
innocuous. 
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each other’s ministers. In Chapter 3 and 4, then, I will discuss explanations emphasizing lack of 
knowledge and changes in institutional rules, respectively. 
The second part of this thesis (Chapter 5) is devoted to the presentation of my dataset and the 
discussion of how I operationalized the dependent variable – government bill changes, measured as 
the number of changed words – as well as the entire set of the independent variables.  
Finally, in the last part (Chapter 6) I introduce the statistical technique I employed (a Negative 
binomial regression model) and present the result of my analysis of the changes made to 
government bills in Italy during the 1987-2006 period. 
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PART I.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
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As highlighted before, in their standard formulation social choice theoretical models do not allow to 
account for the transformations of government-initiated bills we observe in parliamentary processes. 
Commonly assuming complete and perfect information as well as the absence of position-taking 
incentives, those models predict no modifications to legislation at all. In other words, the 
(governmental) proposer of a bill has all the information concerning the other actors’ preferences 
and the policy implications of her proposal. Also, she knows in advance which policy will be finally 
voted on the floor given the current institutional rules. Since, in addition, her utility derives entirely 
from the final policy outcome, she would rarely introduce to parliament a bill corresponding to her 
own ideal point. Rather, she would propose a bill which represents the best she can achieve under 
the present rules and the distribution of political preferences in the parliament. A simple spatial 
illustration may help understand how standard models work. Figure I.1 shows what happens in the 
standard situation in a unidimensional policy space and under two different types of amending rule 
identified in the literature: the open rule, that permits amendments to bills, and the closed rule, that 
prohibits amendments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I.1 
Changes in government bills assuming complete and perfect information and no position taking 
(by type of rule) 
 
 
Let G be the government’s position, P the point corresponding to the position of the parliamentary 
median voter, and SQ the status quo6. Bold letters indicate the final legislative outcome. It is easy to 
                                                 
6
 For ease of illustration, here I consider a one-dimensional policy space (for the plausibility of this assumption, see 
below, note 69). Moreover, as for now, I identify G with the ideal point of the governmental proposer of bills, without 
distinguishing whether such a position reflects that of the proposing minister or a compromise within the cabinet (see 
below).  
 G 
 P    SQ 
   SQ 
 G  P 
Open rule: 
Closed rule: 
∅ 
∅ 
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see that, if complete and perfect information is assumed and position-taking utility is excluded, 
under either amending rule the model predicts no changes to government bills (∅). Under an open 
rule, the government knows in advance that any legislative proposal would be amended to P in the 
parliamentary arena7. Therefore the government cannot avoid proposing P, which is the best that 
can be obtained given the present rules and preferences. Coinciding with the parliamentary median 
voter, the governmental bill is passed into law without any transformations. Similarly, under a 
closed rule the government knows that any proposal will not be amended on the floor and thus 
introduces a bill corresponding to its own ideal point (G). Since amendments are forbidden, the 
parliament approves the bill in its original formulation8. It is worth noting that, without modifying 
the baseline assumptions, even a change from a restrictive amending rule to a permissive one does 
not result in observable transformations to governmental bills. 
However, as pointed out in the introduction, the explanatory power of these models can be 
improved if we allow position-taking behaviour and/or relax the assumption of complete and 
perfect information. On the one hand, political actors use the legislative process also as a means of 
communicating with their respective voters. Thus, even if they know that their proposals will be 
amended on the floor, cabinet ministers may decide to “take a stand” when introducing legislation. 
In other words, they may propose their own ideal point in order to secure future electoral benefits 
for the party they belong to. On the other hand, cabinet ministers may not know exactly the other 
actors’ preferences, and may be unable to perfectly anticipate the effects of laws. The bills they 
propose are then modified in parliament in order to correct such limited knowledge. In addition, as I 
will show, these two modifications of the standard assumptions produce different effects if 
combined with diferent types of formal rules. 
Let me illustrate what happens when we introduce position-taking incentives in the standard 
model presented above9. Remarkably, as Figure I.2 shows, the government proposes its favourite 
policy (G) under either amending rule: the utility of sending signals to their own particular 
constituencies leads cabinet ministers to propose bills reflecting their sincere preferences even in 
presence of an open rule. Hence, whereas under a closed rule amendments are prohibited, under an 
open rule the parliamentary median voter is free of modifying legislation and indeed will amend 
government bills to its own ideal point (P). This way we can account for the transformations of bills 
we observe in real-world parliaments. In particular, the amount of changes made in the legislative 
                                                 
7
 Of course, for the parliamentary median voter the benefits from the final legislative outcome must outweigh the costs 
of revising the governmental bill. Otherwise, the same possibility of any transformation would not exist. 
8
 This argument works also when SQ is on the right of G. In any case, under an open rule the parliamentary median 
voter (P) has to be closer than the SQ to G. Otherwise, the government would prefer the status quo and therefore would 
not propose any bill in the policy dimension at hand. In addition, under a closed rule for the parliamentary median voter 
the governmental proposal has to be closer than SQ. Otherwise, the status quo would prevail in the final voting. 
9
 What follows is meant to be a simple illustration of the argument, not a formal proof. 
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arena will be equal to │G - P│, that is the distance between the initial bill and the final outcome (in 
this case, the parliamentary median voter)10. In the figure, such modifications are represented by the 
arrow. It is worth noting that the final law can be very different from the bill initially proposed11. 
However, from the governmental proposers’ point of view, since utility does not derive simply from 
actual policy implications but also from the perspective of possible future electoral rewards, 
proposing something they know will be changed is far from being a useless activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I.2 
Changes in government bills assuming position taking utility 
(by type of rule) 
 
 
The results are similar when the assumption of political actors’ complete and perfect 
information is relaxed. Let us consider the case in which governmental actors do not fully anticipate 
the effects of laws when they introduce them. As shown by Figure I.3, also in this case under an 
open rule we are able to explain the occurrence of successful amendments to government bills 
during the legislative process. In particular, governmental proposers do not have a perfect 
knowledge of the actual policy consequences of laws when they draft them. This may happen, for 
example, when the subject dealt with by the law is particularly complex. Under an open rule, the 
government introduces P, which seems the best achievable policy given the present rules and the 
distribution of preferences. However, once such a bill is discussed in the parliamentary arena, the 
                                                 
10
 As I will show, the final point to which governmental bills are amended is not necessarily the parliamentary median 
voter.  
11
 Moreover, in presence of position-taking incentives the position of SQ is less important than in the previous situation. 
In an extreme case, it might also happen that the final law approved in parliament is farther from the proposer than the 
status quo. 
 G 
 P    SQ 
   SQ 
 G  P 
Open rule: 
Closed rule: 
∅ 
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political actors learn aspects of the subject which were previously unknown, and understand which 
are the actual policy implications. In other terms, they may discover that the policy proposed by the 
government is actually located in P(G). Since P(G) does not coincide with the position of the 
parliamentary median voter (P), on the floor it is amended to P. The distance │P(G) - P│ thus 
measures the amount of changes made under an open rule to government bills that reflect limited 
information in the cabinet.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I.3 
Changes in government bills assuming imperfect/incomplete information 
(by type of rule) 
 
 
Note that we have the same results when the government does not completely know the 
distribution of preferences among the actors. If ministers erroneously believe that the parliamentary 
median voter is located in P(G) while it is actually P, they will propose P(G) and on the floor their 
bills will be changed to P12. 
It is easy to notice that position-taking and lack of information arguments are not mutually 
incompatible. Rather, they can reinforce each other as well as combine with changes of formal rules. 
On the basis of the arguments sketched above, it is possible to distinguish between three major sets 
of theoretical explanations of the changes made to governmental bills in the course of the legislative 
process: 
I) Explanations based on position-taking and conflict;   
II) Explanations based on the lack of information;  
III) Explanations based on institutional changes.  
                                                 
12
 In addition, political actors may not know even the exact location of the status quo. 
 G 
 P    SQ Open rule:   P(G) 
 G  P    SQ Closed rule: 
∅ 
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In the next four chapters I review the literature dealing with the parliamentary transformations 
undergone by government legislation. Although in real parliamentary life the three above 
mentioned explanations are unavoidably intertwined, for analytical purposes I discuss them 
separately and I present the testable explanatory hypotheses that can be derived under each of them. 
More precisely, I examine theoretical accounts relying on a position-taking argument in the first and 
second chapters, dedicating the latter to Martin and Vanberg’s (2005) hypothesis, which currently is 
probably the most influential one. According the authors, in parliament the members of multiparty 
coalitions amend government-initiated legislation in order to monitor each other. Then, the third 
and fourth chapters are devoted to explanations based on the lack of knowledge and the changes of 
institutional rules, respectively.  
Remarkably, scholars interested in the topic have placed particular emphasis on the conflict 
between actors – and, in particular, on some peculiar types of conflict – as the key explanatory 
factor. My literature review cannot avoid reflecting this imbalance. 
Let me also point out that in the fourth chapter most of the hypotheses dealing with changes of 
rules are discussed just for purposes of completeness, as my research design does not allow to 
empirically evaluate them. Indeed, the processes through which governmental ordinary legislation 
is approved in Italy takes place under an open amending rule13. Moreover, during the chosen time 
span the institutions regulating the parliamentary process have not undergone substantial reforms 
except when, in October 1996, the Italian Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the reissuance of 
decree-laws. In addition, studying a single country makes it impossible to test the effect of 
alternative institutional arrangements external to the parliamentary process on legislators’ ability to 
amend governmental bills. In this respect, however, in the period under consideration a fundamental 
change occurred in the electoral system, which in 1993 turned from a purely proportional 
representation system into a mixed one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Of course, amendments are not allowed when the government attaches a question of confidence to a bill or to some 
part of it. However, although more frequent than in the past (Zucchini 2005), this practice is far from being the rule in 
the Italian legislative process.  
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CHAPTER 1.  
POSITION TAKING AND CONFLICT AMONG ACTORS 
  
Governmental legislation is first proposed and deliberated in the cabinet, and then introduced, 
discussed and finally approved in parliament. Theoretical explanations emphasizing the conflict 
among the relevant actors maintain that position-taking incentives drive governmental actors to 
present bills which appeal to their own constituencies; these bills are hence turned into laws that are 
acceptable for the legislature after being altered on the floor or in committees. In other words, there 
is dissimilarity between the governmental proposal and the final law, and such dissimilarity 
indicates a conflict between the actors involved in the legislative process. Since we are in the 
presence of a two-stage process whereby the cabinet deliberation is followed by the introduction in 
parliament of government proposals, the possible conflicts that explain amendatory activity reflect 
the possible interactions both within the cabinet and between the cabinet and the parliament. More 
precisely, two factors have a crucial role:  
• the type of decision making inside the cabinet, and  
• the difference in terms of preferences between the cabinet and the parliament14. 
As for the first factor, the literature dealing with coalition governments provides two alternative 
models of decision making inside the cabinet: 1) ministerial discretion and 2) collective cabinet 
responsibility15. According to Laver and Shepsle’s ministerial discretion model, coalition parties are 
granted property rights over specific jurisdictions through the allocation of ministerial portfolios16. 
Thus, we can maintain that each minister drafts the bills falling under her policy jurisdiction 
independently of the other members of the cabinet, and then presents them to the parliament for 
approval (Laver and Shepsle 1994, 1996; Laver 2006; see also Austen-Smith and Banks 1990)17. In 
this case, the place where governing parties actually bargain is not the cabinet, but the legislature. 
By contrast, Tsebelis’ (1995, 2002) veto players framework is the basis of a model of collective 
cabinet responsibility. Since each coalition party’s agreement is necessary for a change of policy, 
the responsibility of government decisions is mostly collective and there is always a deliberation or 
                                                 
14
 At least in principle, a third aspect could be relevant: the type of decision making inside the parliament. However, 
since in the present work I analyze only ordinary legislation, such a factor remains constant across laws. As Rasch 
(1995: 494-495) shows, in Italy and all the other European countries the voting procedure adopted in parliament for 
passing ordinary legislation is the simple majority. 
15
 In Strøm’s (1994) definitions, “ministerial government” and “cabinet government”, respectively. 
16
 In his discussion of alternative explanations for budget policy in Italy and Belgium, Hallerberg (2000: 6-7) defines 
such a model as a ‘fiefdom’ approach. 
17
 This view seems supported by what is reported in a number of studies of cabinet decision-making: in several 
parliamentary countries there is a tacit rule of mutual non-interference within the government, whereby ministers do not 
criticize the proposals drafted by their colleagues (see country chapters in Laver and Shepsle 1994; see also Gallagher, 
Laver, and Mair 2006: 43). The presence of such a rule is explained by the ministers’ lack of time (capacity) and the 
logic of anticipated reciprocity between them.   
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a bargaining process within the cabinet. Accordingly, the modifications to government bills we 
observe in parliament depend on the fact that the decision equilibria reached in the cabinet can be 
different than those that will be reached in the legislature.  
Concerning the distance in terms of preferences between the cabinet and the parliament, two 
situations are possible: the cabinet can be either 1) representative or 2) not representative of 
majoritarion preferences in parliament. In the former case, the preferences that are present at the 
cabinet level represent those of the parliamentary majority. Hence, their aggregation in the cabinet 
should, at least in principle, generate an equilibrium (i.e., a governmental bill) which corresponds to 
the equilibrium in the legislature. In the latter case, we have two possibilities: either the cabinet 
does not control a majority of seats in the parliament; or the cabinet does control a majority of 
parliamentary seats, but for some reasons cabinet decisions do not represent the preferences of the 
parliamentary majority. We may have this last situation when, for instance, due to the particular 
type of aggregation rule employed for cabinet decisions, the equilibrium reached in the cabinet (i.e., 
the governmental proposal) does not correspond to the equilibrium in the parliament. 
Combining the type of cabinet decision making and the difference in terms of preferences 
between the cabinet and the parliament, we can obtain a conceptual map of the conflict-based 
theoretical explanations of the changes made to government bills during the legislative process. Let 
me precise that what is displayed in Figure 1.1 is not to be understood as a rigorous classification, 
but just as a framework where to locate existing and original explanatory hypotheses18.  
In the remainder of the present chapter, I discuss the hypotheses displayed in the figure. In 
particular, in the first section I consider the explanations maintaining that the preferences of the 
parliamentary majority are not represented in the cabinet, and in the second section those assuming 
no difference of preferences between cabinet and parliament. In both cases, I specify which 
hypotheses can be derived under either collective cabinet responsibility or ministerial discretion. 
Finally, the third section is devoted to the discussion of the role of presidents of parliamentary 
chambers. As I will show, presidents’ preferences may affect the amount of modifications made to 
governmental bills under either type of cabinet-parliament interaction and of cabinet decision 
making. As anticipated above, Martin and Vanberg’s (2005) hypothesis, which belongs to the set of 
explanations reviewed in the second section of the present chapter, will be examined in detail in the 
next chapter.  
 
 
                                                 
18
 For ease of illustration, all the explanatory hypotheses related to ideological conflict within the cabinet (H.12) are not 
displayed in Figure 1.1. Such hypotheses, which will be discussed in the second chapter, would obviously be located in 
the same place as H.12. See Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 1.1 
Explanations based upon position taking and conflict among actors: a conceptual map. 
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1.1 WHEN CABINETS DO NOT REPRESENT PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY 
PREFERENCES 
When the preferences in the cabinet do not reflect those of the parliamentary majority and actors are 
driven by position-taking incentives, the legislation approved in the cabinet is unlikely to be 
satisfying for the parliamentary majority. Government bills are thus altered during the legislative 
process until they become acceptable to the parliamentary majority. The preferences in the cabinet 
may not be representative of those of the parliamentary majority in several possible situations. First 
of all, quite trivially, when the government is a minority government. Secondly, when the content of 
government legislation has a distributive nature. Thirdly, when the voting rule in force in the 
cabinet prevents government decisions from being representative of the parliamentary majority 
preferences. Finally, when we introduce Tsebelis’s (1995, 2002) veto players approach and 
acknowledge the importance of the position of the status quo. While the former three circumstances 
are independent of the type of decision making inside the cabinet, the latter one assumes collective 
cabinet responsibility. 
 
1.1.1 Minority governments 
By definition, minority governments control no more than 50 per cent of the seats in parliament19. It 
is trivial, therefore, to state that such governments do not represent the preferences of any 
parliamentary majority. Driven by position-taking incentives, the members of minority governments 
propose bills which – they know – are unsatisfying for the parliament and so will be amended. This 
simple logic works with both types of cabinet decision making: legislation initiated by minority 
governments is modified in parliament whether it reflects just the drafting minister’s ideal point or 
the result of a complex bargaining within the cabinet. It is therefore possible to derive the following 
hypothesis:   
 
H.1 Minority Governments: We expect more changes to government bills during the 
legislative process when the government is a minority government rather than a 
majority one20.  
 
In their influential study of legislative review of government legislation, Martin and Vanberg (2005: 
104-105) suggest that the type of governmental coalition (majority versus minority government) 
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 Governments in parliamentary systems are supported by a parliamentary coalition, which is the set of legislators that 
are expected to support government initiatives. Concerning minority governments, the parliamentary support coalition 
may include the parties that support the government on its formal investiture or in subsequent confidence votes (Laver 
2006: 127-128). 
20
 The ‘all else being equal’ clause is presumed in all the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical chapters of the present 
work. 
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may have some effect on the level of modifications made to bills in parliament. However, the cases 
they choose to analyze do not allow them to investigate the impact of such a factor. Indeed, 
throughout the considered period the two countries they select (Germany 1983-1994 and the 
Netherlands 1982-1994) were characterized by majority government coalitions only (for a 
discussion of Martin and Vanberg’s work, see the second chapter). 
In this respect, the case selection seems to favour the present research. One major advantage 
of examining Italy is that the sample of bills exhibits substantial variation in terms of coalitional 
attributes. Therefore, although my analysis concerns a single country, the chosen time span (1987-
2006) allows to assess the impact of different types of government (minority, minimum winning, 
oversized, technocratic) on the amount of changes undergone by government legislation. 
 
1.1.2 Distributive conflict 
A theoretically crucial explanation I will test relies on a distributive perspective on legislative 
institutions (see, for example, Shepsle 1979a,b; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast, Shepsle and 
Johnsen 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Baron and Ferejohn 1989) and argues that government 
legislation is altered during the parliamentary process because reelection-seeking political actors try 
to secure benefits for their own constituencies. According to a vast literature in formal political 
science studying how different voting procedures in legislatures lead to different outcomes and 
primarily focusing on the U.S. Congress, representatives with geographically based constituencies 
ask for spending programs that benefit their district and are financed nationwide. The modifications 
that are made to bills thus depend on politicians’ will to ensure particular benefits for their 
constituencies and to secure their own reelection.  
Drawing on Lasswell’s (1958) insight that the fundamental question of politics is how the 
gains from a bargaining situation are to be distributed among members who have heterogeneous and 
sometimes conflicting preferences, the distributive perspective on politics is based on the 
obsevation that politicians come to the legislature with a variety of purposes. As the scholars in this 
body of literature have variously assumed, these purposes may derive from the electoral connection, 
from the wish for power, or from the desire to enact policy preferences21. In any case, decision 
making in the legislature is characterized by heterogeneity of tastes: there is not any view on the use 
of legislative authority which is shared by enough legislators to be decisive (see Shepsle and 
Weingast 1995: 10). Remarkably, in the framework of social choice theory, as Arrow’s (1951) 
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 According to Mayhew (1974), reelection concerns are legislators’ fundamental motivation: in order to ensure their 
reelection, representatives engage in credit-claiming, advertizing, and position-taking activities. In Fenno’s view (1973), 
legislators pursue three goals – reelection, power, and good public policy – and the relative importance of these 
different goals may vary during a member’s career (Fenno 1978, 1989).  
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impossibility theorem implies, in a unicameral, majority rule legislature there is no voting 
equlibrium unless some restrictions (‘structure’) are imposed by procedural rules. Since any 
alternative can be put simultaneously and costlessly against any other alternative, the legislature 
would never produce any expenditure policy, but only legislative chaos. As Shepsle (1979a,b) 
demonstrates in his fundamental works, imposing restrictions on the ways in which alternatives are 
posed against each other can generally solve Arrow’s problem and induce stable equilibrium 
choices – that is, predictable legislative outcomes. Thereafter, a wide research program in formal 
political science has studied how different voting procedures produce different legislative outcomes, 
focusing most of the time on the budget in the U.S. Congress. Being conceived of as the result of 
the conflicting interests of actors with geographically based constituencies, policy – and the budget 
in particular – is seen as a distributive problem among districts. Accordingly, two problems are of 
primary concern in this line of research: the determination of the size of the budget and the 
allocation of projects among different districts. 
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) provide a clear example of a study of policymaking in 
the context of distributive policy. In offering a rational political explanation for the approval of 
inefficient distributive policies in the U.S. Congress, they develop a formal model of the public 
choice mechanisms in a cooperative legislature in order to show the political factors that 
systematically bias public decisions away from efficient outcomes. In so doing, they emphasize 
geography as the hallmark of distributive politics and the source of its inefficiency: projects are 
geographically targeted, and geography is the basis for political organization and representation. 
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981: 643) define distributive projects (or pork barrel projects), as 
projects that concentrate benefits in a specific geographic constituency and spread their costs across 
all constituencies through generalized taxation 22 . Although distributive projects are typically 
assembled in a single large bill, namely an omnibus package 23 , each project is fashioned 
independent of the others in the omnibus, since its benefits are concentrated in a geographically 
specific constituency. In other terms, if N is the number of districts and taxes are equally distributed 
among them, the voters of the ith district receive benefits from a certain public project in their 
district, but have to pay just 1/N of the total costs of this project. As a result, since each legislator is 
electorally motivated to serve the economic interests of his own constituency, such that in his 
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 Distributive policies (called by Ferejohn [1974] ‘divisible’ policies) may include public works projects about rivers 
and harbors (Maass 1951; Ferejohn 1974), appropriations (Fenno 1966), urban renewal (Plott 1968), land and resource 
management (Fenno 1973), elements of tax policy (Manley 1970), private member bills (Froman 1967), tariffs 
(Schattschneider 1935), military procurement (Rundquist 1973), categorical grants-in-aid (Mayhew 1974), and even 
some social programs (Stockman 1975). For a discussion of the different types of policies based on on the incidence of 
costs and benefits, see Wilson (1973). See also Lowi (1964). 
23
 Sinclair (1997: 64) defines omnibus legislation as ‘legislation that addresses numerous and not necessarily related 
subjects, issues, and programs, and therefore is usually highly complex and long’. For a recent review of the concept of 
omnibus legislation, see Krutz (2001). 
 23 
political calculus local gains and losses are valued more than nonlocal effects24, the legislature will 
select an omnibus of projects with geographically targeted benefits and diffuse financing costs, each 
of which exceeds the efficient scale (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981: 646-658)25. 
Remarkably, as the authors point out and a vast amount of empirical evidence on the U.S. 
Congress demonstrates, the combination of universalism and reciprocity represent the critical 
features of a voting equilibrium leading to an oversupply of pork barrel projects. On the one hand, 
universalism assures any district a project. On the other hand, according to the practice of 
reciprocity, the representative of the ith district votes in favour of a project for district j, expecting 
the same favour in return from the representative of district j in the next vote (Weingast, Shepsle, 
and Johnsen 1981: 651; see also Weingast 1979; Collie 1988)26. 
The scholarship relying on the distributive approach has typically focused on one legislature: 
the U.S. Congress. However, the idea that amendatory activity depends on politicians’ will to secure 
particular benefits for their constituencies has been applied also to parliamentary countries. Mattson 
(1995), for instance, shares this view in his contribution to Döring’s 1995 volume on parliaments in 
Western Europe. In analyzing private members’ bills and amendments, Mattson (1995: 483) argues 
that in European parliaments these two types of legislative behaviour perform both instrumental and 
expressive functions. As for the former functions, which are more interesting here, private bills and 
amendments are not only employed as a means of affecting legislation, but also as instruments for 
ensuring legislators’ renomination and reelection. In particular, through them individual 
representatives may try to show their constituents that they are promoting the interests of the district. 
Moreover, private members’ bills are often pork barrel projects, containing particular benefits for 
the members’ districts. Private members’ bills are commonly small in scope, brief, uncontroversial 
and have minor financial impact. Being pork barrel projects, they concentrate their benefits in some 
specific geographical districts and disperse their costs across all constituencies through generalized 
taxation. Further, these projects are able to satisfy demands from various small groups and are 
approved through a bipartisan legislative process (Mattson 1995: 482). 
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 More precisely, each legislator is assumed to maximize the district's private benefits, minus its share of the taxes, 
minus the externalities of the project which fall on the district (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981: 652). In the 
authors’ view, representatives are conceived of as reelection oriented, and their reelection chances are positively 
associated with the net benefits they deliver to their constituents. In other words, the authors maintain that voters behave 
in a retrospective manner: their decisions depend on what legislators have done for them. This contrasts with the 
prospective voting model, whereby voters choose on the basis of promises for future policies (see Downs 1957).  
25
 As Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981: 658) point out, a cooperative legislature has no incentive to entirely 
remove the sources of inefficiency. These are the politicization of expenditures, the districting mechanism, and the 
general taxation as financing mechanism. 
26
 Evidence abounds that universalism and reciprocity are the prevailing decision rules in the U.S. Congress. Almost all 
the studies cited in note 20 show it. On their turn, a number of other works have focused on the choice among different 
decision rules, identifying the conditions under which institutional actors prefer universalistic criteria to pure majority 
rule (Fiorina 1978; Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981). 
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To sum up, within the distributive approach bills are conceived of as proposed distributions of 
benefits among districts, and are used to secure politicians’ reelection. For our purposes, we may 
argue that governmental actors propose legislation that delivers particularistic benefits to their 
geographical constituencies or to certain interest groups. Importantly, position-taking incentives 
drive cabinet members to do it even when they know in advance that their bills will be amended in 
parliament. In other words, although they anticipate that the original proposal will be altered in 
order to reach a majority of votes, governmental actors may derive considerable utility from 
showing that they are trying to promote the interests of their district or to satisfy the demands of 
some influential interest groups. This may happen under both types of cabinet decision making.  
If ministers are assumed to prepare legislation independently of each other, they may want to 
present bills which benefit just their own district or certain groups. Of course, these bills are not 
acceptable to any parliamentary majority since they do not represent any majority of constituencies.  
If we suppose that ministers collectively decide upon the content of bills, then government 
legislation represents the entire cabinet, but the benefits it distributes are not always satisfying for 
the parliamentary majority. Indeed, even when the government parties control a majority of 
parliamentary seats, the functional or geographic constituencies represented directly by ministers in 
the cabinet cannot be large enough to enjoy a majority in the parliament27.  
In either case, government bills are modified in the legislative arena because, on their turn, 
reelection-seeking legislators add ‘new constituencies’ such that a parliamentary majority is reached. 
As a consequence, defining distributive bills as programs that concentrate benefits in a well-defined 
special interest and widely distribute costs (Wilson 1973: 333-334), the testable hypothesis which 
can be derived from this body of scholarship is the following:  
 
H.2 Distributive conflict: Bills with a distributive nature should be more extensively 
modified in parliament than other types of bills. 
 
Looking at the literature on postwar Italian politics, it seems reasonable to consider Italy as an 
appropriate setting for the application of the distributive perspective on legislative institutions. 
Indeed, many scholars have emphasized the distributive nature of legislation and have considered 
the amending power of the parliament as a reason of the excess of budget debts.  
As Di Palma (1978: 102) argues, the occurrence of amendments may be viewed as an 
indicator of centrifugal tendencies in the Italian parliament. More recently, Hine (1993: 172-174) 
highlights the importance of Italian politicians’ constituency as well as the distributive nature of 
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 For instance, imagine that in a certain country the parliamentary majority is representative of both the northern and 
the southern regions of that country, while all the ministers in the cabinet come from northern districts. In this case, also 
bills which represent the entire cabinet are not acceptable to the parliamentary majority. 
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Italian legislation. As the author points out, Italian MPs’ local ties strongly condition their 
behaviour: combined with the pressures stemming from electoral competition, they create a 
parliamentary class which promotes locally directed legislation. This is proven by the highly 
disaggregated and distributive nature of Italian legislation: governments tend to accomodate all the 
interests, meeting particularistic demands and distributing something to everybody (see Cantelli, 
Mortara and Movia 1974; Bonanni 1983; Motta 1985). In Hine’s (1993: 171) view, parties in the 
Italian parliament represented overlapping and highly fragmented interests throughout the so called 
First Republic. On the one hand, due to their strong local ties, politicians from the DC and the other 
majority parties used to press sectional demands: benefits for their constituency as well as resources 
for their personal electoral machine and for the organized faction they belonged to. On the other 
hand, also the Communists used to promote sectional demands (that at least in part overlapped with 
those of the governing parties), although not having the same individual entrepreneurialism typical 
of the Christian Democrat group. According to Cotta (1994: 60-64), due to the noticeable degree of 
parliamentary individualism in both chambers, Italian backbenchers have a legislative culture closer 
to that of the U.S. Congress than to that of many European legislatures. As Hine and Finocchi (1991: 
83; 95, n. 4) stress, this is reflected in Italian legislators’ attitudes about the legitimacy of 
questioning, altering, delaying and rejecting government legislation, and in their considerable 
autonomy from party leaders. In the authors’ view, one of the consequences of Italian 
backbenchers’ legislative culture is, as in the U.S., an unhealthily large budget deficit (see also Hine 
1993: 180-182). 
Relying explicitly on the distributive perspective on legislative institutions, large part of the 
studies of Italian budgetary process see the amending power of the parliament as a crucial factor 
explaining the growth of public debt. For example, Masciandaro (1996) employs a theoretical 
scheme of analysis based on Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen’s (1981) model, in which reelection-
seeking politicians try to maximize the benefits for their own constituencies (either geographical 
districts or particular categories or interest groups). In Masciandaro’s (1996: 401-417) analytical 
scheme, as in those inspired by the U.S. Congress, each legislator finds incentives to amend the 
governmental budgetary bill in order to provide his own constituency with benefits, thus increasing 
the overall amount of public exepnditures. The author’s aim is to explain how, during the budgetary 
process, certain institutional aspects of the relationship between government and parliament – 
namely, the type of amending rule employed – affect the amount of public expenditure28 . In 
particular, Masciandaro (1996: 417-419) demonstrates that MPs are more able to affect the amount 
of public expenditures the more powers of amending the governmental budgetary project they have. 
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 The reason why Masciandaro (1996: 399) develops such a model is discussing the possible consequences of a 
proposed reform of the Italian budgetary process implying a closed amendment rule. 
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In so doing, he distinguishes between two ‘budget regimes’: the ‘parliamentary’ type, in which the 
legislature can amend and introduce, with a majority vote, expenditure proposals; and the 
‘governmental’ type, where the legislature can either accept or reject the governmental budgetary 
bill. As Masciandaro (1996: 419) argues, the Italian case approaches the parliamentary regime since 
Italian parliament enjoys considerable proposal powers during the budget session: both chambers 
can modify the budgetary bill presented by the government, and appoint committees specifically 
dedicated to fiscal matters, with proposal and amending powers29. 
Let me precise, however, that the amending power of parliament is not the concern of the 
present work. Indeed, the fact that legislators are more able to amend government bills during the 
budgetary process does not necessarily result in more extensive modifications to those bills. Unlike 
the rest of legislation, the budget must be approved within a limited period of time. Hence the 
government, being aware of the amending powers of the parliament, may attempt to reduce the 
possible obstacles to the approval of the budget by strategically including in the initial bill some 
concessions to certain representatives or parliamentary groups30. In this case, the amount of changes 
we observe between the initial bill and the final law does not indicate the actual extent of the 
conflict between the actors involved. 
 
 
1.1.3 Conflict with parliamentary majority 
As Huber (1992: 682) suggests, we may observe changes to government legislation during the 
parliamentary process simply because the cabinet and the floor have different policy preferences: as 
policy divergence between the cabinet and the floor becomes larger, he argues, the modifications to 
the government’s text of a bill increase. Hence, in testing the hypohesis that restrictive procedures 
                                                 
29
 The thesis of the amending power of the parliament as the main factor of public deficits and debts, which has long 
been an axiom in the literature on Italian fiscal policy, assumes the existence of a relationship between the type of 
electoral system and the size of budget deficits. The conventional wisdom is that PR systems tend to produce larger 
deficits than plurality systems (see, for example, Persson and Svensson 1989; Roubini and Sachs 1989; Grilli, 
Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991; Hahm 1994; Alesina and Perotti 1995; for an alternative perspective, see Hallerberg 
and von Hagen 1997a). In Italy, where the PR produced a multiparty system, the political fragmentation prevented 
governments from controlling the legislative agenda, particularly in fiscal matters. Thanks to the mass of amendments 
submitted during the budgetary process, the Italian parliament was able to considerably influence the budget project 
proposed by the government, thus producing growing deficits and debts. As predicted by Grilli, Masciandaro, and 
Tabellini (1991), a move from PR to a plurality system would have improved the government’s control of the agenda 
and reduced the amending power of the parliament, leading to lower budget deficits. However, interestingly, in a recent 
analysis of Italian financial laws Fedeli and Forte (2007) find that in the 1988-2002 period neither the parliament 
exploited its amending power to increase the budget deficits beyond the planned value, nor the 1994 adoption of a 
quasi-plurality electoral system affected the use of the amending power, since governments proved to be able to control 
the amendments flow under both electoral systems. According to the authors, the structural break of the Italian 
budgetary policy was instead the Maastricht Treaty, whose fiscal rules succeeded in constraining both the government 
and the parliament to a new budgetary discipline. 
30
 In other words, during the budgetary process we may assume that the position-taking incentives for governmental 
actors are somehow compensated for by the need to speed up the approval of the budget. 
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are used by the government to protect its bills from change, Huber assumes that successful 
amendatory activity (measured as the sum of all accepted amendments on a bill) is a proxy for the 
distance between government and floor preferences31. 
Apart from minority governments and distributive legislation, the preferences of the cabinet 
and those of the parliamentary majority may not coincide under other circumstances. For example, 
when the cabinet controls a majority of parliamentary seats, but government decisions are taken 
under a particular type of aggregation rule which produces a cabinet equilibrium different from the 
equilibrium in parliament (i.e., the parliamentary median voter). This may happen when decisions 
within the cabinet are taken by majority rule and each party enjoys equal consideration, no matter 
its size. In a one-dimensional policy space, the median voter in the cabinet can often be different 
from the median voter in the parliament. Government parties know that the difference between 
these two majority equilibria will result in modifications to the initial bill in parliament, however 
they face position-taking incentives and therefore choose to introduce legislation which pleases 
their voters.  
Maintaining that the parliamentary median voter eventually prevails in the legislative arena, 
we can have conflict between governmental proposers and parliamentary majority under both types 
of cabinet decision making. If cabinet decisions are taken according to collective responsibility, 
coalition partners may bargain and finally agree to submit a certain government bill (corresponding, 
for instance, to the cabinet median voter) in order to convey a symbolic ‘compromise’ message to 
the electorate. Yet, as the equilibrium in the parliament is different, that bill will be modified. If, 
instead, we assume ministerial discretion, individual ministers may want to introduce bills in order 
to communicate their own ideal point to their respective constituencies although they know in 
advance that those bills will be amended to the parliamentary median voter. Therefore,  
 
H.3 Conflict with parliamentary majority: I expect more changes to government bills 
as the policy distance between a) the government compromise or b) the proposing 
minister and the parliamentary median voter increases.  
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 As acknowledged by Huber (1992: 684) himself, the use of amendments as a proxy for differences between 
government and floor preferences may raise two objections. First, in case of multidimensional bills a huge amount of 
modifications does not necessarily stems from a wide divergence of preferences between government and floor. Second, 
all else equal, large bills are likely to experience more changes than small bills. As I will show, I control for both factors 
in my empirical analysis. 
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1.1.4 Status quo and veto players approach 
There is another situation in which, in presence of position-taking motivations, the difference 
between cabinet decisions and parliamentary preferences may result in observable modifications to 
governmental bills during the legislative process. It is the case when decision making in the cabinet 
not only conforms to collective responsibility, but the unanimous agreement of all the government 
parties is necessary to change the policies enacted by prior cabinets. In the present paragraph, I 
employ Tsebelis’ (1995, 2002) veto players approach and discuss an original account of the changes 
made to government legislation in the course of the parliamentary process. As I will illustrate, the 
position of the status quo may result to be a key factor for explaining how much governmental bills 
are altered in the legislative arena32. 
Except for the one which is discussed in this paragraph, all the explanations considered in the 
first and second chapters of the present work are based upon some conflict among actors and ignore 
where the status quo is located before the lawmaking process starts in the cabinet. Indeed, if we 
assume that political actors in the cabinet cannot prevent a decision making process whose last 
outcome is for them worse than the status quo (i.e., they lack gatekeeping power), then the position 
of the status quo does not matter at all. However, this assumption may be disputable: fundamental 
contributions in the literature on comparative politics (Tsebelis 2002; Cox 2006) assign to each 
government party the possibility to veto the policy change. A veto players framework allows to take 
this possibility into account, and once such an approach is introduced, the position of the status quo 
becomes a crucial variable.  
Imagine hence that the assent of each coalition party is required for a change in policy 
(Tsebelis 1995, 2002). Suppose that (1) the equilibrium decision at the cabinet level (i.e., the bill 
which is introduced to parliament) corresponds to the policy closest to the cabinet median voter that 
is also unanimously preferred by the government parties to the status quo, and that (2) the final 
outcome in parliament (the approved law) is the policy closest to the parliamentary median voter 
that is also unanimously preferred by the government parties to the status quo. The second 
assumption requires that coalition parties prefer the final policy outcome to the status quo. 
Otherwise, they would not introduce any bill. The first assumption, instead, requires that also the 
cabinet deliberation, which is induced by position-taking utility, is preferred by all the government 
parties to the status quo. In other words, even if coalition partners know in advance which policy 
will be approved on the floor, the need to communicate with the electorate drives them to jointly 
present to parliament a policy which is different from the final law. Under these two assumptions, 
the farther the status quo is from the government, the more government-sponsored bills are 
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 This paragraph owes much to Francesco Zucchini. 
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modified in parliament. A simple graphical illustration in a one-dimensional policy space (Figure 
1.2) can easily show why it happens.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 
Changes in government bills and location of SQ. 
 
 
Imagine a coalition government formed by three parties: L, G and R. G’s ideal point represents 
also the cabinet median voter, while P is the median voter in the parliament. The figure illustrates 
how the location of the status quo affects the amount of transformations experienced in parliament 
by government bills in two different scenarios: in the first one the parliamentary median voter (P) 
overlaps with the leftist coalition party (L), while in the second one it overlaps with the rightist 
coalition party (R). The status quo is located on the left of L33, and its position can be either SQ 
(near the government) or SQ1 (far from the government). LSQ is a policy on the right of L and 
marginally better for L than SQ. Similarly, LSQ1 is on the right of L and marginally better than 
SQ1. 
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In the first scenario, when the status quo is SQ the policy closest to the cabinet median voter 
that is also unanimously preferred by the government parties to the status quo is LSQ. Thus, the 
bill presented in parliament by the government is LSQ. In the legislative arena, since P is the 
policy closest to the parliamentary median voter that is also unanimously preferred by the 
government parties to the status quo, the government bill LSQ is amended to P. The distance | LSQ 
– P | thus represents the amount of changes made in parliament to the initial bill. If the status quo 
moves farther up to SQ1, the cabinet median voter G becomes an acceptable compromise also for 
L. Therefore, since P is still the final outcome in parliament (i.e., the final law approved), the 
governmental bill is altered more than in the previous situation. As we can see looking at the 
arrows in the figure, | G – P | > | LSQ – P |. 
Let us now turn to the second scenario, where the rightist coalition party R is also the 
parliamentary median voter P. Also in this case, the farther the status quo is from the government, 
the more governmental legislation is changed in the parliament. In particular, when the status quo 
is SQ we do not expect any change as LSQ is both the equilibrium decision in the cabinet (i.e., the 
closest policy to the cabinet median voter which is also preferred by all the government parties to 
the status quo) and the final law approved (i.e., the closest policy to parliamentary median voter 
which is also preferred by all the government parties to the status quo). If the status quo moves to 
SQ1, the coalition partners jointly propose the cabinet median voter’s ideal point, since G is 
unanimously preferred to SQ1 by all the government parties. In the legislative arena, such a 
government bill (G) will undergo an amount of changes equal to | G – LSQ1 |. Indeed, the law 
finally approved will be LSQ1, which represents the closest policy to the parliamentary median 
voter that is also preferred by all the government parties to SQ1. Quite trivially, | G – LSQ1 | > ∅. 
All that said, the position of the status quo appears to be a crucial theoretical factor for 
explaining the changes made to government bills. However, from an empirical point of view, it 
seems rather difficult to know exactly where the status quo is located. Nevertheless, if we interpret 
the status quo for the current government in a certain policy area as the decisions taken by the prior 
cabinet in that policy area, it is possible to identify a systematic source of relatively large shifts in 
the position of the status quo in many policy domains: government alternation. Government 
alternation affects the location of the status quo in at least two ways. First, the decisions taken by 
the previous government are likely to be in many policy areas a status quo far from the current 
government if the current government is formed by the previous opposition. Second, also the mere 
perspective of the alternation may have an impact on the location of the status quo. Under the 
expectation of government alternation, the ‘reversion point’ in case of no decision can move 
farther than the present status quo in a certain policy area. In other words, the potential legislative 
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outcome if the current opposition wins the next elections becomes the status quo that the current 
coalition parties take actually into consideration. Such a crucial change in the political calculus of 
goverment parties takes place when the expectations of government alternation are well grounded 
– that is, when government alternation has already become a real and experienced possibility. 
Therefore, since the status quo is more likely to be far from the government in the presence of 
alternation than in the absence of it,  
 
H.4 Alternation: I expect that government bills proposed in an alternational party 
system are more changed than government bills proposed in a pivotal party system.  
 
Although they are rather rare, in principle we might have large shifts in the position of the 
status quo also in a pivotal party system. However, these shifts would not result in observable 
modifications to government bills. As Figure 1.3 shows, in absence of government alternation the 
location of the status quo is by no means influential.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 
Changes in government bills and location of SQ in a pivotal party system. 
 
 
This figure resembles the two scenarios illustrated in Figure 1.2. However, in this case, G and P 
coincide. Indeed, it seems reasonable to suppose that in a pivotal party system the median voter in 
the cabinet is very close to the median voter in the parliament. Since the median voter in the cabinet 
and in the parliament almost overlap, all the bills that are unanimously preferred to the status quo by 
coalition parties are passed into laws without changes34. In more detail, when SQ is the status quo, 
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the government parties agree on proposing LSQ, which is at the same time the policy that all the 
coalition parties prefer to SQ and the closest point to the median voter in both the cabinet and the 
parliament. Such a bill will not be modified in the legislature. The same will happen if the status 
quo moves to SQ1, with the only difference that in this case coalition partners can implement the 
ideal policy of the cabinet median voter. Remarkably, in either case we would not observe changes 
in parliament. The reason is that, if government alternation is neither credible nor possible, the 
location of the status quo does not affect the amount of modifications made to governmental 
legislation.    
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1.2 WHEN CABINETS DO REPRESENT PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY 
PREFERENCES 
How is it possible to account for the changes made to government bills when cabinets are assumed 
to replicate the preferences and the equilibria of the parliamentary majority? When the preferences 
of the cabinet and those of the parliamentary majority coincide, the prime minister and his cabinet 
colleagues are expected to introduce legislation that is absolutely acceptable to the legislature and 
thus will not be modified. However, in presence of position-taking incentives, there may be 
situations in which this does not actually happen. First, assuming that government legislation is the 
outcome of a collective decision within the cabinet, we may imagine that for some reasons coalition 
partners may fail – or deliberately renounce – to reach a true agreement in the pre-parliamentary 
stage. As a consequence, government parties have to bargain on the content of bills in the legislative 
arena. Second, even when coalition partners are able to reach a full agreement on the content of 
bills in the cabinet, in the legislature they may be forced to accept some modifications proposed by 
opposition parties. Third, if we hold that each minister drafts the bills falling under her policy 
jurisdiction independently of the other cabinet members and presents them in parliament for 
approval, such a discretion may generate some kind of conflict among the members of the 
government, a conflict which in turn will result in observable changes to the initial proposals. 
Conflict inside the cabinet may concern the policy jurisdictions of different ministries, the peculiar 
preferences developed by ministers in their respective departments, or the ideological divergence 
among the different parties to which ministers belong. As already mentioned, this last type of 
conflict will be examined in detail in the second chapter. In any case, remarkably, some ministers 
could be less sensitive to position-taking incentives. It is the case of technical ministers, whose bills 
are expected to be acceptable to the parliamentary majority from the very beginning.  
 
1.2.1 Number of coalition parties 
Governmental bills can be altered in the course of the legislative process even when the preferences 
of the government replicate exactly those of the parliament and within the cabinet coalition partners 
collectively decide on the content of legislation. This may happen when, for some reasons, cabinet 
members decide to introduce legislation in parliament although they have not yet reached a full-
fledged agreement on its content. Therefore, they have to find a compromise in the legislative arena, 
where the original bill is modified until it reflects the cabinet equilibrium (which in this case 
corresponds also to the preferences of the parliamentary majority). In other words, the executive-
level process of bargaining “fails” or, at least, is stopped: coalition partners debate in the cabinet, 
but at a certain point they may choose to introduce a bill even in the absence of an actual agreement 
 34 
on its content. They may decide to do it for a number of reasons. For instance, because new issues 
arise and the government is overloaded with work, or because cabinet bargaining is taking too long 
and government members need to show that they are not divided. Also, coalition partners may 
realize that in the cabinet they lack the knowledge required to take decisions on certain subjects, but 
they do not have the time to collect new information. In any case, governing parties may want to 
introduce that bill in order to signal to their respective electorates that they are doing ‘something’. 
Of course, coalition members know that they will have to endeavour to find a compromise in the 
parliament. In this perspective, in the legislative arena it is up to coalition partners – and not to the 
entire parliament – to reach a decision on the content of legislation. In doing so, they may amend 
the originary bill. 
Remarkably, this argument works also if we assume ministerial discretion. By definition, in 
such a situation it is always the case that the legislation introduced by coalition partners does not 
represent a true agreement among them. In other terms, a bill reflecting the drafting minister’s ideal 
point can be employed as a normal starting point for the parliamentary process. 
The process through which coalition partners arrive at an agreement in the parliament after 
renouncing to reach it in the cabinet can be affected by several factors, such as their number and the 
amount of efforts already made at the executive level. The present paragraph concerns the former 
aspect, while the next one deals with the latter. 
In a recent contribution on the duration of lawmaking, Becker and Saalfeld (2004) argue that 
Tsebelis’ (1995, 2002) theory of veto players can provide useful insights into this process. Tsebelis 
(1995: 301) defines a veto player as ‘an individual or collective actor whose agreement (by majority 
rule for collective actors) is required for a change in policy’, and argues that the number of veto 
players, the ideological distance between them, and their internal cohesion affect the ability of a 
political system to change the policy status quo. Veto players can be ‘partisan’ (the parties forming 
a government) or ‘institutional’ (for instance, second chambers or directly elected presidents with 
significant veto power) (Tsebelis 1995: 302). The author’s core prediction is that the policy stability 
of a political system increases with the number of veto players, the ideological distance between 
them, and the internal cohesion of each of them (Tsebelis 1995: 293-301). 
Interestingly, Kreppel (1997) analyzes Italian legislative output during a relatively long period 
of time (1948-1987) within a veto player framework. In her perspective, the size of the government 
coalition (in terms of the number of parties participating in the government) influences both the 
quantity and the type of legislation that governments introduce and get passed by the legislature. 
Importantly, the parties participating in the government are conceived of as veto players in the 
legislative game. In other terms, the government must work as a unified body if it is to be successful, 
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and so each party represents a potential hurdle to the successful proposal and acceptance of a 
governmental bill. Therefore, the inclusion of each additional party increases the difficulties that the 
government will have in successfully proposing and passing legislation. This is especially true if the 
growth in the number of governmental parties also increases the ideological distance between the 
two extremes of the coalition (Kreppel 1997: 336; see also Tsebelis 1995). As expected, Kreppel 
(1997: 340-342) finds that increases in the number of parties participating in the government 
coalition systematically reduce the number of laws presented and laws passed. Moreover, the 
number of veto player has the same negative impact on the number of leggine35. Finally, the number 
of decree-laws is positively related to the number of veto players and inversely related to both laws 
and leggine, showing that decree-laws are used as substitutes for normal legislation36.   
In their contribution, Becker and Saalfeld (2004) draw on Tsebelis’s work, altough their 
interest is not in the changes of the legislative status quo but in the speed of those changes. In 
particular, their dependent variable is the speed of the legislative process, measured as the number 
of days from the introduction to the promulgation of a bill. Becker and Saalfeld (2004: 60) theorize 
the dynamics of the legislative process as a function of the transaction costs of legislation, which, in 
turn, depend on (among other factors) institutional constraints, including the number of veto players 
or the ability to inflict opportunity costs on the parliamentary majority37. Using a sample of bills 
from 17 West European parliamentary democracies in the policy area of working time and working 
conditions, the authors test whether the speed of the legislative process is affected by 1) the number 
of partisan veto players (i.e. the number of parties in the government coalition), 2) the ideological 
range of the government, 3) the number of veto players outside the legislatures, and 4) the presence 
of opportunities enjoyed by parliamentary minorities in the chamber. Interestingly, evidence does 
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 Kreppel (1997: 337-338) interprets leggine as rather substantive (albeit often low cost) pieces of legislation. They are 
approved in committees and encompass a broad range of policies with the key characteristic that they are less 
controversial than bills passed on the floor. This contradicts the conventional wisdom, according to which leggine are 
small, clientelistic, and therefore unimportant, laws (see Della Sala 1993: 102; Furlong 1990: 64; D’Onofrio 1979: 89; 
Di Palma 1978: 110-111). Conceiving of leggine this way, Kreppel (1997: 338) conjectures that leggine, just like laws, 
will react negatively to an increase in the number of parties participating in the government coalition. 
36
 Coalitions with many veto players may find it really difficult to agree on regular legislation, and so they may choose 
decree-laws as temporary solutions to politically divisive problems (Kreppel 1997: 338). Indeed, as Furlong (1990: 65) 
argues, decree-laws are often used to deal with important issues that from a political point of view are potentially too 
damaging or controversial to be introduced as normal legislation.  
37
 Indeed, Becker and Saalfeld (2004: 61) use the term ‘veto player’ in a wider sense than Tsebelis. Concerning 
institutional veto players, also powerful interest groups, independent central banks, the army, constitutional courts, 
constitutionally required super majorities and referendums may be included (see Schmidt 1997: 227). As for partisan 
veto players, since parliamentary minority groups are somehow able to prevent majorities from monopolizing the 
legislative agenda, they may have a de facto veto power (see Scharpf 1997: 116-150), and thus may be counted as veto 
players. However, in the hypotheses I am interested in – namely, the first two – Becker and Saalfeld use the concept in 
the same way Tsebelis uses it. 
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not support the first three hypotheses, thus not providing support for the veto players’ framework as 
an explanation for the length of the legislative process (Becker and Saalfeld 2004: 71-88)38.  
Following Becker and Saalfeld’s (2004) logic, which they apply to the length of the 
parliamentary process, it seems possible to derive hypotheses also concerning the amount of 
changes made to legislation during that process. Reasonably, there could be a positive relationship 
between how long bills are discussed and how much they are modified in parliament. We may 
therefore argue that, once a bill is submitted to the floor, if the parties forming the government 
coalition are many or have very different policy preferences, they are likely to debate a lot before 
reaching an agreement on the content of that bill. Hence, they are more likely to propose 
amendments and to successfully modify the originary bill. However, in the formulation of my 
hypothesis I will not employ the term ‘veto player’. Tsebelis uses the concept of veto players for 
deriving predictions on policy stability across different types of political systems (Tsebelis 1995: 
315), and not on features of legislative process such as the amount of modifications or the length of 
the process. In any case, the hypothesis I derive from Becker and Saalfeld’s (2004) work is the 
following: 
 
H.5 Number of coalition parties and government range: We can expect more 
modifications to government legislation the higher the number of parties in the 
government coalition and the wider the ideological distance between them.  
 
1.2.2 Length of cabinet debate 
When coalition partners fail to agree in cabinet meetings or deliberately choose to use the 
parliament as the place where to actually discuss the content of governmental bills, the difficulties 
of reaching compromises in the legislative arena may depend also on the amount of efforts already 
made at the cabinet level. In particular, it seems reasonable to assume that, in the cabinet, the more 
coalition members strain to arrive at an agreement, the longer they discuss; and that the bigger the 
efforts put in the debate in the pre-parliamentary stage, the less are the difficulties of reaching a 
compromise in the legislative arena. On their turn, less difficulties mean less need of modifying the 
original bill introduced in the parliament. Putting it differently, longer bargaining among coalition 
partners in the cabinet makes changes to governmental bills less likely in the legislature39. As a 
consequence,     
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 As for the fourth hypothesis, the one which is confirmed by the data, Becker and Saalfeld (2004: 82-88) find that the 
speed of the legislative process is reduced by parliament’s authority to determine floor agenda independently of the 
government, and increased by committee’s authority to determine its own agenda independent of government. 
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 It is worth noting that, unlike the hypothesis based on the number of governing parties, the argument concerning the 
length of debate in the cabinet works only if we assume collective responsibility in the government. The logic of the 
former hypothesis holds even if bills are not discussed at all in the cabinet – that is, in the extreme case when there is 
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H.6 Length of cabinet debate: I expect more modifications to government legislation 
the shorter the length of debate in the cabinet. 
 
Remarkably, this argument might be linked to those explanations of parliamentary scrutiny 
which rely on ideological conflict between cabinet parties (see chapter 2). In investigating the 
timing of bill introduction by the cabinet, Martin (2004: 455-456) shows that ideological divergence 
among governing parties induces delay in the introduction of legislation to the parliament. 
 
1.2.3 Conflict with opposition parties 
When in the cabinet coalition partners have the time to reach full agreements on the content of 
legislation and executive policy outcomes reflect the preferences of the parliamentary majority, 
government bills may be altered in the legislature because opposition parties manage to modify 
them. 
Heller (2001: 786) defines opposition amendments as alternative proposals through which the 
opposition wants to involve part of the majority into a new enacting coalition40. As suggested by a 
number of important comparative works, opposition parties are able to influence policymaking in 
parliamentary systems (see, for example, Döring 1995a; Powell 2000; Strøm 1990a). In particular, 
since time is one of the scarcest resources in the legislative arena (Döring 1995c; Cox 2006), 
opposition parties are not necessarily ineffective in the course of parliamentary process. In this 
regard, several scholars have emphasized how legislative institutions strengthen the influence of 
opposition parties (Döring 1995a; Müller and Strøm 2000; Powell 2000: 32; Saalfeld 1990, 2000: 
365; Strøm 1990a: 70-72; see also Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2006: 66). According to Strøm 
(1990a: 71), for example, the opposition enjoys greater potential influence over policymaking when 
the number of standing committees is large, the areas of committee specialization are fixed, 
committee jurisdictions closely correspond to ministerial jurisdictions, there are restrictions on the 
number of committee assignments per legislator, and committee chairs are proportionally 
distributed among parliamentary parties. 
Opposition parties may play an important role in modifying government legislation under both 
collective responsibility and ministerial discretion within the cabinet. In the former case, after 
discussing and arriving at collective policy decisions inside the cabinet, coalition partners may 
decide to introduce bills that, they know in advance, will be amended in parliament also by 
                                                                                                                                                                  
ministerial discretion. The latter, instead, requires that government parties spend at least some time debating in the 
cabinet. 
40
 In his analysis of governments’ authority to make last-offer amendments in West European countries, Heller (2001: 
786) distinguishes between friendly, credit-claiming, and opposition amendments.  
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opposition parties. This may happen because parties in the opposition could exchange the 
possibility to delay the final approval of a governmental bill for the introduction of some 
modifications that bring some benefits or alleviate some costs for their own electoral constituencies. 
Reasonably, opposition parties will be more inclined to use dilatory tactics the more they perceive 
government legislation as detrimental to the interests they represent. Government parties, in turn, 
derive a (position-taking) utility from presenting a bill which, although bound to be altered, 
symbollically represents the will of the coalition. 
In the latter situation, it is the bills autonomously drafted by cabinet ministers that induce 
opposition parties to threaten to slow down the legislative process. Although anticipating that her 
proposals will be amended in parliament, the responsible minister introduces legislation that pleases 
her constituency. In this case, changes to government-sponsored bills occur because on the issue at 
hand the minister’s party holds an extreme position with respect to the parties sitting in the 
opposition.  
Based on the previous arguments, I can formulate the following conjecture: 
 
H.7 Conflict with opposition: I expect more changes of government bills as the policy 
distance between a) the government compromise or b) the proposing minister and the 
opposition parties increases. 
 
This hypothesis is consistent with a common view of Italian parliament, whereby a strong and 
decentralized committee structure enables the opposition to exercise substantial policy influence 
(Strøm 1990: 152-154). As Di Palma (1978: 95) points out, it is in the committees that the Italian 
opposition has the best opportunity to influence legislation: in committees, opposition parties often 
succeed in amending even governmental bills 41 . Moreover, as shown by Cox, Heller and 
McCubbins (2005: 30) in their analysis of roll rates, Italian parliament stands out from other 
legislatures in that it gives opposition parties much more power to delay or block statutes. This is 
especially true for non-extreme opposition parties, whose average roll rates are lower than those of 
extreme ones, and for ordinary legislation, on which opposition parties are rolled less often than on 
decree conversion and budget bills42. 
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 Di Palma especially refers to the PCI (the Communists), which has been the main opposition party throughout the 
Italian First Republic. 
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 Cox, Heller, and McCubbins (2005: 47, n. 24) define roll rates as the total number of times a party is rolled divided 
by the total number of final passage votes for a party. In particular, a roll is when a party allows another party to put a 
bill on the agenda, which then passes although the former party votes against it. Cox, Heller, and McCubbins (2005) 
analyze roll rates in the Italian Chamber of Deputies from 1988 to 2000 and find strong evidence that governing 
coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers – that is, they block bills that would roll them. 
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The influence that Italian opposition parties seem to exert on lawmaking is highlighted also by 
Capano and Vignati (2008), who analyze amendatory activity in Italy during the ‘bipolarization 
decade’ (1997-2006) from a descriptive point of view 43. The fundamental theoretical assumption 
underlying Capano and Vignati’s work is that of the institutional dis-alignment of parliament, 
according to which parliament is much more than an arena where different actors (governments, 
parliamentary groups, individual MPs) further their own interests. Indeed, in line with historical 
institutionalism, parliament is conceived of as ‘an institution with its own logic, organizational 
culture and rules’ (Capano and Vignati 2008: 36). As Capano and Giuliani (2001a) demonstrate in 
their volume on the Italian legislative process, history shows that the Italian parliament is an 
autonomous institutionalized arena: it does not simply reflect the logic of governments but seeks to 
perpetuate the objectives and purposes it has inherited from the past44. Following this logic, Capano 
and Vignati (2008: 36-39) see the amendatory process as the occasion in which the boundaries 
separating the parliamentary majority and the opposition may blur, and government is forced to 
bargain with parliament, negotiating with both majority and opposition parties. In other words, due 
to the powerful institutional tools at the disposal of Italian parliament (substantial powers to delay 
lawmaking as well as opportunities to amend bills), governments need to renegotiate the content of 
their own bills in the parliament if they want to protect them and get them through45. 
  
1.2.4 Conflict of responsibility between ministers 
Let us now leave aside the conflict with opposition parties and assume that the cabinet reproduces 
the preferences and the equilibria of the parliamentary majority. Then, the only possible conflicts 
which may result in observable changes to governmental bills during the legislative process are 
those among cabinet members, and take place just if decision making in the government conforms 
to ministerial discretion. Focusing on the patterns of interaction among ministers, it is possible to 
identify a first type of conflict which may explain the amount of modifications made to government 
legislation in the course of the parliamentary process: the conflict over which minister has the 
responsibility in a certain policy area. More precisely, if minister A introduces a bill dealing with 
issues on which also other ministers may draft legislation, minister B could perceive interference. 
Believing that those issues fall under her own jurisdiction, minister B may thus want to correct the 
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 Capano and Vignati (2008) consider all the bills approved in the Italian Chamber of Deputies during the 13th (1996-
2001) and 14th (2001-2006) legislatures (except for 1996 and part of 1997), and collect information on all the 
amendments voted on. Laws ratifying international treaties are not included in the dataset, which consists of around 
42,000 voted amendments. 
44
 See also Capano and Giuliani (2001b: 27-28). For a different perspective, see Hine (1993: 194), who interprets Italian 
parliament as an arena. 
45
 A second solution for Italian governments is to force the hand of parliament and of the parliamentary majority 
through a vote of confidence and/or instruments such as maxi-amendments. As Zucchini (2006) and Vassallo (2007) 
point out, this option was deliberately strengthened during the 13th and 14th legislatures.  
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initial bill. In order to do so, she may rely on her followers in the assembly and in committees, who 
will therefore amend the bill submitted by minister A. The drafting minister can be perfectly aware 
that she is proposing legislation in a rather disputed policy domain, and that some other ministers 
could react. However, she may want to communicate with her own constituency, signalling that she 
is promoting her voters’ interests in that particular policy area. Therefore, she introduces that bill all 
the same. On the basis of this argument, I can derive the following hypothesis: 
 
H.8 Conflict over ministerial responsibility: Since there are issues on which different 
ministries may draft legislation, on those issues I expect to observe more conflict over 
jurisdictions and so more changes to governmental bills. 
 
1.2.5 Departmental capture 
Still looking at the interactions among cabinet members, let us now turn to the conflict that may 
arise when ministers develop some peculiar type of preferences in their respective departments. 
According to Andeweg (2000: 389-391), who frames in agency-theoretic terms the relationship 
between the cabinet as a whole and individual ministers, the most probable source of agency 
problems in this stage of the parliamentary chain of delegation is ‘departmental capture’ – that is, 
ministers’ identification with the interests of the departments they head. Since, as the author argues, 
the government (principal), which delegates to heads of departments (agents), also consists of heads 
of departments (i.e., the principal is made up of its own agents), each minister is almost free to 
follow her own preferences. Drawing on the literature on coalition governments, Andeweg 
identifies two drives that may motivate cabinet ministers as well as politicians in general: 
continuation in office or promotion to higher office (office-seeking), and policy achievements 
(policy-seeking)46. Whereas delegation to office-seeking ministers is not particularly problematic in 
that the policies they make will simply reflect the preferences of those who decide on their further 
career (very often their principal), delegation to policy-seeking ministers may present dramatic 
agency loss: ministers may use their considerable discretion to pursue their policy goals regardless 
of their principal’s preferences. Remarkably, as Andeweg points out, one of the typical solutions 
provided by rational choice neo-institutionalism – ex ante screening of potential ministers – cannot 
mitigate this kind of agency loss. The reason is that such a mechanism assumes that policy 
preferences are stable and exogenous to institutions: within the rational choice approach, ministers’ 
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 For the distinction between office-seeking and policy-seeking motives in the literature on governmental coalitions, 
see Budge and Laver (1986), and Strøm and Müller (1999b). Office-seeking political actors – parties, in particular –
value offices intrinsically and simply seek to increase control of governmental office rewards. Instead, if policy is 
pursued, offices are valued instrumentally, as a means of influencing policy, and actors are not willing to sacrifice 
policy objectives for office rewards. 
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preferences are exogenously given, do not change after appointment to a ministry, and hence can be 
predicted on the basis of past track records in other offices and circumstances. Andeweg rejects this 
assumption and embraces the historical neo-institutionalist insight whereby political institutions do 
not only represent constraints on the possibilities for pursuing (exogenous) preferences, but may 
also mould those preferences. Indeed, institutions provide a set of expectations about the 
appropriate behaviour of an incumbent of a position – that is, a role (March and Olsen 1989: 6, 23). 
Following this logic, a minister heading a certain department may internalize these expectations, 
developing preferences that may differ from those she held before being appointed. The result, 
which Andeweg claims to be very common in parliamentary systems, is departmental or 
bureaucratic government, with ministers being ‘captured’ or ‘going native’47. 
However, being captured does not necessarily mean being less susceptible to position taking 
incentives. When a minister increasingly identifies with the interests of the department she heads, 
she may become more and more sensitive to the demands of the specific pressure groups and 
external organizations which are active in the policy area at issue. It seems thus reasonable to 
suppose that the stronger a minister identifies with the interests of her own department, the more 
she will propose policies that favour her department, but that can be detrimental to the interests of 
other members of the government. Coalition partners, on their turn, may want to monitor what 
captured ministers do by modifying in parliament the bills submitted by those ministers. In other 
terms,  
 
H.9 Departmental capture: The more ministers are captured, the more we should 
expect modifications to their bills. 
 
In the Italian case, as Hine and Finocchi (1991: 86) argue, the inhibitions against departmental 
capture were weak for the ministers belonging to the DC. The reason is that, due to the factionalized 
nature of that party, Christian Democrat ministers were more loyal to their own particular faction 
than to the party or to the prime minister48.   
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 Alternatively, one may think about leisure-shirking motivations: ministers (agents) attempt to secure leisure time for 
themselves, and therefore do not do their best for the party or the coalition they belong to (their principal). Confronting 
bureaucrats who typically dislike policy changes, a certain minister may opt to adhere to the knowledge and common 
practices in use in her department instead of making every effort to achieve the policy objectives of her party or her 
coalition (see Müller 2000: 320-321).   
48
 In their analysis of the factors constraining Italian prime ministers, Hine and Finocchi (1991) distinguish between the 
constraints deriving from the institutional context (such as the Constitution, the principle of dispersion of power across 
institutions, the centrality of parliament, the legislative culture, etc.) and the more fundamental ones arising from the 
nature of parties and the party system. In the second set, the peculiar, highly factionalized nature of the DC is 
considered by the authors as the most serious limit on prime ministerial autonomy (Hine and Finocchi 1991: 85).   
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1.2.6 Technical ministers 
As stressed at the beginning of the present chapter, theoretical explanations focusing on the conflict 
among actors rest on a position-taking argument. Since initiating legislation serves also the purpose 
of communicating with the electorate, cabinet ministers can propose bills corresponding to the 
preferences of their respective constituencies even when they know in advance that those bills will 
be modified in parliament. In other words, each minister derives considerable utility from the 
simple fact of introducing a bill representing her voters’ ideal point. However, there might be 
ministers who are less sensitive to position-taking incentives. 
It is the case of technical ministers, who are non-partisan ministers appointed for their 
technical competence in a particular policy domain. Unlike their much more common partisan 
colleagues, who become ministers for the purpose of (at least) representing in the cabinet the 
coalition party they belong to, technical ministers are assigned portfolios because of their expertise. 
Neither technical ministers represent a certain political party or constituency, nor they seek to be re-
elected. Therefore, they do not need to send signals to their own voters. While each partisan 
minister continuously tries to communicate with her electorate, and hence takes stands in order to 
show publicly that she is doing something (and in particular, that she is doing exactly what her 
voters want), technical ministers are experts whose aim is to actually reach policy goals. As a 
consequence, when they initiate legislation, technical ministers are likely to propose the technically 
feasible policy which is the closest to the coalition agreed-on compromise. Coalition parties are thus 
unlikely to modify such a ‘technical’ proposal, even under ministerial discretion. Therefore, since 
for technical ministers position-taking utility is lower than for other ministers, 
 
H.10 Technical ministers: Government bills proposed by technical ministers should be 
less extensively changed in parliament than bills sponsored by partisan ministers.  
 
Beside the fact that technical ministers are more pragmatic due to the relatively small utility 
they derive from position-taking, another reason might help to explain why legislation drafted by 
technical ministers should be less amended than that presented by their partisan colleagues. 
Generally speaking, when ministers present legislation they may exploit feasibility constraints in 
defense of their preferred policies. Typically, ministers claim that they did all that could be done – 
that is, their bill represents the closest policy to the coalition compromise given the current situation. 
In multiparty governments, the other coalition parties commonly want to discover whether 
proposing ministers are honest (Martin and Vanberg 2004: 16). In order to do so, they may engage 
in amendatory activity as well as employ other control mechanisms (see chapter 2). However, 
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technicians’ publicly-acknowledged expertise makes technical ministers’ commitments and 
justifications fairly credible: if it is an expert who claims that her bill represents the best feasible 
solution, then this claim appears more credible to coalition partners. 
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1.3 PRESIDENTS OF PARLIAMENT 
Before concentrating on Martin and Vanberg’s (2005) hypothesis, whereby the changes made to 
government bills stem from ideological conflict within the cabinet, it is worth spending some words 
on presidents of parliament. Since the literature on parliamentary systems emphasizes the important 
role that presidents of the chambers play in the lamaking process, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that their ideological preferences and the position-taking incentives they face may influence their 
attitude towards the cabinet, thus making modifications to governmental bills more or less likely to 
occur. In the present section, I review some important contributions on presidents of parliament 
(both in a comparative perspective and in the Italian case), from which I infer that in Italy the heads 
of the chambers could actually affect the amount of transformations undergone by government-
initiated bills. Then, I formulate a testable hypothesis on the role of presidents of the chambers. 
As Jenny and Müller (1995) emphasize in the first comparative study of presiding officers of 
legislatures in Western Europe, presidents of parliament influence legislative processes mainly 
through their control over the parliamentary agenda: they are typically in charge of scheduling bills 
for deliberation and arranging the parliamentary calendar. In addition, parliamentary presidents may 
carry out several other important functions: assigning bills to committees, shifting bills between 
committees, stopping comittees work on bills, administering the parliamentary staff, choosing rules 
for floor debate and voting procedures (Jenny and Müller 1995: 331-335).  
The authors analyze 18 West European legislatures and the European Parliament in the 1970-
1994 period, and evaluate the role of presidents of parliament in the parliamentary decision making 
on the basis of two dimensions: power and partisanship 49 . On the one hand, parliamentary 
presidency can be more or less powerful concerning the prerogatives mentioned above. On the other 
hand, presidents may exercise their powers either in a partisan or in a neutral fashion. By combining 
these two dimensions, Jenny and Müller (1995: 358-359) obtain a map on which they locate all the 
countries under investigation50. Presidents of most West European parliaments are rather weak, 
being classified either as ‘neutral chairmen’ or as ‘minor party positions’. In the neutral chairman 
type (weak powers – neutral), which is best approached by the Speaker of the House of Commons 
in the U.K., the behaviour of the president of parliament does not raise any controversy among 
parties. Traditionally, the president neither votes in the chamber he heads (even when he formally 
has the right to do it), nor participates in legislative activities other than those strictly referable to its 
office. In the minor party position (weak powers – partisan), which is found for example in Portugal 
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 In countries with bicameral legislatures, they choose either the head of the whole parliament (where such a position 
exists), or the head of the politically dominant chamber (which is normally the lower house).   
50
 The powers of parliamentary presidents are measured through an index which takes into account both their 
institutional rights and their accountability to parliament As for partisanship, the authors build an index almost based on 
the amount of support for the presidents as expressed in their election (Jenny and Müller 1995: 336, 341, 350). 
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and France, the incumbent acts as a partisan, but this does not have relevant consequences since the 
parliamentary presidency provides weak powers. Few countries have relatively strong presidents of 
parliament. The ‘speaker of the house’ type (strong powers – neutral) is inspired by the principle of 
the separation of powers, whereby the speaker represents the parliament as a whole vis-à-vis the 
public and the executive. Only Austria falls into this type, but as a borderline case. Indeed, this type 
might be found in the pre-party government era. Finally, in the ‘party asset’ type (strong powers – 
partisan), the parliamentary presidency is an instrument of party politics. The legislative majority 
elects the president in order to exploit for its own political purposes the powers associated with the 
presidential office. The president usually participates in parliamentary votes and engages in other 
partisan activities. Since he pursues the goals of the party he belongs to, his decisions are likely to 
cause controversy. Together with Greece, Italy falls into this type (although as a borderline case, 
close to the minor party position type).  
Interestingly, the classification of Italy in the party asset type contrasts with the image of 
Italian presidents of the chambers depicted by Di Palma in the 1970s. In his discussion of 
committees and parliamentary procedures in Italy, Di Palma (1978) describes Italian presidents of 
the chambers as officers with rather strong powers who behave in a non-partisan manner 51 . 
According to the author, the presidents of both the Chamber and the Senate are provided with 
considerable prerogatives and play a key role in the lawmaking process: they arrange the 
parliamentary calendar, are in charge of interpreting the standing orders and, most of all, choose 
what type of parliamentary procedure to adopt. Concerning the last aspect, it is the president of each 
house who, in assigning legislative proposals to a certain committee, decides at his complete 
discretion whether the committee shall be empowered to pass them into law (decentralized 
procedure), or shall report them to the floor for examination (ordinary procedure) (Di Palma 1978: 
275). As Di Palma (1978: 77) points out, the presidents may decide to assign a project to the 
decentralized procedure (which is shorter and presents higher rates of success) in order to facilitate 
its approval. Therefore, if the government wants its proposals to be quickly enacted, the best it can 
do is to exercise its influence over the presidents of the houses and the chairs of the committees (Di 
Palma 1978: 72). However, as the author argues, the presidents of the Italian chambers do not 
exploit their powers for the political purposes of the party (or coalition) they belong to. On the 
contrary, they tend to act as neutral officers. Indeed, since they cannot effectively exercise their 
prerogatives without the consent (or, at least, the tolerance) of the majority of the parliamentary 
groups, in order to maintain a broad support in the parliament the heads of the Italian chambers 
need to behave in a prudent and impartial manner (Di Palma 1978: 275-277). 
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 However, it must be taken into consideration the fact that Di Palma (1978) and Jenny and Müller (1995) study the 
Italian case in two different, only minimally overlapping, time periods: respectively, 1948-1972 and 1970-1994.  
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By contrast, more recent contributions on Italian lawmaking seem to take into consideration 
the ideological preferences of parliamentary presidents, thus treating them as partisan actors. For 
instance, Zucchini (2005) suggests that Italian governments have taken advantage of their political 
affinity with the presidents of the chambers in order to enhance their effectiveness in the 
parliamentary process. The author analyzes the evolution of the legislative agenda setting power in 
Italy, aiming to assess whether an increase of the executive’s control of the agenda has taken place 
in the years of the Second Republic. As Zucchini (2005: 8-9) shows, since the beginning of the 
1990s Italian governments have actually strengthened their role in the lawmaking process vis-à-vis 
the parliament, although they managed to do it through rather ‘unusual’ methods. First of all, as 
pointed out also by many other scholars, Italian governments have increasingly made use of the 
procedure of delegating laws (Vassallo 2001; Lupo 1998; Gianniti and Lupo 2004; see also Capano 
and Giuliani 2001b, 2003b; Zucchini 2006)52 . Rarely employed during the First Republic (De 
Micheli and Verzichelli 2003), delegating laws give the executive the last word in the lawmaking 
process53. Moreover, together with delegating laws, Italian governments have increasingly resorted 
to other instruments for ‘circumventing’ the ordinary legislative process: decree-laws (Cox, Heller, 
and McCubbins 2005: 7-10) and maxi amendments (Zucchini 2005: 16-18)54. By contrast, the 
several reforms of the standing orders enacted in both Italian chambers (in 1971, 1981, 1990, and 
1998) have only marginally contributed to enhance the executive’s position. Instead, they 
strengthened the internal bodies of the parliament, most of all the presidents of the chambers. It is in 
such a situation that the political affinity between the government and the heads of the houses has 
turned out to have some importance.  
In particular, according to Zucchini (2005) Italian governments may try to exploit the powers 
of well-disposed presidents of the chambers in three crucial domains of the legislative life: the 
parliamentary business planning and time constraints, the budgetary process, the amendment and 
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 According to Zucchini (2005: 23-29), two factors explain why in the 1990s the Italian executive has managed to 
strengthen its control over the parliamentary agenda, which has corresponded to the increasing use of delegating laws: 
the economic and financial emergency of those years and the real possibility of government alternation in Italy. Both 
circumstances made the staus quo in many issues bad enough to induce the governing coalition to bear the transaction 
costs inherent in lawmaking and to delegate to the executive.  
53
 The advatage for governments is the following: if the parliament enacts a delegating law containing delegations that 
are too far from the executive’s ideal point, the executive can refuse to promulgate legislative decrees, thus preserving 
the status quo. Reasonably, since lawmaking is costly, legislators may anticipate the executive’s behaviour by taking its 
preferences into account when they (re)define the content of the delegating bill. In addition, since 1992, the delegations 
included in most of the delegating laws enable governments to integrate and correct legislative decrees that have been 
already promulgated on the basis of the same delegating law (Zucchini 2005: 8-9). 
54
 As Cox, Heller, and McCubbins (2005: 29-30) point out in their analysis of agenda power in the Italian lower 
chamber from 1988 to 2000, in some countries governments enjoy special parliamentary rights that enable them to get 
their legislation passed rather easily. Such peculiar prerogatives include special confidence powers as in France (Huber 
1996a), urgency motions as in Brazil (Amorim Neto, Cox, and McCubbins 2003), the guillotine as in the U.K. (Dion 
1997), and the authority to make last-offer amendments as in a number of European countries (Heller 2001). In other 
countries, as in Italy, the executive does not have similar powers, and therefore needs to resort to circumvention tactics 
in order to push its bills through the legislature.  
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voting rules. Concerning the last aspect, which is the most relevant for the purposes of the present 
work, the author stresses the crucial role of Italian parliamentary presidents both in the control over 
the end of the amendment sequence and in the choice of the order of voting.  
More precisely, as Zucchini (2005: 13-14) points out, in the Senate it is the president who 
decides the end of the amendment sequence, while the government has the same rights as the 
committe. Firstly, individual senators’ amendments are allowed only before the debate. During the 
debate, new amendments are allowed only if introduced by groups of eight senators and referring to 
amendments that have already been tabled or accepted. However, the president can discretionally 
decide to allow new amendments during the debate even when they do not refer to any previous 
amendment (art. 100 R.S., comma 5). Secondly, although the government and the committee can 
submit amendments without the previous restrictions, the president can choose to delay the debate 
in order to give senators the possibility to introduce new pertinent amendments (art. 100 R.S., 
comma 6). 
In the Chamber of Deputies, where some of the filtering functions that in the Senate are 
accomplished by the president are carried out by the committee or a sub-unity of it (‘Comitato dei 
9’), the president is just slightly weaker (Zucchini 2005: 14-15). As in the Senate, when 
amendments and sub-amendments are allowed at the last moment, the president of the Chamber can 
discretionally decide the time limit for tabling them (art. 86 R.C., comma 5). Remarkably, in both 
branches of the Italian parliament, the control over the end of the amendment sequence plays a very 
important role if combined with the question of confidence (Zucchini 2005: 14). Moreover, the 
president of the Chamber has considerable powers against obstructionsim. First, he can reject the 
so-called ‘serial’ amendments: if the same text is subjected to a series of amendments differing 
from one another only with respect to increments in figures or data, the president puts to the vote 
the amendment that is the farthest from the original text, together with a limited number of 
intermediate amendments, thereby declaring the others to be subsumed (art. 85 R.C., comma 8). 
Second, the president can deal with obstructionist amendments by means of a ‘vote by principles’. 
According to this practice, the assembly is called upon to vote on the common normative content of 
a number of amendments, all of which are rejected if the vote is negative (Manzella 2003: 335). 
Another crucial prerogative in the hands of the presidents of both Italian chambers is the 
power to change the order of voting, which they can exert for reasons of efficiency or clarity of 
votes (art. 85 R.C., comma 8; art. 102 R.S., comma 4). 
Remarkably, the influence that the presidents of both Italian chambers exert on the 
amendatory procedure, and in particular their crucial role in controlling the end of the amendment 
sequence, runs counter to Heller’s (2001) argument that Italian governments enjoy the so-called 
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power of the final amendment offer. In discussing the puzzle of why multiparty governments are 
able to make joint policy, Heller (2001: 781-783) indicates as a solution the governments’ ability to 
offer amendments toward the end of the process. Since coalition members may submit amendments 
to government bills in order to move policy in directions they favour but that can be detrimental to 
the interests of their partners, coalition cohesion stems from the responsible minister’s ability to 
make ‘last-offer’ amendments before the final vote, thereby restoring the initial policy55. According 
to Heller (2001: 783-785), Italy is among the West European countries where such an argument 
finds empirical support (see also Heller 2000). However, as shown by Zucchini (2005), the standing 
orders of both Italian chambers do not grant the executive an unconditional and exclusive last-offer 
authority. Moreover, as displayed by the most relevant studies on amendatory activity in Italy, 
amendatory powers are distributed among several actors, both institutional and individual, within 
the parliamentary arena (Di Palma 1978; Capano and Vignati 2008). 
All that said, it seems clear that the presidents of Italian chambers play a fundamental role in 
the parliamentary life: they can effectively favour certain bills over others, and they can take some 
part also in defining the content of legislation. For our purposes, parliamentary presidents can affect 
the amount of changes made to governmental bills during the legislative process. Of course, 
presidents of the houses cannot directly modify legislation, since they cannot submit amendments to 
the bills introduced in the chambers they head. However, thanks to the prerogatives mentioned 
above, parliamentary presidents are able to wield the rules regulating amendatory activity, thus 
allowing more or less amendments to bills. In the ordinary process, which is the one I am interested 
in and which normally takes place under an open rule, the president of the chamber may decide to 
foster some particular bills by putting constraints on the possibility to amend them. In other words, 
there would be a move towards a more restrictive amending rule, which would result in relatively 
few modifications in the course of the legislative process, all else equal. If, instead, the president 
wants to hinder the approval of some piece of legislation, or dislikes the content of the initial 
proposal, he may choose to keep the amending rule as open as possible. In this case, he would 
refuse to impose any limtation on the flow of amendments and, everything else being equal, we 
would observe more changes to the initial bill. Reasonably, the president of the chamber is more 
likely to restrict the amending process the more his preferences are similar to those of the proposer 
of the bill at issue. As a consequence, 
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 It is worth noting that, although starting from the same puzzle, Martin and Vanberg (2004, 2005) give a different 
interpretation of the amendatory game. Whereas Heller sees amendments as coalition parties’ attempts to move policy 
away from the coalition compromise (so that the responsible minister punishes them with her last-offer authority), 
according to Marting and Vanberg legislative review represents coalition partners’ effort to correct ‘hostile’ ministers’ 
attempts to undermine the coalition agreed on policy (see chapter 2). 
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H.11 Presidents of the chambers: We should expect more changes to government bills 
during the legislative process the larger is the ideological distance between a) the 
government compromise or b) the proposing minister and the president of the chamber 
where the bill is discussed. 
 
Why should the preferences of parliamentary presidents be relevant for explaining how much 
government bills are altered in parliament? The incumbents of such a prestigious office could 
indeed choose to behave neutrally, in order to gain the esteem of the whole chamber as well as of 
the general public. However, as Jenny and Müller (1995) point out and Zucchini (2005) suggests, 
the presidents of both Italian chambers tend to act in a partisan manner. Therefore, like all 
politicians they need to send signals to their constituency, trying to enhance their chances of 
reelection. Hence, presidents of the chambers may derive position taking utility from fostering or 
hindering some government bills. Remarkably, presidents’ preferences and position-taking 
incentives may affect the amount of changes made to governmental bills under either type of 
cabinet-parliament interaction and of cabinet decision making. Whichever the preferences 
represented in the cabinet and whoever the proposer, the presidents of the chambers may use their 
prerogatives in order to favour the government bills they prefer. 
In the present paragraph, I focused on the ideological preferences of the presidents of the 
chambers, abstaining from formulating hypotheses that take into account changes in their powers. 
In fact, it does not seem straightforward to derive conjectures on the amount of modifications 
experienced by bills from the simple fact that presidents become stronger or weaker. For instance, 
the 1990 reform of the standing orders strengthened the president of the Italian lower chamber, who 
since then has the ability to impose an agenda when a unanimous vote in the Conference of Group 
Chairpersons does not pass. However, the president may want to exercise this power either to 
favour or to hinder government legislation. Probably, his behaviour will depend on his attitude 
towards the government, or the particular minister, which proposes legislation. In other terms, the 
political affinity between those actors turns out to be the key factor. 
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CHAPTER 2.  
IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AMONG COALITION PARTIES 
 
A recent line of research identifies ideological conflict within the cabinet and among ministers as 
the fundamental factor explaining the occurrence of modifications to governmental bills (Martin 
and Vanberg 2004, 2005). This body of literature focuses on delegation relationships within 
multiparty coalitions, and conceptualizes them within a principal-agent framework 56 . In this 
perspective, policymaking in parliamentary democracies can be understood as a chain of delegation 
that begins with the voters and ends with the civil service employees that implement government 
decisions, and in which each link attaches a principal to an agent (Strøm 2000: 266-267; Strøm, 
Müller and Bergman 2003, 2008). Remarkably, as this emerging research program acknowledges, 
the parties forming a coalition government have both to govern together and please their voters 
(Strøm and Müller 1999a). During their tenure, coalition partners continuously interact in the 
legislative process and use mechanisms such as legislative scrutiny of government bills to manage 
the delegation relationships between them and to influence policymaking57. 
Due to the delegation of important policymaking powers from the parliament to the cabinet 
and from the cabinet as a whole to individual ministers (Saalfeld 2000: 354), in appointing 
multiparty governments the parliamentary supporters of a coalition have to agree to delegate not 
only to their own party’s cabinet representatives, but also to ministers from their party’s coalition 
partners. Whereas in a single-party government all delegation to cabinet ministers is intraparty 
delegation and therefore parties should be able to successfully control their ministers, in multiparty 
coalitions delegation necessarily crosses party lines, and parties do not enjoy the same control over 
ministers from other parties. As a consequence, the implementation of the coalitional compromise58 
that makes the existence of the government possible is subject to the agency problems also known 
as ‘ministerial drift’: ministers, acting as agents of the cabinet as a whole, may not work fully in the 
interests of their principal. More precisely, each minister enjoys a near monopoly on policy 
initiation within the jurisdiction of her portfolio (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2006: 43-44), and may 
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 According to Lupia’s (2003: 33) definition, delegation is ‘an act where one person or group, called a principal, relies 
on another person or group, called an agent, to act on the principal’s behalf’. 
57
 Whereas most works in this program focus on the policymaking role of parliamentary institutions in helping parties to 
‘police’ the coalition compromise, Martin and Vanberg (2008) emphasize the use of parliaments for the purpose of 
communication by coalition parties that wish to ‘sell’ the compromise to their constituencies. 
58
 As Martin and Vanberg (2005: 95) suggest, it is possible to think about the coalitional compromise in several ways. 
On the one hand, there may be the written coalition agreements that would-be government parties negotiate during the 
coalition formation process and commit themselves to implement. On the other hand, when new unforeseen issues 
emerge during the tenure, the coalitional compromise can be interpreted as the policy that would result if government 
parties engage in a full-fledged bargaining process, each employing the resources at its disposal for influencing the final 
policy outcome. 
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attempt to use her discretion in drafting legislation to move policy in directions favoured by her 
own party, but that can be damaging for the interests of other coalition members59. 
As Thies (2001: 582) points out, multiparty executives face greater delegation problems than 
single-party executives. First of all, ministers in a coalition government are likely to have more 
divergent policy preferences than their colleagues in a single-party government, all else equal60.  
According to Strøm and Müller (1999a: 257), these different preferences are driven by three kinds 
of motivations: policy benefits, office benefits, and electoral advantage. While all of these are 
scarce goods, ‘electoral advantage is even more strictly constant-sum’, and thus although the 
electoral fortunes of coalition parties are likely to be positively related, ‘commonly coalition parties 
are in some sort of mutual competition for votes’61. As Martin and Vanberg (2005: 94) put it, 
ministers’ legislative initiative usually receives considerable media attention, and electoral 
calculations give ministers incentives to move policy in ways that appeal to their respective 
constituencies, or ‘to appear to work toward providing such policies even when party leaders 
realize that they may not be able to deliver them in practice’. Facing these position-taking 
incentives, coalition parties are continually in competition with one another (see also Huber 1996b).  
A second feature makes agency problems particularly severe in multiparty governments: the 
difficulty of sanctioning ‘troublesome’ ministers. While in single-party governments the party 
caucus can administer punishments such as reductions in campaign support, denial of the official 
party endorsement, or a lower position in the party list, in multiparty governments troublesome 
ministers cannot be sanctioned that way by their coalition partners (Thies 2001: 582). 
In addition, ministers enjoy an informational advantage in their jurisdiction: in drafting 
legislation, they become informed about what is feasible in a given issue area, and which political 
outcomes will result from adopting particular policies, whereas the other cabinet members largely 
lack these resources, are therefore less informed and so cannot correct their colleagues in cabinet 
meetings. Each ministers may hence be tempted to exploit such an informational advantage and 
draft legislation that, wihout her colleagues’ knowledge, favours her own constituency at the 
expense of the coalition policy compromise. 
Other coalition parties, in turn, face strong incentives to manage delegation to ‘hostile’ cabinet 
ministers, thus enabling the coalition to implement the policy compromise on which it has agreed. 
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 To put it in a slightly different way, ministers belonging to multiparty governments act as agents of two potentially 
competing principals: the party to wich they are affiliated and the parliamentary majority more generally (Müller and 
Meyer 2010: 1067; Strøm, Müller, and Smith 2010: 519).  
60
 Since ministers in a single-party cabinet are all members of the same political party, they are supposed to have similar 
policy preferences. For accounts challenging this assumption, see, for example, Müller (2000: 320).  
61
 As Strøm (2003: 76) highlights, this is especially true in pivotal systems, where a single party forms the core of the 
governing coalition and so ‘coalition partners cannot assume that they are doomed to sink or swim together and often 
have electoral incentives to defect’. 
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For this purpose, coalition partners make use of several means of controlling the actions of 
ministers belonging to other parties. In their fundamental contribution, Kiewiet and McCubbins 
(1991: 27-37) identify four major classes of accountability mechanisms: (1) contract design, (2) 
screening and selection rules, (3) monitoring and reporting requirements, and (4) institutional 
checks (see also Aghion and Tirole 1997; Lupia 2003; Strøm 2003). The former two are ex ante 
mechanisms, that principals use to gather information about their agents before they act. Since they 
align preferences, such devices are appropriate for preventing ‘adverse selection’62. Conversely, the 
third and fourth measures are ex post mechanisms, employed by principals after the effects of 
delegation have already been produced. By improving principals’ capacity for observing the actions 
of their agents and the effects of such actions, they allow to deal with ‘moral hazard’63.  
Recent scholarship on multiparty governments identifies three (non-mutually exclusive) 
institutional settings where to control each other’s ministers and hence to mitigate agency loss 
within coalitions: the executive arena, the parliamentary arena, and the extraparliamentary arena 
(Strøm, Müller, and Smith 2010). In the following pages I discuss the most relevant accountability 
instruments outlined in the literature, focusing on those which can have a role in accounting for the 
changes made to governmentals bill during the legislative process. In particular, in the first section I 
examine in detail Martin and Vanberg’s (2004, 2005) hypothesis, which is currently one of the most 
influential explanations of why government legislation is altered in parliament. Their argument is 
that legislative review serves as a means of monitoring hostile ministers in multiparty governments. 
The second and third sections are devoted to control mechanisms employed in the cabinet and in the 
legislature, respectively. Finally, in the last section I consider some possible ways of combining 
different accountability instruments. Remarkably, different mechanisms have different effects on 
the modifications made to government legislation: some of them are expected to increase the 
amount of observable changes, while others should reduce it. Mechanisms operating in the 
extraparliamentary arena are discussed in part while dealing with the other two arenas: in particular, 
coalition agreements are examined in combination with other control devices. 
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 When the principal does not fully know the competencies or preferences of his agent or the exact demands of the task 
at hand (hidden information), it might be the case that the agent is unwilling to pursue the principal’s interests because 
she desires a different outcome, and/or unable to pursue the principal’s interests because her resoures are insufficient. 
63
 If, after establishing the delegation relationship, the principal cannot fully observe his agent’s actions (hidden action), 
the agent, once selected, may have incentives and opportunities to take unobservable actions that are detrimental to the 
principal’s interests. 
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2.1 LEGISLATIVE REVIEW AS INTRACOALITION MONITORING MECHANISM 
Focusing on the legislative arena, Martin and Vanberg (2004, 2005) argue that coalition partners 
use parliamentary scrutiny of government bills for the purpose of containing agency loss within 
multiparty cabinets. Indeed, as Huber and Shipan (2002, ch. 7) show in an analysis of legislative 
production in 19 parliamentary systems, coalition parties write detailed legislation in order to 
control each other64.  
According to Martin and Vanberg (2005: 97), there are several reasons for seeing legislative 
review as a powerful intracoalition monitoring device. One derives from the size of the cabinet: due 
to time and resource constraints, coalition partners may find it too costly to monitor hostile 
ministers from within the cabinet, and so they can be forced to employ mechanisms outside the 
cabinet such as legislative scrutiny. This is especially the case of smaller parties, that usually have 
only few junior ministers (JMs) to assign (Thies 2001: 589). Secondly, in parliamentary systems the 
explicit assent of parliament is required for all major legislation. Cabinet-level institutions may be 
used to correct ministerial drafts, but it is only when the final parliamentary vote takes place that 
such modified bills becomes laws. Thirdly, and most importantly, the internal organizational 
features of modern parliaments can provide considerable opportunities for counteracting ministerial 
discretion: many parliamentary countries with proportional representation rules and multiparty 
governments (Lijphart’s [1999] ‘consensus democracies’) have systems of strong standing 
committees65. Commonly, powerful permanent committees have jurisdictions that correspond to 
those of cabinet ministers66 and enable their members to acquire the policy expertise necessary to 
scrutinize legislation67. Moreover, committees possess broad powers: they can arrange hearings, 
summon witnesses, demand relevant documents, and propose amendmends (see also Mattson and 
Strøm 1995). Finally, the fact that works in committee remain typically hidden from public scrutiny 
reduces the costs of challenging and amending ministerial bills from within the coalition.  
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 Remarkably, however, Huber and Shipan (2002: 183-187) focus on intracabinet problems arising during policy 
implementation, rather than during policy formulation. As the authors highlight, once a law is approved, individual 
ministers may want to use their privileged position in the department they head in order to influence its implementation. 
By contrast, the literature on ministerial drift emphasizes ministers’ attempts to influence policy before legislation is 
approved by parliament – i.e, when they draft bills.  
65
 As Powell (2000: 34, Table 2.2) shows, strong committee systems are highly and positively correlated to 
parliamentary systems that operate under PR and typically produce coalition governments. Conversely, majoritarian 
systems that largely rely on single-party governments typically feature weak committee systems. 
66
 As a large number of studies demonstrate, contemporary parliamentary democracies present a close correspondence 
between the jurisdictions of ministries and those of legislative committees. Mattson and Strøm (1995: 261-263, Tab.8.1) 
present evidence of such a correspondence in West European parliaments, while Olson (2002) and Barkan (2003) find 
the same in many Eastern European and several African legislatures, respectively. Moreover, Martin and Depauw (2009: 
34, Tab.1) show that committees parallel ministries in 25 of the 31 European democracies they analyze, and Carroll and 
Cox (2005) outline the same relation between committees and ministries in the 23 countries featuring multiparty 
governments they investigate (see below). 
67
 See Krehbiel (1991), whose approach is introduced in the next chapter. 
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For all these reasons, coalition partners can effectively employ legislative scrutiny. This 
means that, once a certain governmental bill has been introduced to parliament, they can rely on 
members of their legislative factions to try to anticipate its possible consequences, to evaluate the 
justifications offered by the proposing minister, to take into consideration viable alternative policies, 
and to prepare amendmends. Therefore, the changes made to the government bills during the 
legislative process would be the evidence that a monitoring activity is at work. 
Remarkably, previous comparative research and some recent works have highlighted the 
function of legislative institutions in strengthening the influence of opposition parties (Döring 
1995a; Müller and Strøm 2000; Powell 2000; Saalfeld 1990, 2000; Strøm 1990a), or that of party 
backbenchers in the attempt to solve intraparty delegation problems (Saalfeld 2000: 364). For 
Martin and Vanberg (2004: 17), instead, parliamentary institutions are employed to manage an 
intracoalition  and interparty agency problem. 
Martin and Vanberg (2005: 94-96) model the delegation problem faced by multiparty 
governments as a game of complete information in which coalition parties are motivated by policy 
considerations, potential position-taking benefits and the costs they may incur in the policymaking 
process68. The authors consider a coalition composed of two parties confronting a one-dimensional 
policy space69. The cabinet relies on ministers to implement the coalition compromise, and the 
sequence of moves is as follows (see Bendor, Glazer and Hammond 2001: 241). The first move is 
made by the agent (a minister associated with one of the coalition parties), who gathers information 
and makes a proposal (a bill dealing with a certain policy area) to the principal (the entire cabinet, 
represented by the governmental majority in parliament). The principal, in turn, can either accept or 
correct the agent’s proposal. In other words, the other coalition party, acting on behalf of the entire 
government, can either accept or amend the drafted bill before it becomes law.  
In discussing the circumstances under which ministers are likely to use their discretion and 
those under which other coalition members are likely to counteract such moves through legislative 
scrutiny, the authors identify three possible scenarios. The first is ministerial autonomy: when the 
(resource and opportunity) costs of challenging the ministerial draft70 are so large relative to the 
policy distance between the minister’s party and the coalition partner, the latter is willing to tolerate 
the minister’s ideal point rather than to attempt to restore the coalition compromise. It is the 
                                                 
68
 Martin and Vanberg (2005) assume that it is not asymmetric information, but the incentives for position-taking that 
give the minister the opportunity to move away from the compromise policy. The actors move in a complete 
information situation, and agency costs depend only on the divergence between agent’s and principal’s preferences.  
69
 Since each minister drafts legislation in her own policy area (see Laver and Shepsle 1996), the policy space faced by 
the actors is likely to be one-dimensional. 
70
 These are the resources and opportunity costs that coalition partners pay when they decide to rewrite the minister’s 
bill, thus challenging the ministerial proposal in the legislature instead of delegating to the executive (Martin and 
Vanberg 2005: 95; see also Strøm 2000: 272 on the costs of oversight). 
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scenario depicted by Laver and Shepsle (1996), although actually they predict ministerial autonomy 
for all levels of policy divergence71. A second possible outcome involves limited ministerial drift: if 
the costs of challenging the ministerial bill are not so large but parties are not so distant, the 
coalition partner is willing to accept some deviation from the coalition compromise. In this case, the 
minister can draft a bill which neither exactly coincides with the coalition compromise, nor induces 
her coalition partner to correct the bill in parliament because the costs of challenging and rewriting 
legislation are still present. Hence, the minister is able to exploit her agenda setting power to shift 
policy in a more favourable direction only to a certain degree. Finally, when the policy distance 
between the coalition partners grows large enough (and the costs of challenging the ministerial draft 
are not so large), the minister will choose to take a position by introducing a bill that corresponds to 
her own ideal point, thus prompting her coalition partner to revise the proposal in parliament. 
The model shows that, when the ideological conflict within the cabinet is sufficiently severe, 
position-taking motives may drive ministers to introduce bills that deviate from the coalition 
compromise, thereby inducing their coalition partners to restore the agreed-upon policy by means of 
legislative review. More precisely, on issues that sharply divide cabinet parties the incentives both 
to deviate and to monitor are strong. In order to implement the coalitional compromise, the 
responsible minister would probably be required to present bills which are distant from her 
(constituency’s) ideal point. Hence, she may be tempted to use her discretion in drafting bills to 
propose legislation that pleases her electorate. If passed into laws, such bills would easily impose 
significant agency loss on the rest of the coalition, since the minister’s proposal is probably far from 
the preferences of the other coalition members. For issues which are less conflictual for cabinet 
parties, the reverse is true: the responsible minister would reap few position-taking benefits from 
proposing her favourite policy, and the agency loss associated with a small deviation would be 
relatively minor for coalition partners.   
In the case of the agency problems to which coalition compromises are subjected, not all types 
of accountability mechanisms are likely to work: contracts will not be self-enforcing in the future; 
screening and selection through copartisanship are not feasible in multiparty governments; 
institutional checks typical of presidentialism are not present in parliamentary systems. The control 
measure employed is thus ex post monitoring: coalition partners make use of legislative review in 
order to restore the coalition compromise, doing what the full cabinet would have agreed to72. 
Martin and Vanberg’s core hypothesis is thus the following:  
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 In other words, Laver and Shepsle’s (1996) ministerial autonomy emerges as a special case in Martin and Vanberg’s 
model.  
72
 Of course, under the assumption of complete information, ministers might anticipate legislative review by coalition 
partners, and thus the restoration of the original coalitional agreement. In this case, ministers would simply stick to the 
agreed-upon policies, and no monitoring activity (i.e., no changes) would be observed in the parliament. However, since 
 56 
 
H.12 Ideological conflict within the cabinet: As ideological divergence between 
coalition partners becomes larger, the incentives for ministerial drift from coalition 
compromise increase, and thus the coalition partners will rely more heavily on 
legislative review. 
 
Being interested in the degree of parliamentary scrutiny on government bills, in two related 
articles the authors take two measures as their dependent variables: the length of the legislative 
process (Martin and Vanberg 2004) and the number of article changes in government bills (Martin 
and Vanberg 2005). In other words, in the former case they consider all the several monitoring 
activities carried out throughout the legislative process: amendments by parliament, committee 
hearings, contact with outside experts and interest groups, etc. In the latter case, instead, they take 
the observable modifications as a proxy of the whole ‘corrective’ activity on government bills. 
Martin and Vanberg empirically test their argument using data from Germany (1983-1994) and the 
Netherlands (1982-1994), and find support for the general hypothesis that legislative scrutiny is 
used more extensively when the risk and opportunity of ministerial drift are greater. More in 
particular, as the level of policy disagreement between coalition parties increases, the legislative 
process becomes longer and the number of articles which are altered in ministerial drafts becomes 
higher73. Interestingly, they find no evidence that ideological conflict between the government and 
the opposition leads to legislative delay or article changes. Such a result contrasts with much of the 
conventional wisdom in comparative studies, according to which legislative institutions in 
‘consensus’ democracies enable opposition parties to influence lawmaking (Martin and Vanberg 
2004: 23; 2005: 102).  
In addition, as Martin and Vanberg (2005: 100) suggest, the saliency of the issue addressed by 
government bills may play an important role in accounting for the changes made in the course of 
the parliamentary process. Indeed, it is position-taking utility which makes ministers introduce 
legislation even if they know it will be amended. Reasonably, position-taking incentives are 
stronger on more salient issues. Therefore, I derive the following hypothesis: 
 
H.13 Saliency: We should expect to observe more changes on bills dealing with issues 
that are more salient for the parties’ constituencies and hence for the parties 
themselves.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
coalition parties face position-taking incentives, under the circumstances indicated by the authors ministers may 
propose the ideal point of the party they belong to even when they know in advance that it will be amended to the 
coalition compromise. 
73
 In a recent contribution on the national transposition of EU directives, Franchino and Høyland (2009) find that in 
West European parliamentary countries the ideological conflict inside the coalition increases the likelihood of 
parliamentary involvement in the process of trasposition, and thus the probabiliy of legislative review. 
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Two further hypotheses can be formulated following Martin and Vanberg’s logic. First, quite 
obviously, ministerial drift poses more severe problems in multiparty than in single-party 
executives (see above). Therefore, as Martin and Depauw (2009: 3-4) emphasize, the incentives to 
employ monitoring mechanisms will be stronger in the former type of government. In other words,  
 
H.14 Multi- versus single-party cabinets: All else being equal, governmental bills 
should be more extensively modified in parliament under multiparty governments than 
under single-party governments. 
 
Second, as a refinement of Martin and Vanberg’s argument we can suppose that not all 
ministers are equally likely to deviate from the coalition compromise and thus to trigger a 
(parliamentary) reaction by other coalition parties: all else being equal, some ministers may be less 
susceptible to position-taking motives than others. As pointed out in paragraph 1.2.6, technical 
ministers are expected to derive lower utility from taking positions than their partisan colleagues. In 
addition, some ministers may be less risky agents than others because of the nature of the party they 
belong to. As suggested by Carroll and Cox (2005: 14-15), larger parties are less likely to be 
shadowed by their partners than smaller ones. In fact, whereas small parties often have parochial 
constituencies and thus may be more prone to take purely ideological or extremely distributive 
stances, large parties usually can credibly claim to internalize a broad array of interests and 
therefore turn out to be less risky agents. Accordingly, 
 
H.15 Size of the minister’s party: I expect more changes to bills during the legislative 
process the smaller the proposing minister’s party is.  
 
Still focusing on the size of the parties involved in coalition policymaking, Martin and 
Vanberg (2005: 97) follow Thies’ (2001: 589) logic and suggest that smaller parties should be more 
likely to amend government legislation than larger ones. Having just a small amount of senior and 
junior ministers to assign, smaller coalition parties may be unable to effectively control ministerial 
discretion and influence legislation at the cabinet level. Therefore, they will resort more to 
mechanisms operating in the parliament – most of all to amendatory activity. Although theoretically 
interesting, this hypothesis regards the probability of engaging in amendatory activity, and not the 
modifications actually made to government legislation. Hence, it deals with something which is not 
the primary concern of the present work74.  
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 In any case, such a hypothesis could not be tested in the present work because it would require a different research 
strategy, with the probability of presenting amendments as the outcome to be studied and single parties as units of 
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2.2 CABINET-LEVEL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
As the scholarly literature on multiparty governments suggests, coalition parties set up a wide array 
of accountability instruments within the cabinet, through which they coordinate policy before 
legislation is introduced in the parliament. Such instruments represent ex post control devices, and 
are employed as institutional checks75. In principle, the allocation of ministerial portfolios among 
coalition members might serve as an ex ante control mechanism at the cabinet level. However, as 
Strøm, Müller, and Smith (2010: 523) argue, the mere assignment of ministries to coalition parties 
yields very small possibilities for mutual monitoring among them: collective screening of potential 
ministers to prevent problems of hidden information is rather rare (Müller and Strøm 2000: 574, 
Table 15.7), and in any case would be uneffective against hidden action. In addition, for coalition 
partners it is not so easy to replace troublesome ministers through cabinet reshuffles (see Huber and 
Martinez-Gallardo 2008). As a consequence, coalition parties resort to ex post mechanisms such as 
junior ministers and other cabinet-level tools. 
 
2.2.1 Junior ministers 
At the executive level, as shown by Thies (2001) and later confirmed by Martin and Vanberg (2005: 
102-103) and Verzichelli (2008), coalition partners ‘keep tabs’ on each other by appointing junior 
ministers to hostile ministries. Junior ministers have access to much of the same information as the 
minister they are ‘shadowing’, and have the incentives to report such information to their own party. 
As a consequence, when a policy proposal drafted by a minister is submitted for approval in the 
government (for example in a meeting of the full cabinet), other coalition partners do not suffer any 
more an informational disadvantage about the policy implications of her proposal: they are able to 
discover whether or not each others’ ministers are deviating from the coalitional agreed-upon policy 
and to correct ministerial proposals before they are introduced to parliament. This way, the coalition 
compromise can actually be implemented.  
Thies (2001: 581) proposes a model of ‘managed delegation’, in which delegation to ministers 
is handled through executive-level control instruments such as interministerial committees, 
overlapping jurisdictions, and junior ministers, and contrasts it to Laver and Shepsle’s (1996) 
‘ministerial government’ model, whereby each minister enjoys virtual dictatorship over her 
jurisdiction and delegation equals to abdication. Focusing on a particular monitoring mechanism 
(the appointment of JMs from parties other than the party of the corresponding minister), he derives 
                                                                                                                                                                  
analysis. As I will show in the fifth chapter, the information I collected concerns each approved governmental law in 
Italy during the 1987-2006 period. 
75
 The principal (the whole cabinet) delegates authority to an agent (the minister) who is checked by a second agent (a 
JM, or another cabinet-level conflict management body) with different policy preferences (Müller and Meyer 2010: 
1076).  
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from the theory of managed delegation a number of testable hypotheses concerning the use of this 
delegation-control device (Thies 2001: 585-586)76. Evaluating his hypotheses against evidence from 
Italy (1970-1989), the Netherlands (1971-1994), Japan (1965-1996), and Germany (1966-1990), 
Thies finds that in the former three countries coalition partners actually keep tabs on each other’s 
ministers: they systematically appoint JMs of different parties (or factions in the 1965-1990 
Japanese single-party governments) to shadow the work of a hostile cabinet minister. In particular, 
this practice is found to be in use mostly in countries that have few institutional checks on 
ministerial discretion (i.e. where ministers are not already constrained as in the German case), and 
in the most important governmental departments (i.e. where the parties that do not hold the ministry 
have the most to lose from abdication to their coalition partners) (Thies 2001: 589-593, 595). 
Thies’ findings for Italy are consistent with Pridham’s (1988: 55) suggestion that Italian JMs 
are appointed from parties other than their ministers’ and are employed ‘as a means of knitting 
together the coalitional relationship at the [ministry] level’. Thies’ results are also confirmed by 
Giannetti and Laver (2005) in a more detailed and recent analysis of the appointment of Italian 
junior ministers. On the other hand, these findings contrast with Cotta’s (1988: 129-130) and 
Furlong’s (1990: 60) arguments, whereby Italian JMs are allocated as a mere distributional means 
to ‘pay off’ coalition parties and following a simple rule of proportionality (‘lottizzazione’)77. 
 
2.2.2 Other cabinet-level control mechanisms 
As outlined by the scholarship on coalition governments, a number of other institutional 
mechanisms may enable coalition partners to monitor each other at the cabinet level: inner cabinets, 
interministerial committees, cabinet committees, party summits, committees of parliamentary 
leaders (Andeweg and Timmermans 2008; essays in Müller and Strøm 2000). Moreover, 
overlapping jurisdictions between ministries (Thies 2001), prime ministerial government (Andeweg 
2000), deputy prime ministers or finance ministers (De Winter, Timmermans, and Dumont 2000; 
Saalfeld 2000) may serve the same purpose. 
Andeweg and Timmermans (2008: 270-272) classify conflict resolution mechanisms on the 
basis of their composition: they may include only cabinet ministers (e.g., inner cabinets and 
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 It is worth noting that, while in the model of managed delegation JMs are expected to come from different parties 
than the ministers they shadow, ministerial government predicts that JMs will belong to the same party as their 
corresponding ministers. On their turn, office-seeking theories predict that the partisanship of ministers and JMs will be 
random, the only constraint being that each coalition party gets its fair share of each (Riker 1962; Strøm 1990b). 
77
 For an office-seeking interpretation of Italian junior ministers, see Mershon (1996, 1997, 2001, 2002). In Mershon’s 
view, JMs are appointed in such a way to compensate for possible imbalances in the distribution of ministerial 
portfolios among coalition parties. Such an interpretation is confirmed by Manow and Zorn (2004), who show that 
cross-party shadowing in the Italian case is nothing but a side-effect of distributional games between coalition parties. 
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interministerial committees)78, include just non-cabinet members (e.g., committees of parliamentary 
leaders), or allow the presence of both (e.g., cabinet committees and party summits)79.  
Let us now concentrate on how, according to the available literature, these cabinet-level 
monitoring tools have been employed in Italy, which is the case under investigation in the present 
work. In general, Criscitiello (1993, 1994) emphasizes the role of such executive-level institutions 
in mitigating ministerial autonomy and thus managing conflicts between Italian coalition parties. 
Most of all, the rise in importance of an inner cabinet of key ministers (‘consiglio di gabinetto’) led 
to a lower degree of ministerial autonomy (a ‘restricted’ collegiality). While in the period prior to 
the 1980s ‘ministers presided over their departments almost like barons’, and the cabinet used to 
simply ratify decisions made by individual ministers, the use of inner cabinets from their first 
establishment in 1983 onward has increased the level of collegiality of Italian cabinets, thus 
containing ministerial autonomy (Criscitiello 1994: 192-193; see also Cotta 1988: 130).  
As highlighted by the Italian scholarship, the same function has been carried out by party 
summits, or majority summits. In Italy, in particular, party summits are known as ‘vertici’. 
According to Criscitiello (1994: 188), given their great contribution to coordination and collegiality 
at the top of the executive branch, majority summits might be considered the ‘efficient secrets’ of 
the Italian model of government (see also Criscitiello 1993). 
Concerning overlapping jurisdictions, Cotta (1988: 131) argues that ‘some of the most 
important policy areas (for instance external relations and financial and economic affairs) have been 
fragmented into more than one ministry and allocated to the representatives of different parties. 
This has meant, in the best case, that the policy of the government in that area has been the result of 
long consultations between the Ministers (and also the parties and the ministerial bureaucracies) 
responsible for that area’. 
With regard to the prime minister’s role, a number of limited changes in the 1980s and 1990s 
transformed the governmental decision-making process in a more hierarchical direction, giving the 
Italian prime minister greater authority to limit individual ministers’ autonomy (Verzichelli 2003: 
462-463). In addition to those institutional changes, as Hine and Finocchi (1991: 85-88) point out, 
the strength of Italian prime ministers has been affected by the presence of the coalition partners’ 
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 Inner cabinets and interministerial committees are both composed of cabinet ministers only. However, the former are 
not issue-specific and typically include just the prime minister and coalition parties’ leading ministers, while the latter 
are explicitly designed to deal with problems in a certain policy area and usually involve more ministers (even JMs). 
79
 Party summits are non issue-specific bodies consisting of cabinet ministers and external party leaders, whereas 
cabinet committees are typically issue-specific and may include senior ministers, junior ministers and civil servants. 
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veto on a powerful prime minister. In absence of such a veto, e.g. in the cases of the governments 
headed by Forlani, De Mita and Andreotti VI in the 1980s, there were strong prime ministers80.  
As for interministerial committees, the expectations about their effects in Italy seem to be less 
clear: although these committees facilitated the coordination between smaller numbers of ministers, 
they also reduced the level of collegiality between ministers as a whole (Criscitiello 1994: 190). As 
Cotta (1988: 131) points out, a common interpretation is that in Italy such committees ‘have been 
more an instrument for legitimizing the independent role of certain ministries vis-à-vis the cabinet 
than for effective coordination’. 
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 Concerning the strengthening of the prime minister as an intracoalitional monitoring tool, several scholars have 
argued that such a mechanism would present some important problems, since the prime minister would not be able in 
any case to whip the ministers into line. Indeed, the prime minister must necessarily be from a single party, and the 
other coalition parties may have little reason to believe that he will faithfully pursue coalition-wide, as opposed to party-
specific, goals (Müller, Philipp and Gerlich 1993: 232-236; Andeweg 2000: 382). According to Hallerberg (2000), 
delegation to a powerful Finance Minister to constrain the other ministers’ spending appetites would present the same 
problem. 
 62 
2.3 LEGISLATIVE LEVEL MONITORING MECHANISMS 
Let us now (re)turn to the legislative arena. The present section deals with two fundamental 
accountability mechanisms outlined in the literature on policymaking in multiparty governments: 
strong committee systems and committee chairs.  
Along with parliamentary scrutiny, these two instruments allow ex post control of coalition 
partners’ behaviour. In particular, monitoring hostile ministers through legislative review, strong 
committees and committee chairs can be understood as direct monitoring. In this type of monitoring, 
which is also known as ‘police-patrol oversight’, the principal does much of the oversight himself 
by using audits, investigations, and other direct methods of monitoring. By contrast, in ‘fire-alarm 
oversight’ the principal provides third parties with the means and the incentives to gather 
information and report to him about the agent’s actions (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; see also 
Lupia and McCubbins 2000: 295; Strøm 2003: 63)81. Possible instances of fire alarms are interest 
groups, which may provide coalition partners with information on the consequences of 
governmental legislation. 
Another police-patrol control mechanism outlined in the literature is represented by 
parliamentary questions and interpellations (see Strøm, Müller, and Smith 2010: 526-527; see also 
Wiberg 1995), while the requirement of an investiture vote for new governments may be considered 
as an ex ante legislative accountability mechanism (Bergman, Müller, Strøm, and Blomgren 2003). 
However, the analysis of these two intracoalitional control devices is beyond the scope of the 
present work. 
 
2.3.1 Strong committee systems 
Strong committees have been identified in the literature as an institutionalized and concrete solution 
to the problem of ministerial drift faced in multiparty government. Since the primary function of a 
strong committee system is to control and oversee the executive, the idea that strong committees are 
the best instrument through which the legislature can hold accountable the cabinet, individual 
ministers and bureaucrats has long been present in legislative studies (see, for example, Lees and 
Shaw 1979).  
In a recent work, Martin and Depauw (2009) argue that establishing a system of powerful 
committees represents a structural solution to the problems posed by delegation to ministers within 
multiparty coalitions. Just as Martin and Vanberg (2004, 2005) do, the authors find a solution to 
ministerial drift at the legislative level. Yet, whereas Martin and Vanberg’s concern is for how 
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 As highlighted by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), who coined the terms, fire-alarm oversight allows the principal 
to gather information at lower cost than police-patrol oversight. However, also oversight by third parties presents 
drawbacks (see Lupia and McCubbins 1994). 
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legislatures deal with some particular bill proposed by some particular cabinet minister, Martin and 
Depauw focus on how the internal structures of legislatures in parliamentary systems are arranged 
in order to revise government legislation. More precisely, Martin and Depauw’s aim is to explain 
the variation in strength of committees across different legislatures.  
As Martin and Depauw (2009: 5) put it, structured committee systems can monitor the 
executive in two fundamental ways. First, committees are able to scrutinize the legislation 
submitted by the government. As pointed out in the literature, in so doing they are more efficient 
and effective than the assembly as a whole because of the gains stemming from exchanges 
(Weingast and Marshall 1988) and from committee members’ specialization (Krehbiel 1991)82. 
Second, committees can monitor the implementation of legislation and scrutinize also the non-
legislative activities of individual cabinet ministers, in particular when each parliamentary 
committee shadows a certain government department. Indeed, once enacted by the legislature, 
government bills still need to be implemented, and this task is typically delegated to the minister 
heading the department under whose jurisdiction the bill falls. As Huber and Shipan (2002) have 
shown, legislation often leaves considerable discretion in the hands of the minister and her 
bureaucracy. According to Martin and Depauw (2009), legislatures featuring strong committees are 
better able both to revise governmental bills and to monitor ministers’ post-legislative actions, while 
legislatures with weak committees are less able to carry out such review and oversight functions. 
Therefore, since the problems posed by ministerial drift prove to be more severe in multiparty 
governments than in single-party governments (see above), the authors’ core hypothesis is that 
stronger committees are likely to be established in multiparty coalition systems, while weaker 
committees should be associated with systems characterized by single-party governments83. Martin 
and Depauw (2009: 12-14) empirically evaluate their argument using data from 31 advanced 
industrial democracies for the 1979-2009 period and, as expected, find that a significant proportion 
of the cross-national variation in the strength of parliamentary committees is explained by the type 
of government: as predicted, multiparty coalition systems tend to present powerful committees 
whereas single-party systems tend to present weak committees84. 
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 For a review of the different perspectives on legislative organization, see for example Shepsle and Weingast (1995) 
and Gamm and Huber (2002). 
83
 The authors rely on a rational efficiency view of legislative structures, whereby legislative institutions are considered 
as endogenous. In particular, as devices designed by the parliamentary majority to solve certain fundamental problems. 
Since a parliamentary majority can typically change legislative structures, no majority will preserve a legislative 
organization that is disadvantageous (Cox 2006; Binder 1996; Krehbiel 1991, 2004). 
84
 Remarkably, Martin and Depauw’s (2009) theoretical argument and findings call into question some relations that 
have become conventional in legislative studies. Typically, in fact, powerful committees have been associated with 
oppositional influence (as, for example, in the case of Italy), and have been seen as compatible with weak parties (as in 
the U.S. Congress) but incompatible with the strong parties common in parliamentary systems (see the next paragraph). 
Instead, the authors argue that strong committees emerge to serve the needs of parties, and in particular the parties in 
government rather than those in opposition. 
 64 
2.3.2 Committee chairs 
On the basis of studies as Martin and Depauw’s (2009) one, where it has been shown that 
committees provide considerable opportunities for counteracting ministerial discretion, it is also 
possible to develop hypotheses emphasizing the role of committee chairs as counterweights to 
cabinet ministers. Whereas Martin and Vanberg argue that coalition partners can use parliamentary 
scrutiny as a means of monitoring one another, a number of studies focus on the role of committee 
chairs in serving the same purpose (Hagevi 2000; Carroll and Cox 2005; Kim and Loewenberg 
2005; see also Hallerberg 2000).  
A specific case in which such a counterbalancing seems plausible is Sweden. As Hagevi (2000: 
238) writes, ‘during the preparation of a government bill in…the Swedish Riksdag, the responsible 
minister takes care to obtain the consent and strategic advice of representatives of the governing 
party on the relevant committee, particularly the chairman’. 
As Carroll and Cox (2005: 5) put it, committee chairs are more able to monitor cabinet 
ministers when they are more powerful (having greater authority to delay or expedite bills referred 
to their committees), as well as when the committees are more specialized and better-informed 
(having better rights to extract information from their corresponding ministries). Therefore, under 
these conditions, each coalition party has incentives to chair the parliamentary committees that 
oversee the ministries held by its coalition partners. In their analysis of the patterns of committee 
chair appointments in the German Bundestag during a relatively long period (1961-1998), Kim and 
Loewenberg (2005: 1113-1121) show that the coalition parties in the German lower chamber 
distribute committee chair positions such that coalition members can monitor each other’s cabinet 
ministers. In particular, although committee chairmanships are distributed among parties in 
proportion to their strength in the chamber, committee chairs turn out to be systematically drawn 
from different parties than the cabinet ministers they oversee. 
Kim and Loewenberg’s (2005) research is an attempt to explain the puzzle of the coexistence 
of strong parties and strong committees in the German Bundestag. The existence of an inverse 
relationship between committee and party power in legislatures was long considered as an axiom in 
the literature, in both congressional and parliamentary studies85. As for the United States Congress, 
for example, Weingast and Marshall (1988: 158-159) consider ‘strong parties and strong 
committees’ as ‘substitutes’ and regard the committee system as an institutional arrangement to 
ensure gains from exchange among legislators across time. Concerning parliamentary democracies, 
in their comparative analysis of the powers of committees and parties in eight national legislatures, 
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 For the inverse relationship between the importance of committee arenas and the importance of party arenas in 
legislative research, see for example Mezey (1993: 349-350). Remarkably, as Mezey (1993: 349) stresses, this does not 
hold true in Germany and Italy, where strong parties and strong committees coexist. 
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Lees and Shaw (1979: 394) conclude that “where the committees are strongest...one finds the 
lowest level of party control over committees”86. Given the growing evidence that both parties and 
committees affect policymaking in Congress, during the 1990s congressional research has called 
into question such an inverse relationship. In particular, Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) reject the 
question of whether parties are more powerful than committees and reconceptualize the relationship 
between them in a principal-agent framework, with committees regarded as agents of congressional 
parties. Investigating the appropriations process in Congress, they demonstrate that ‘congressional 
parties have successfully managed the delegation of policy-making authority to their members 
serving on committees’ (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991: 233). In a related work, Cox and 
McCubbins (1993) analyze American congressional parties as procedural and floor voting 
coalitions and show that, in fact, congressional committees are the agents of the majority party87. 
According to Kim and Loewenberg (2005: 1106), in parliamentary systems with coalition 
governments committees may be agents of the parties as they are in the U.S. presidential system. 
More precisely, as the patterns of committee chairs appointment show, in the German Bundestag 
committees are employed by coalition parties as intracoalition monitoring tools.          
Kim and Loewenberg’s (2005) results are in line with what Carroll and Cox (2005) find in 
their study of 23 countries featuring multiparty governments. In their analysis, Carrol and Cox aim 
to assess whether, and under what conditions, committee chairs are used by coalition members to 
monitor hostile cabinet ministers. Following an approach similar to that employed by Thies (2001) 
in his study of junior ministers, the authors check whether committee chairs belong to parties other 
than the party of their corresponding cabinet ministers, more often than we would expect in any 
random distribution of committees88. Proceeding at the level of jurisdictional areas, for each country 
Carroll and Cox (2005: 8-10) look at the proportion of jurisdictions which are shadowed – i.e, 
jurisdictions where the responsible minister and the relevant committee chair are not copartisan. As 
expected, empirical evidence supports the thesis that committee chairs are systematically employed 
as counterweights to cabinet ministers: the proportion of jurisdictions that are shadowed is 
relatively high in several countries (Carroll and Cox 2005: 12, Tab. 1).  
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 A typical example of this inverse relationship is the British House of Commons. Weingast and Marshall (1988: 158-
159) suggest that, as the British case shows, “parties potentially provide an alternative means for enforcing agreements”. 
Drawing on interviews with MPs, Jogerst (1990) shows that British backbenchers see and use the committees as 
instruments for strengthening their own role vis-à-vis their party’s leaders and policies. It is for this reason that British 
governments have always worked to keep committees weak.  
87
 In particular, Cox and McCubbins (1993) show that the majority party, when it is sufficiently homogeneous in 
political purpose, is able to seize legislative authority and (re)devise legislative institutions and practices (such as the 
committee system) in order to carry out the policy programs on which its members agree. 
88
 In a random distribution of committees, ministers and committee chairs would be appointed independently of one 
another. 
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However, as the same authors acknowledge, the presence of high rates of shadowing does not 
necessarily mean that intentional balancing is at work. Indeed, there could be high proportions of 
shadowed jurisdictions simply because the government coalition consists of many parties. The 
higher the number of parties participating in a coalition, the lower the probability that any of them 
will get both the ministry and the committee chair in a given jurisdictional area. Therefore, in what 
they define as a preliminary empirical investigation, Carroll and Cox (2005: 14-17) test a number of 
possible explanations of why some jurisdictions are shadowed and other are not. In particular, they 
find that two factors which reflect the logic of ‘keeping tabs on partners’ have a significant effect on 
the probability of shadowing ministers: the size of ministerial party and the strength of committees. 
More precisely, the results show that larger parties are less likely to be shadowed by their partners 
than smaller ones (see above), while ministers are more likely to be shadowed in systems with 
strong committees89. Concerning the latter finding, as in Martin and Depauw (2009), the underlying 
logic is not that more powerful committees cause shadowing. Rather, where parties want to use 
committees in order to control one another, they devise stronger committees and, as a consequence, 
the rates of partisan shadowing turn out to be higher.  
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 In addition, Carroll and Cox (2005: 14) include in their analysis two control variables: the number of parties in the 
governing coalition and the government share of committee jurisdictions. The latter variable takes into account the fact 
that, when a committee chair belongs to an opposition party, the corresponding jurisdiction inevitably results to be 
shared. Therefore, many chairs from opposition parties would artificially inflate the rates of shadowing. Both control 
variables have a significant effect: shadowing is more likely when the number of coalition parties is higher and when 
the share of comittee jurisdictions held by government parties is lower. 
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2.4 COMBINING MONITORING MECHANISMS 
Undoubtedly, none of the aforementioned monitoring mechanisms can be universally valid, and  
those instruments are neither always available, nor cost-effective, for coalition partners. Indeed, it 
might be possible that some control devices are not present in the institutional design of some 
political systems. For instance, junior ministers are not permitted in Denmark, Finland, and Iceland 
(Verzichelli 2008: 260-261). More importantly, the measures employed for mitigating agency loss 
are themselves costly. As Müller and Strøm (2008: 185) point out, employing control mechanisms 
entails transaction costs (see Kreps 1990)90. In a recent contribution, Müller and Meyer (2010) 
discuss the array of instruments through which governing parties try to manage delegation to hostile 
ministers, arguing that the use of coalition control mechanisms is constrained by their respective 
costs. In particular, the authors argue, a number of factors may influence the costs of employing the 
available control instruments as well as the choice among them (see also Müller and Strøm 2008). 
First of all, a certain control mechanism may be chosen simply because it has been long and 
successfully used by prior governmental coalitions. Second, the gains from employing control 
measures increase when the government is a majority government, when there is considerable time 
before the next scheduled elections, and when bargaining in parliament is complex due to the large 
number of possible majority coalitions. Third, government parties are more likely to resort to 
control instruments if their policy preferences are heterogeneous and if the coalition includes the 
parliamentary median party. Fourth, the use of monitoring tools should be more likely the stronger 
the institutional prerogatives of the prime minister. Moreover, ex ante coalition agreements are less 
likely when institutional veto players exist, while ex post monitoring is more likely in the 
simultaneous presence of both coalitional agreements and institutional veto players. Finally, 
coalition partners are expected to rely more extensively on control mechanisms when the level of 
uncertainty about future elections is relatively high due to electoral volatility, and when the 
termination of prior coalitions was caused by policy or office conflicts or critical events (a fate they 
obviously seek to avoid) (Müller and Meyer 2010: 1083-1086). 
Remarkably, although they can be treated separately from an analytical point of view, in real-
world multiparty politics control mechanisms are probably used simultaneously. In other words, 
such instruments coexist and complement each other. Some of them can exclude one another, while 
some others can reinforce each other thus making monitoring more effective. The literature 
examined give us some clues on how coalition partners can combine the several control instruments 
at their disposal. In particular, parliamentary scrutiny can be combined with both ex ante and ex 
post devices, as well as with both executive level and legislative level mechanisms. In the 
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 In Kiewiet and McCubbins’ (1991: 25) terms, the principal incurs in ‘agency costs’. 
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remainder of the paragraph, I discuss feasible combinations of accountability instruments and, when 
possible, I derive testable hypotheses for explaining the changes made to governmental bills in the 
course of the legislative process. As Figure 2.1 summarizes, control mechanisms operating in the 
parliamentary arena are expected to increase the overall amount of modifications, whereas those 
employed in the cabinet – with one possible exception – are likely to reduce it. Indeed, everything 
else being equal, legislative-level devices should enhance representatives’ ability to revise 
government legislation, which will result in greater changes during the parliamentary process. By 
contrast, control mechanisms set up in the cabinet should manage the possible conflicts among 
coalition members in the pre-parliamentary stage. Once solved, such conflicts would not manifest 
themselves in parliament and, all else equal, would not lead to observable modifications to the 
initial bills. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 
Effect of different accountability mechanisms on legislative review by type of instiutional arena. 
 
 
H.16-17 JMs (-) 
 
H.18 Conflict-management 
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H.22-23 Committee chairs (+) 
 
H.24 Coalition treaties (-) 
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2.4.1 Legislative review plus cabinet-level mechanisms 
Following Thies’ (2001) logic, the observable changes made to govenmental bills in parliament can 
be explained by the scarce information at coalition partners’ disposal concerning the proposing 
minister’s behaviour. When coalition members can gather such information by appointing junior 
ministers to a hostile ministry, they are enabled to exert control at the cabinet-level (e.g. in meetings 
of the cabinet or in the government department where the bill is drafted), and so they should be 
unlikely to make use of review in the legislative arena. As a consequence, it is possible to formulate 
the following hypothesis, which has been successfully tested by Martin and Vanberg (2005: 102-
103) against data from Germany and the Netherlands: 
 
H.16 Junior ministers (presence): We should expect the presence of a JM from a 
partner party in the ministry drafting a bill to reduce the level of changes made to the 
bill in the assembly. 
 
As a refinement of the previous claim, we can take into account in a more accurate way the 
ideological divergence between the JM and the minister he shadows. Indeed, the presence of a 
partner party in the drafting ministry should reduce the level of parliamentary scrutiny only insofar 
as the JM and the minister have divergent preferences. Instead, when their preferences are similar – 
in the extreme case, when they are copartisan – JMs may not be an effective means for 
counteracting ministerial discretion. Thus,  
 
H.17 Junior ministers (preferences): I expect less modifications the more the 
ideological preferences between the proposing minister and her JMs diverge. 
 
Let us now turn to the wide array of other executive level mechanisms outlined in the scholarly 
literature on multiparty governments. Just as JMs do, these cabinet-level institutions should enable 
coalition partners to control each other in the pre-parliamentary stage, thus reducing the probability 
of monitoring in the legislature. As a consequence,  
     
H.18 Other cabinet-level institutions: In presence of inner cabinets, cabinet 
committees, interministerial committees, party summits, or overlapping jurisdictions, 
government bills should be subject to a lower amount of changes in parliament. 
 
By the same logic, also the number of government parties that (by means of their respective 
ministers) formally co-sponsor a government bill can indicate the level of intracabinet control. The 
higher this number, the greater the probability that the proposal submitted to parliament 
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approximates the coalition compromise, thus making monitoring superfluous. Extreme cases are 
when the bill is sponsored by all the governing parties or by the prime minister. Unlike line 
ministers, the prime minister does not have the jurisdiction over a specific policy area. Instead, his 
typical task is supposed to be that of ensuring coordination among the other ministers (see Müller, 
Philipp, and Gerlich 1993). As a consequence, when a bill dealing with a particular policy area is 
presented by the prime minister, we can reasonably suppose that it is the entire cabinet which wants 
the approval of that bill91. Therefore,  
 
H.19 Number of signatory parties: I expect less changes to government bills the larger 
the number of signatory parties.  
 
H.20a Prime minister’s bills: I expect that the bills proposed by the prime minister 
should be less changed in parliament than the bills proposed by other cabinet members.  
 
As for prime ministers’ role, Müller and Meyer (2010: 1086) interestingly suggest a different 
interpretation, arguing that the prime minister can be the member of the cabinet who is mostly 
subject to monitoring activities. In this case, the prime minister is assumed to be an agent of the 
entire coalition (and of the party he belongs to), rather than the representative of the whole 
government, and the (only) party in the coalition which holds the prime ministerial post is in a 
relatively privileged position92. In particular, given the institutional prerogatives they may exploit to 
favour their own constituencies and the media attention they usually receive, prime ministers are 
likely to be particularly risky agents for the entire cabinet93. Therefore, on their turn, the other 
coalition partners are likely to put considerable efforts into controlling prime ministers’ actions (see 
also Müller and Strøm 2008: 192). All that said, it seems reasonable to put forward a second, 
opposite hypothesis involving prime ministers. In particular, 
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 It is worth noting that both the hypotheses concerning the number of signatory parties and prime ministerial bills may 
also rest on a logic based on the costs of decisions. In a seminal work, Buchanan and Tullock (1962: 68-69) provide 
crucial insights into the relationship between the transaction costs of decision making and key features of the political 
system. According to the authors, the higher the number of actors involved in a decision, the higher are decision making 
costs (time and resources needed to reach an agreement). On the other hand, any decision presents external costs: as the 
number of actors involved in a decision becomes small, the external risks and potential costs for those affected by, but 
not participating in, that decision increase. This logic can be employed for understanding the lawmaking process: after a 
decision in the cabinet, one or more governing parties present a bill in the legislature, where the parties (both from the 
government and from the opposition) that were excluded from the decision amend the government bill in order to 
mitigate the costs they would pay if the bill were approved. Therefore, if the number of parties proposing a bill 
increases, the number of parties not participating in that decision necessarily decreases, and hence also the number of 
potential overseers becomes small. Similarly, bills that are signed by the prime minister should minimize external costs 
and hence the transformations undergone in parliament by those bills.   
92
 By this logic, prime ministers are not supposed to be intracoalitional monitoring mechanisms. 
93
 Of course, prime ministers’ powers vary a lot across countries. See Bergman, Müller, Strøm, and Blomgren (2003); 
O’Malley (2007). However, prime ministers are undoubtedly the members of the cabinet who mostly receive media 
attention. 
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H.20b Prime minister’s bills: I expect that the bills proposed by the prime minister 
should be more changed in parliament than the bills proposed by other cabinet 
members.  
 
 
2.4.2 Legislative review plus legislative-level mechanisms 
As previously noted, accountability mechanisms operating in the parliamentary arena reinforce each 
other, thereby making monitoring of hostile ministers more incisive. In particular, both powerful 
committees and committee chairs enable legislators to effectively revise governmental bills. 
Concerning the strength of parliamentary committees, we can follow Martin and Depauw’s (2009) 
logic and hypothesize that  
 
H.21 Strength of legislative committees: The stronger are legislative committees, the more 
they are able to accomplish their review task, and thus the more we should observe changes to 
government bills in the parliamentary arena. 
 
Obviously, testing this hypothesis would require a comparative research design and cross-national 
data. Instead, in the present work I investigate a single country (Italy) whose system of committees 
does not seem to have changed over the considered time span (1987-2006). 
As for committee chairs, several recent works emphasize their role as intacoalitional 
monitoring tools. In particular, as counterweights to cabinet ministers. Therefore, carrying Kim and 
Loewenberg’s (2005) and Carroll and Cox’s (2005) analyses one step further, I formulate the 
following two hypotheses concerning the role of committe chairs:  
 
H.22 Committee chairs (presence): We should expect a higher level of modifications 
made to a bill drafted by a certain minister when the committee to which the bill is 
referred is chaired by one of the minister’s coalition partners.  
 
H.23 Committee chairs (preferences): Taking into account the ideological preferences 
of the chair of the committee to which bills are referred, we should expect more 
modifications the more his preferences diverge from those of the drafting minister.  
 
While the former simply concerns the presence of a counterweight to the proposing minister, the 
latter is a more nuanced hypothesis and takes into account the ideological distance between 
committee chairs and corresponding ministers. Indeed, we should expect more changes to 
government legislation the more the chair’s preferences diverge from those of the drafting minister. 
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The more they converge, the more committees are unlikely to be effective monitoring instruments, 
all else equal.   
Thanks to their considerable powers in fixing the agenda and influencing legislation, Italian 
committee chairs do seem to be able to play such a role, thus making changes to government bills 
more or less likely to occur. Indeed, commitee chairs’ substantial influence over lawmaking has 
commonly been considered one of the key features characterizing the Italian parliament (see, for 
example, Di Palma 1978: 72, 277-289).  
 
 
2.4.3 Junior ministers, committee chairs and coalition treaties 
In their empirical investigation of the patterns of committee chair appointments in the German 
Bundestag, Kim and Loewenberg (2005) formulate and test hypotheses involving two other 
intracoalition monitoring mechanisms described in the literature: junior ministers (Thies 2001) and 
coalition treaties (Müller and Strøm 2000, 2008).  
Concerning the former, as expected the frequency of assigning committee chairs to shadow 
ministries controlled by a party’s coalition partner is inversely related to appointing JMs to 
ministries held by its coalition partner. In other words, monitoring through committee chairs results 
to be an alternative at the legislative level to controlling through JMs at the executive level: since 
the chairs of the Bundestag committees are appointed only after the composition of government has 
been defined and hence in full knowledge of the identity of senior and junior ministers, coalition 
parties are likely to assign their committee chairs to shadow ministries in which they have not been 
able to place JMs (Kim and Loewenberg 2005: 1110)94. In line with these empirical results, we thus 
expect to find that Italian coalition parties use junior ministers and committee chairs as alternative 
monitoring mechanisms.  
As for coalition treaties, Kim and Loewenberg (2005) find that the presence of such 
agreements increases the use of committee chairs in the German Bundestag as instruments for 
monitoring ministers. The existence of coalition agreements encourages the use of other monitoring 
tools: since, as Müller and Strøm (2000: 577) argue, 90% of the content of coalition treaties deals 
with matters of policy, coalition parties have an incentive to ensure that ministers stick to the 
agreed-on compromise, and hence they employ additional monitoring measures (Kim and 
Loewenberg 2005: 1123)95. 
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 This is consistent with Thies’ (2001: 588) suggestion that parliamentary committees and junior ministers might be 
viewed as alternative monitoring mechanisms. He speculates that the unusually strong committees in the German 
Bundestag might be substitutes for junior ministers in keeping tabs on coalition partners. 
95
 See Müller and Strøm (2008) for an estensive cross-national analysis of coalition agreements. Whereas, as the authors 
show, most West European multiparty governments rely on ex ante agreements, Italian coalition parties have almost 
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In general, the existence of an ex ante mechanism such as a coalition treaty should be 
positively related to the use of ex post measures such as the control instruments available to 
coalition parties. Therefore, since when a coalition treaty exists coalition parties have an incentive 
to enforce it and so put more effort into monitoring each other, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H.24 Coalition treaties: We should expect the presence of a coalition treaty to increase the 
amount of modifications made to government bills in parliament, as well as the appointment 
of junior ministers and committee chairs to monitor hostile ministers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
never made use of such documents. The only (partial) exceptions were in 1963 and 1978. The former case concerns the 
Moro I government, at the beginning of the centre-left phase. Although distributed by the DC, that agreement was not 
recorded in any official document. As for the latter, the Andreotti IV cabinet was a single-party government which was 
based on a ‘national solidarity’ agreement signed by all the major parties in parliament (with the exception of the neo-
fascists). This agreement cannot be considered as a fully-fledged coalition agreement (Verzichelli 2000: 457-459). In 
any case, being outside the time span considered in the present work, I will not test the effect of these two coalition 
agreements on the use of other monitoring tools. 
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CHAPTER 3.  
LACK OF INFORMATION 
 
Let us now focus on a second crucial factor for explaining the empirically observable modifications 
made to government-sponsored bills in parliament: the limited level of information at political 
actors’ disposal throughout the legislative process. Generally speaking, cabinet ministers may not 
know completely the other actors’ preferences, and may be unable to perfectly anticipate the effects 
of laws. Hence, when they are introduced to parliament, governmental bills may reflect such lack of 
knowledge. Scrutiny in the legislative arena may thus allow actors to learn and to correct the initial 
proposals. This is possible because, although cabinet ministers are certainly not less staffed than 
ordinary members of parliament, the variety of origins and competences of the legislators and the 
specialization of the parliamentary committees provide the expertise needed to revise governmental 
legislation. 
As Krehbiel argues in his fundamental 1991 volume on information and legislative 
organization, political actors may have only a limited knowledge of whether the policies they 
choose produce actually the outcomes they seek. Embracing an informational perspective on 
legislative institutions, Krehbiel (1991: 20, 66-70) conceptualizes uncertainty as incomplete 
information about the relationship between policies (i.e., objects of legislative choice such as bills 
and laws) and outcomes (i.e., consequences of enacted policies). Legislators are assumed to 
maximize their utility, which depends on the outcomes and not on the policies. Yet, legislators see 
and directly choose policies, but cannot choose outcomes. Indeed, initially legislators can just 
roughly foresee outcomes as a function of the policies under consideration96. To put it bluntly, 
legislators know what they want, but they do not know how to accomplish their goals. What is 
needed to solve this problem is expertise (or specialization), which is defined as precision of 
expectation about the relationship between policies and outcomes. Within the frame of 
informational theories, policy expertise is considered as a potential collective good, whose benefits 
for the entire legislature can be captured only if legislative institutions (committees) provide some 
legislators with incentives to specialize, gather information and share their expertise. Potential 
specialists are thus granted resources to better understand the relationship between policies and 
outcomes as well as to share such knowledge. A well-designed legislature is hence a “producer, 
consumer, and repository of policy expertise” (Krehbiel 1991: 62)97. 
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 Formally, let x be the outcome and p a policy. Legislators’ forecast is x = p + ω, where ω is a random variable whose 
precise value is unknown but whose distribution is known (Krehbiel 1991: 68). 
97
 The informational perspective on legislative organization is a supply-side approach, and sees committees as 
(specialized) agents of production which solve informational problems (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989; Krehbiel 
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Politicians’ informational problems are well-known also in the scholarly literature on 
delegation in multiparty governments. In discussing the implications of the institutional features of 
parliamentary versus presidential constitutions for specific democratic agency problems, Strøm 
(2003) identifies incomplete information as one of the sources of agency loss, the others being 
divergent policy preferences and non-policy motivations such as leisure-shirking and rent seeking. 
More precisely, some critical information concerning the agent may be hidden from the principal’s 
eyes: typically, the agent’s competencies or preferences and/or the agent’s actions. Such problems 
of asymmetric information between principals and their agents are present all along the 
parliamentary chain of delegation (Strøm 2003: 85-93), and are among the primary concerns of 
sevreal important studies of coalition politics under parliamentary governments. As Strøm, Müller 
and Bergman (2008) show, informational asymmetries – together with transaction costs – 
characterize all the stages of coalition politics98.  
All that said, we can imagine that parliamentary changes to government legislation are driven 
by an improvement of the decision makers’ knowledge. This can be especially true for legislation 
addressing complex issues. If a bill deals with a complex subject, neither the proposing minister nor 
the rest of the cabinet are likely to take all the possible aspects into account in the draft version. 
However, during the debate in committees and on the floor legislators are engaged in a process of 
learning in which they discover aspects that previously were unknown (and, necessarily, not 
considered in original version of the bill). Therefore, they correct the bill in order to include this 
new information. This kind of parliamentary scrutiny somehow resembles what Heller (2001: 786) 
calls ‘friendly amendments’ – that is, amendments ‘designed to correct technical or political flaws 
and omissions’. The hypothesis I put forward is the following: 
 
H.25 Complexity: It is reasonable to expect more changes the more complex the 
subject of a governmental bill is. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
1991). In particular, legislative majorities do not always know which policy will achieve the desired outcome, and so 
they need expertise. Since policy expertise is costly, a majority grants special procedural prerogatives to committee 
members, who are thus willing to pay the costs of specialization. In other words, each legislator wants to be assigned to 
the committee which maximizes his capacity to effectively participate in the decision making process. As a 
consequence, committees should be composed of legislators sharing policy expertise in the same area. Krehbiel (1991) 
contrasts his approach with the other major interpretation of legislative organization: the distributive perspective (see 
paragraph 1.1.2). According to this view, which is a demand-driven perspective whereby committees are conceived of 
as agents of allocation, the organization in committees solves distributive problems (Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Fiorina 
1981; Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast 1979; Weingast and Marshall 1988). In particular, 
committees secure benefits to legislators’ constituencies, and thus increase their chances of being reelected. For this 
reason, representatives seek assignments to committees with jurisdiction over issues of vital concern to their 
constituents. As a result, we should expect committees to be composed of legislators with similar interests. A third view 
of legislative organization is Cox and McCubbins’s (1993) partisan perspective. 
98
 On the role of information and uncertainty in politics, see also Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989, 1990), Austen-Smith and 
Riker (1987), and Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). 
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The argument underlying this hypothesis seems particularly reasonable in the presence of 
problems of capacity in the cabinet: if the government agenda is crowded by provisions to examine 
and deliberate, the cabinet may lack the resources (especially time) for taking all (or most) 
necessary decisions. Therefore, cabinet ministers may find it convenient to delegate the learning 
activity to the parliament instead of improving the knowledge at the cabinet level. 
Remarkably, explaining the changes made to government legislation on the basis of the lack 
of knowledge in the cabinet does not exclude the importance of position-taking incentives and 
conflict among political actors. On the contrary, it is possible to imagine that in some circumstances 
the two types of explanation reinforce each other. This is fairly straightforward if we employ the 
status quo and veto players approach. There can be situations in which the status quo is so far from 
the government that a policy change is desired by all the cabinet parties: there are a lot of policy 
alternatives which the governing parties unanimously prefer to the status quo. In these 
circumstances, the coalition parties may jointly choose to delegate to their parliamentary majority 
the definition of the details of legislation: the study in depth of possible implications, the evaluation 
of feasible alternatives, the inclusion of technical aspects, and all the final decisions on the conent 
of bills. Therefore, driven by position-taking utility, the cabinet can deliberate a generic and vague 
bill through which to convey to the electorate a symbolic message of internal cohesion and capacity 
to innovate. This allows governing parties to avoid investing time and energies in examining the 
same issue for a long time in the cabinet, and to concentrate their efforts on more controversial 
policies.   
Apart from the complexity of the subject which is dealt with, it is possible to identify another 
factor that can limit the information at coalition parties’ disposal when they draft bills and propose 
them to the cabinet. If a governmental bill addresses more than one policy area, then both the debate 
and the decision in parliament take place in a multidimensional policy space. Since the decision rule 
is the majority rule, the final outcome is not easily predictable by anyone (Plott 1967; McKelvey 
1976; Schofield 1978), the bargaining process can last longer and more modifications can be made 
to the initial bill. Therefore,  
 
H.26 Multidimensionality: I expect more changes to those bills which can be evaluated 
according to more than one policy dimension. 
 
Individual legislators can use their personal competencies and the specialized expertise 
aquired in parliamentary committees for scrutinizing government-initiated bills. However, some 
representatives may be in a better position to do so: some of them may have better information on 
other actors’ preferences and on the likely effects of laws, as well as a better knowledge of the rules 
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and practices of legislative processes. This informational asymmetry may depend on a number of 
legislators’ personal properties, such as their parliamentary and pre-parliamentary political 
experience.  
In his investigation of the effects of several individual properties on Italian representatives’ 
propensity to introduce legislation, Zucchini (2001) evaluates the effects of MPs’ parliamentary 
seniority, their role in committee, and their experience in the party and in local governments. In 
particular, he shows that parliamentary seniority has a clear influence on MPs’ behaviour with 
regard to both presented and approved bills during the entire period considerded (1987-1998). 
Interestingly, the relation does not seem to be linear. The proportion of both presented and approved 
projects is significantly lower than the overall mean for new members, and significantly higher for 
deputies who have been in parliament for one or two legislatures. Instead, MPs with a seniority of 
three or four legislatures have a proportion which is not different from the mean of the population 
(except for the XII legislature), and in some cases the value for deputies who have been member of 
parliament for more than four legislatures is lower than the overall mean (Zucchini 2001: 66)99. As 
the author argues, ‘legislative activity is the peculiar activity of those parliamentarians who are 
enough experienced to know the rules and practices of the legslative proceedings, but are not yet 
enough known and important to aspire to offices in the cabinet or leading roles in the party they 
belong to’ (Zucchini 2001: 83).  
The influence of the other explanatory factors seems to be less clear. Concerning the role in 
committee, being chair or deputy chair of a committee presents advantages especially for the 
proportion of approved projects, which is significantly larger than the overall mean. Yet, the 
relation holds just in the X and XI legislatures. However, as the high values of the standard 
deviations in the following two legislatures suggest, at least in some committees the chair and the 
deputy chair still have a fundamental role (Zucchini 2001: 68).  
The variables dealing with pre-parliamentary experiences of MPs prove to have some effects 
on their legislative behaviour, but their influence seems to strongly diminish in the XIII legislature, 
after the fall of the Italian party system. Pre-parliamentary experience in the party organization has 
a systematic impact on the propensity to initiate legislation and on the probability of seeing that 
legislation approved. In fact, in all four legislatures, parliamentarians with party experiences at a 
national level have a proportion of both presented and approved projects which is significantly 
higher than the overall mean. However, in the XIII legislature, deputies with no pre-parliamentary 
party experience have proportions of both presented and approved projects that are not different 
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 The Northern League is a perfect example of such a nonlinear relation: both in the case of presented and approved 
projects, its proportion is significantly lower than the overall mean in the XI legislature (when its members were 
newcomers), it increases in the XII and finally becomes non different from the mean in the XIII (Zucchini 2001: 66). 
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from the overall mean, thus losing the disadvantage they previously had. Also the effect of pre-
parliamentary experience in local governments becomes weaker during the years of the transition to 
a new party system: having been a member of a municipal or provincial council has a positive 
impact only in the X legislature, while in the XIII legislature deputies with no experience in local 
governments present a proportion of projects which is not significantly different from the overall 
mean (Zucchini 2001: 67-68)100. Assuming that the variables influencing MPs’ decision to initiate 
legislation affect in a similar way their decision to amend bills, I thus formulate the following set of 
hypotheses: 
 
H.27 Legislators’ parliamentary and pre-parliamentary experience: I expect that MPs 
should be more likely to alter legislation, just as they are to initiate it, when they have a 
relatively long (but not too long) parliamentary experience, and when they had some 
party experiences at a national level or in local governments before their election in the 
national parliament. 
 
Although theoretically interesting, the above mentioned hypotheses will not empirically tested in 
the present work. Indeed, they concern more legislators’s probability of proposing amendments and 
successfully altering bills than the actual number of observable modifications. 
It is rather easy to note that, among all the theoretical hypotheses discussed so far, those based 
on the lack of information are far fewer than those based on position-taking and conflict among 
actors. On the one hand, scholars interested in multiparty policymaking seem to stress much more 
coalition parties’ divergent preferences (and the resulting conflicts) than their information problems. 
Such emphasis is of course understandable, given that, quite tautologically, the most important 
issue in coalition politics is that different parties govern together and have to make joint policy. On 
the other hand, however, information plays a fundamental role also in several of the explanations 
that I classified as based upon conflict. Leaving aside the combination of lack of knowledge and 
veto players approach I discussed above, uncertainty is one of the problems which are at the basis of 
the literature on accountability mechanisms employed in multiparty cabinets. As Strøm, Müller, and 
Smith (2010: 519-520) argue in a recent review, what make particularly difficult to control coalition 
partners are preference divergence, uncertainty and opportunism. Indeed, the use of several control 
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 Zucchini (2001) provides further evidence that an informational logic is at work in the Italian parliament. In the 
second part of the same chapter, he analyzes Italian legislators’ decision to become members of a certain committee. In 
particular, the author discusses and tests the hypotheses on the composition of committees generated by the two major 
alternative approaches on legislative organization: the distributive and the informational perspective. The data support 
the latter perspective: legislators’ profession proves to be a key factor in their decision to become members of a certain 
committee and, as the study of the number of interventions in committee shows, legislators’ propensity toward a certain 
committee due to their profession is reflected in a greater involvement in committee activities (Zucchini 2001: 71-82). 
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instruments is induced by the informational advantage each minister enjoys in her jurisdiction. For 
instance, junior ministers and other cabinet-level devices are employed as means of reducing the 
informational asymmetry between a minister and the rest of the cabinet. The same could be said for 
legislative level instruments such as committees and their chairs, whose powerful resources are 
employed to discover whether ministers are deviating from the coalition’s agreed-upon compromise. 
While distinct from an analytical point of view, in real-world democratic politics the various 
sources of agency loss interact with each other, thus increasing the risks associated with delegation. 
Thus, divergent preferences between principals and agents are typically paired with and exacerbated 
by informational asymmetries favouring the agents (Lupia 2003: 37; Strøm 2003: 86).  
It is worth spending some words also on technical ministers. Remarkably, technical ministers 
are not just the cabinet members who face least position taking incentives, but also those who have 
the best knowledge of the actual policy implications of laws. Their expertise in the issue at hand is a 
second reason for expecting less modifications to the bills they propose. When technicians initiate 
legislation, they draft bills which are well made from a technical point of view. Hence, even in case 
of complex subjects, these bills will not be extensively changed in parliament because all the 
technical information has already been included. 
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CHAPTER 4  
CHANGES IN FORMAL RULES 
 
As any other type of legislative behaviour, also the changes which actors make to governmental 
bills are influenced by the institutional rules regulating parliamentary life. Following North (1990), 
we can conceive of institutions as ‘rules of the game’: the procedural and structural mechanisms 
that actors use to influence policy outcomes. In line with rational choice theory, institutions 
constrain actors, providing them with larger or narrower opportunities, and modifying the incentive 
structure they face101. Conceptualized this way, parliamentary institutions affect legislators’ ability 
to shape legislative outcomes. In particular, for our purposes, certain types of institutions – such as 
amendment rules or other procedures – affect representatives’ ability to modify legislation. 
As previously noted, legislators’ ability to alter governmental bills is influenced by the type of 
amending rule employed as well as by other institutional arrangements. Generally speaking, more 
restrictive institutions reduce the possibility of modifying legislation in parliament. For the purpose 
of the present work, we can distinguish between two types of institutions: 1) the formal rules 
directly regulating the legislative process, and 2) other institutional arrangements which influence, 
but are only indirectly linked to, lawmaking. If we focus on the Italian case, the former include the 
type of amending rule employed as well as other rules which can be relevant: the internal rules of 
parliament, the presence or absence of secret voting, and the rules regulating special legislative 
processes such as the budgetary process. The latter include electoral rules, the strength of the 
committee system, and the type of democracy. 
What should be evaluated is whether, and how, these institutional changes do affect Italian 
MPs’ ability to amend government legislation. Indeed, when insitutional changes are accomplished 
by reforms of the rules, also behavioural changes take place 102 . Rational actors adapt their 
behaviour in response to the modifications occurred in the institutional setting, and may search for 
and adopt new strategies in order to pursue their goals103.   
In any case, many of the institutional explanations I introduce in the following pages are 
discussed just for purposes of completeness. Indeed, except for some important changes, the impact 
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 For an introduction to the role of institutions in rational choice theory, see Weingast (2002).  
102
 Within the rational choice theory, political institutions are analyzed as either exogenous or endogenous. The former 
approach is the one employed in the present section and studies how institutions affect individual interactions and 
choices. The latter, i.e. the neo-institutional perspective, maintains that institutions are themselves endogenous: rules 
and structures can be explained in terms of goal-oriented human behaviour. According to North (1990), for instance, 
institutions are ‘man made rules’, ‘humanly devised constraints’. 
103
 As Weingast (1992: 160) argues, this is unlikely to occur all at once. Since actors are substantially uncertain about 
what strategies, conventions, or rules will succeed, we should expect considerable experimentation, and also dead ends. 
However, when a strategy proves to be successful, it will be repeated and eventually adopted as optimal. 
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of most reforms in institutional rules cannot be empirically evaluated with my research design. As 
for the formal rules regulating the legislative process (i.e., the first set of institutional explanations), 
Italian ordinary legislation is approved under an open amending rule. However, as I will discuss, if 
legislators are enough impatient they may behave as if a more restrictive rule were in force in 
parliament. Concerning the formal changes in the standing orders, only the 1997 reform can be 
evaluated104. Moreover, the secret ballot was abolished in 1988, while my data concern the Italian 
governmental laws approved between 1987 and 2006 and thus include just one year of secret voting. 
Further, the impact of the reforms of the Italian budgetary process cannot be tested since budgetary 
laws are excluded from my sample.  
With regard to the institutional rules external to the parliamentary process (i.e., the second set 
of hypotheses), the study of a single country does not allow to assess whether the strength of 
committees or the type of democracy affect legislators’ ability to amend governmental bills. As for 
the latter factor, however, some scholars define the First Italian Republic as a consensual system 
and the Second Republic as a (more) majoritarian system. Another ‘external’ major change 
occurred during the period under consideration was the 1993 reform of the electoral system, which 
turned from a purely proportional representation system into a mixed one. Yet, as I will discuss, the 
conjectures that can be put forward on the basis of that electoral reform concern mostly the 
behaviour of individual legislators, the study of which is out of the scope of the present work.  
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 Another major change is the 1996 verdict of the Italian Supreme Court, which prohibited the reiteration of decree-
laws. 
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4.1 FORMAL RULES REGULATING THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
 
4.1.1 Type of amending rule  
Since more restrictive rules decrease representatives’ ability to alter legislation in parliament, any 
change of amending rule from the open rule type to the closed rule type will decrease the amount of 
modifications made to government bills. Such a logic has been of primary importance for scholars 
relying on a distributive perspective of legislative institutions (see above, paragraph 1.1.2). In 
particular, in investigating how different rules influence the final allocation of benefits among 
districts, the theoretical literature on procedures has focused on two issues: the rules regulating the 
sequence of voting, and those setting the type of admissible amendments. Although voting 
procedures are clearly important because they establish who has an influence on the final legislative 
outcomes, and when, for the purposes of the present work amendment rules are more interesting105.  
In a series of fundamental works, Baron (1989, 1991) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989) address 
the issue of how legislatures reach agreements on how to choose distributive projects. In particular, 
Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) bargaining model takes into consideration the formal rules governing 
agenda formation and voting (i.e., the sequential nature of proposal making, amending, and voting) 
in legislatures with majority rule. The authors view policy, and the budget in particular, as a 
distributive problem among districts, and conceive of legislative bargaining as a process conducted 
according to the formal rules governing agenda formation and voting – that is, those which specify 
who may make proposals and how they will be decided. They point out that, although such rules 
and the structure of the legislature shape legislative outcomes, standard social choice theory finds 
voting equilibria that only rarely take these aspects into account. On the contrary, Baron and 
Ferejohn (1989: 1183) endogenize the institutional structure of both the agenda formation process 
and the voting mechanism, and in particular the amendment rule (closed versus open) employed by 
the legislature.  
Their model shows that in a noncooperative, multisession, and multilateral game, equilibria 
exist, and that the structural element of the legislature that allows such equilibria is the sequential 
process by which proposals are made and voted on. Remarkably, whether the equilibrium is 
majoritarian (thus reflecting the majoritarian nature of the voting rule as predicted by Riker 1962), 
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 As for the literature on timing of voting, see for example Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987). Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) 
study in theoretical terms the determination of the size of the budget under the two alternative procedures regulating the 
order of voting: (1) vote first on the size and then on the composition of the budget; (2) vote first on the composition 
and then on the size of the budget. The result the authors reach is rather counterintuitive: it is not always the case that 
the size of the budget is smaller when legislatures follow the former procedure, relative to the case they follow the latter. 
More precisely, the size of the budget is in general not independent of the order of votes, but the relative size of the 
budget with different voting procedures depends on the distribution of legislators’ preferences for the composition of 
the budget. Recently, Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997) have revisited this issue. 
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or universalistic (as expected by Weingast 1979), stems from the amendment rule used in the 
legislature. A closed rule implies that a proposal made by a member of the legislature is 
immediately voted on against the status quo: if the motion is approved, the legislature adjourns, 
while if it is rejected, the status quo prevails and the benefits are not distributed. Conversely, an 
open rule allows on the floor amendments to the proposed motion. As shown by the model, under a 
closed rule the equilibrium outcomes are majoritarian in nature, the first proposal is passed, and 
benefits are allocated to a minimal majority. Moreover, within the majority the author of the 
winning proposal achieves between half and two-thirds of the benefits. On the other hand, under an 
open rule, the bargaining outcome may be either universalistic (if the legislature is small and its 
members find delay in the passage of legislation to be very costly), or majoritarian (if the legislature 
is large and impatience is not substantial). In addition, the benefits are evenly distributed within the 
winning majority, and the member recognized to make a proposal has reduced agenda powers. 
However, she gets more benefits that any other member. Maintaining that the amendment rule 
employed in a legislature is endogenous, Baron and Ferejohn (1989: 1198-1199) predict that, unless 
there is no impatience, legislatures prefer a closed rule to an open rule. In fact, since legislators face 
strong incentives to use their opportunity to make a proposal securing benefits to their own 
constituencies, and under an open rule this may result in costly delay, a closed rule may be adopted 
to avoid that cost106. 
In their analysis of budget institutions as an explanation of cross-country variation in fiscal 
policy107, Alesina and Perotti (1999: 20) show how Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) logic can be 
applied to the budgetary process in parliamentary systems108. Since in a parliamentary context the 
agenda setter in the budget process is the government, closed amendment rules strengthen the 
government and weaken the floor of the legislature. Under closed rules, the legislature cannot 
amend the size of the deficit, budgets are approved rapidly, and the outcome is closer to the 
preferences of the government, at the expense of minority groups in the legislature. Under open 
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 Remarkably, as Baron and Ferejohn (1989: 1199) admit, at least in the U.S. Congress, emprirical evidence does not 
support this prediction. Neither chamber frequently employs a closed rule. However, in the House of Representatives a 
variety of rules to constrain the possibility of amending legislative proposals on the floor is used, and the Senate has 
increasingly resorted to unanimous agreements to limit time or amendment activity. In any case, as the authors put it, 
their results can be explained by the fact that the internal structure of the legislature (e.g., the committee system) is not 
included in their model. 
107
 Alesina and Perotti (1999: 14) define budgetary institutions as ‘all the rules and regulations according to which 
budgets are prepared, approved, and carried out’. 
108
 According to Alesina and Perotti (1999: 18), the greater the number of actors enabled to influence budgetary politics, 
the more difficult it is to keep deficits under control. This depends on the budgetary procedures employed, e.g. the 
sequence of voting and amendments rules. Such procedures produce iterative collective action problems, in which 
rational legislators from both the government and the opposition continually face incentives to defect from austerity 
agreements and ensure particular benefits for narrow constituencies. Quite obviously, this occurs at the expense of 
collective fiscal austerity. 
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rules, by contrast, the approval of the budget is slower, budgets distribute benefits to larger 
majorities, and the allocation of benefits are less uneven109.  
As previously noted, the Italian parliament approves ordinary legislation under an open 
amending rule. However, as Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) model shows, there are factors which 
may induce legislatures to prefer more resctrictive amendment rules. One of these is impatience. 
Being impatient means discounting the utility of future payoffs. For the purposes of the present 
work, we can imagine that the more the actors involved in the legislative process are impatient, the 
more they are willing to accept the original text of the bills as proposed by government. Indeed, 
trying to correct the initial proposal could mean lengthening the debate in parliament, thus 
postponing its approval. It could even happen that, due to legislators’ attempts to modify it, the bill 
is not approved at all. If it were the case, nobody would get anything. Therefore, since for impatient 
politicians having something now is better than having it in the future (and, of course, is better than 
having nothing), the initial bill will receive relatively few changes during the legislative process. 
Although the open amending rule is not formally changed, legislators tend to modify less the initial 
proposal, behaving as if a closed rule were in force.  
For elected politicians, there is one major reason to be impatient: the approach of the end of 
their tenure because of new general elections. At the beginning of the parliamentary term, 
representatives reasonably expect to have enough time to alter government-sponsored legislation, 
thus being able to introduce the modifications they desire. By contrast, as the legislative term 
proceeds, they know that the time for altering bills in parliament is becoming smaller and smaller, 
and hence the value they assign to future benefits or policy achievements progressively decreases. 
In the extreme case when the end of the constitutional term is near, such a value is very close to 
zero110. As a consequence, it is possible to formulate the following hypothesis taking into account 
representatives’ degree of impatience:    
 
H.28 Impatience: We should expect less changes in parliament to governmental bills 
the more the legislative term progresses. 
  
4.1.2 Standing order reforms 
Changes in the internal rules of parliament may have a considerable impact on legislators’ ability to 
amend government-sponsored bills. The standing orders regulate legislative life and define the role 
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 Therefore, as for the choice of rules, closed rules are more appropriate for countries with high debt and/or in periods 
of macroeconomic instability, when the rapid adoption of fiscal measures is needed. On their turn, open rules can be 
adopted in low-debt countries and/or in periods of fiscal stability, where concerns of allocative efficiency and fairness 
tend to be predominant (Alesina and Perotti 1999: 20). 
110
 I do not consider here the possibility of strategic parliamentary dissolution (see Strøm and Swindle 2002). 
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of the actors moving in the legislature: individual MPs, parliamentary groups, committee and their 
chairs, presidents of the chambers, and the government. Modifications in internal rules may 
therefore grant government legislation more or less protection by leaving more or less room for 
amendatory activity.   
The weakening of the government in the legislative process is commonly considered the main 
effect of the reforms of the standing orders of both Italian chambers enacted in 1971. As Capano 
and Giuliani (2003b: 12-13) point out in analyzing the evolution of the Italian parliament’s role in 
the legislative process, the 1971 reforms formally ratified the praxis and theory of the ‘centrality of 
parliament’, producing the further weakening of government’s position in the legislative process111. 
In particular, the changes strengthened the parliamentary groups (which were granted unequivocal 
protection at the expense of the government), their leaders (whose predominant role in determining 
the parliamentary agenda was formalized by the adoption of the unanimity rule in their conference), 
and the standing committees (which were given increased powers of inquiry and of governmental 
oversight)112. As a consequence, we should expect less modifications to government bills before the 
1971 reforms than in the following period. 
The internal rules of both Italian chambers underwent a number of changes also during the 
1980s and 1990s. Remarkably, in 1997 the standing orders of the Chamber of Deputies were 
reformed, in an attempt to strengthen the government in the legislative process. The unanimity in 
the conference of the leaders of parliamentary groups was replaced by a quorum of three-quarters of 
all representatives (although when the quorum could not be reached, the power to plan the 
parliamentary activities was delegated to the president of the chamber), the government was given 
the chance to notify parliament formally of its priorities, and important restrictions on speech times, 
on the timing of the legislative process and on the selection of amendments were introduced (see 
Capano and Giuliani 2003b: 14). To sum up, we should hence expect more changes made to 
governmental legislation in the period 1971-1997 than in the periods before and after it.  
However, as previously noted, only the impact of the 1997 reform can be evaluated. Moreover, 
most of all, it is not clear whether any expectation concerning the 1997 reform is plausible. Indeed, 
the literature on Italian lawmaking suggests that the reforms of parliamentary rules introduced 
during the 1980s and 1990s did not succeed in strengthening the government in the legislative 
process. As Capano and Giuliani (2003b: 15) argue, in spite of all these changes, the government 
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 For a similar interpretation of the 1971 reforms, see also Cotta (1994: 74); Hine (1993: 188-189); Zucchini (2005: 
11-12). See also D’Onofrio (1979); Della Sala (1988, 1993, 1998); Leonardi, Nanetti, and Pasquino (1978). 
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 Moreover, according to Capano and Giuliani (2003b: 12-13), the 1971 reforms were the institutional prerequisite for 
the subsequent changes in the political framework – that is, the formation in 1976 of a government (Andreoti III) 
supported by the Communists. In addition, after 1971 parliamentary activities were increasingly conducted in 
consensual-assemblearistic manners, thus making the legislative process totally exhausting, inefficient and ineffective. 
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has not been granted adequate powers to lead the discussion, and in the amendatory process it is still 
in a weak position vis-à-vis individual MPs. It is the leaders of parliamentary groups and the 
presidents of the chambers, and not the executive, who actually have the legislative agenda power. 
In addition, individual legislative initiative remains unrestricted, and the powers of committees have 
not been reduced but widened113. Also in Zucchini’s (2005: 10) view the changes in formal rules 
occurred in the last decades did not succeed in strengthening the government in the parliamentary 
process. Indeed, the government has been able to strengthen its lawmaking role only by using 
delegating laws, exceptional instruments as decree-laws, or disputable practices as maxi 
amendments. 
 
4.1.3 Abolition of secret ballot 
The drastic curtailment in the use of secret voting in 1988 has been undoubtedly one of the most 
fundamental reforms in the internal rules of the Italian parliament, and probably the most important 
change regarding voting and amendments. The abolition of secret ballot strengthened the position of 
Italian governments in the legislative process, making them better able to control their 
parliamentary majorities and defend their own bills from amendments (and failures) in the 
legislature.  
Until 1988, the secret voting was required for the final vote on any bill in the Chamber of 
Deputies, while in the Senate it had to be adopted if asked for by at least 20 representatives – that is, 
by a medium-size opposition party. Importantly, in both houses it was possible to ask for the secret 
vote at any stage of the legislative process, and also on amendments. Only the government, by 
calling a vote of confidence, was able to stop secret voting. However, in the Chamber, whenever the 
government made particular articles of bills issues of confidence (thus allowing for an open roll-
call), still a secret vote on the final bill was required. And this could happen even in the case the bill 
itself consisted of just one article, as many bills converting decrees into laws do. In other words, it 
was possible to have two votes on exactly the same text: in the first vote, by open roll-call, the 
government could obtain a positive vote on the question of confidence attached to the (unique) 
article; in the second vote, the ‘final’ vote on the full text, the bill could be defeated by the secret 
voting (see Hine 1993: 191; Zucchini 2005: 16; Manzella 2003: 338). 
Clearly, during the First Republic the secret voting was widely used to the detriment of 
government legislation, and thus prevented Italian governments from effectively controlling their 
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 In Capano and Giuliani’s (2003b: 15) words, ‘20 years of reform of internal procedures had proven incapable of 
substantially affecting the historically rooted consensual style that characterises parliamentary life’. According to Cotta 
(1994: 83), although several reforms in rules and procedures have been undertaken, during the last four decades ‘a 
considerable degree of institutional inertia has prevented these changes from affecting too deeply the balance of powers 
within the executive-legislative subsystem’. 
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parliamentary majorities (see, for example, Cotta 1988: 137; Cotta 1994: 68; Furlong 1990: 1963; 
Hine 1993: 190-193). In paricular, as Forestiere and Pelizzo (2004: 4-5) stress, the use of secret 
votes favoured the practice of the so-called ‘franchi tiratori’, or ‘snipers’: members of parliament 
who vote against their party’s position, or against the government’s position (when their party is a 
member of the governing coalition). Under secret ballots, backbenchers were able to defect without 
being politically punished by their party leaders: since there was no official record on how 
backbenchers voted, party whips were unable to identify defectors, who therefore could not be 
sanctioned. This way, as Fedeli and Forte (2007: 312) point out, snipers were able to reduce Italian 
governments’ control over their parliamentary majorities’ voting behaviour, and in the legislature 
secret coalitions involving MPs from both the majority and the opposition frequently formed, 
mostly for rent seeking purposes. During the 1980s, on three notable occasions (Cossiga in 1980, 
Spadolini in 1982, and Craxi in 1986) snipers even provoked the downfall of the government (Hine 
1993: 190-191). 
The 1988 reform abolished the secret ballot, whose use was confined to bills affecting civil 
liberties. As Cotta (1994: 79) points out, the purpose of the reform was to make Italian governments 
better able to control their supporting coalition in the legislature, preventing dissenters from 
defecting without any sanctions114. 
Since the abolition of secret ballot is commonly associated to the strengthening of the 
government in the legislative process, and to the curtailment of MPs’ ability to influence 
government legislation, it seems reasonable to expect to observe less modifications to government 
bills after such a reform than before, all else equal. 
 
4.1.4 Budgetary reforms 
Italian budgetary process has changed several times since its first introduction in 1978. The reforms 
mainly regarded the content of the financial law, the amendment regime, and the documents and 
bills to be examined in parliament throughout the process (see Verzichelli 1999; Verzichelli e 
Vassallo 2004; Zangani 1998). They attempted to develop a rational and planned approach to public 
expenditure which would have yielded better economic results and a reduction in the micro-
distributive legislation produced (see Hine 1993: 180; Zucchini 2005: 19). According to Hine (1993: 
182), the fundamental problem in the Italian budget procedure has been the permeability of the 
                                                 
114
 According to Zucchini (2005: 16), a remarkable consequence of the abolition of secre ballot is the strengthening of 
the question of confidence as an instrument in the hands of Italian governments. As previously noted, before 1988 
governments could not attach any question of confidence to the final voting since the vote on the question of confidence 
could not be secret. Thus, in two separate votes on the same texts, governments could be defeated on the same bill on 
which they already won a vote of confidence. Moreover, in the author’s view, the 1988 reform made the practice of 
maxi amendments more convenient.   
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parliament to the demands coming from a multiplicity of interests. In the author’s view, two other 
features exacerbate this problem: Italian administrative and parliamentary tradition, which places 
more emphasis on procedures and legal controls than on economic management; and a wide array 
of procedural opportunities within the legislature which may encourage extensive parliamentary 
activity throughout the amendment process and the passage of the budget.  
It would be thus interesting to evaluate whether, and to what degree, an important reform 
introduced in 1988 has been able to mitigate the key problem of the Italian budget procedure, 
making modifications to the financial laws less likely to occur. 
Until 1978, Italy did not actually have any financial law, and the budget discussed in 
parliament was limited to the budget of the central government. Due to the lack of any financial 
legislative instrument, the Italian parliament probably enjoyed a considerable ability to intervene in 
the economic and financial planning and on all money bills (see Zucchini 2005: 19). The financial 
law was introduced in 1978, when the first budgetary reform ocurred. The reform increased the 
room for the discussion on the budget in parliament, and organized the budgetary process as the 
discussion and approval of two legislative instruments: the budget and the financial law for the 
subsequent year. Since the budget law is the formal law allocating expenditures and revenues on the 
basis of the existing laws, whereas the financial law may change the existing legislation affecting 
revenues and expenditures, thus shaping yearly the entire fiscal picture, the latter is the venue in 
which the amending pressure is actually exerted, while the former is barely modified (see Fedeli 
and Forte 2007: 310, n. 1). However, the 1978 reform had effects rather different from those 
intended. As Zucchini (2005: 19-20) stresses, legislators were still able to freely amend the financial 
bill (both in the committee and on the floor), and the section fixing the overall spending could be 
voted at the end of the process. Indeed, as pointed out by Hine (1993: 185-186, 195), since the 
finance bill, unlike ordinary legislation, was guaranteed to pass, legislators began to see it as a 
reliable channel through which to promote their (individually) minor spending provisions. 
Therefore, once they understood this, legislators increasingly subjected the financial bill to a 
‘bombardment of amendments’, which very often drastically altered the parameters originally 
proposed by the government, and in such a way that the control of the borrowing requirement 
resulted more and more difficult to manage115. As a consequence, the 1978 attempt to regulate 
Italian budgetary process by concentrating expenditure proposals into a single annual finance bill 
did not succeed in producing better financial outcomes and less micro distributive legislation 
(indeed, it produced the so called financial omnibus laws). 
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 In Hine’s (1993: 185) words, the autumn budget cycle became ‘an unedifying, and for the government’s busy 
parliamentary managers anarchic, scramble of favours exchanged across factions, parties of the majority, and not 
infrequently across the boundaries of government and opposition’. 
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The room for amendatory activity during the Italian budgetary process seems to have been 
reduced in 1988. In 1988, with the second budgetary reform, the Document of Economic and Fiscal 
Planning (DPEF) was introduced. The DPEF fixes the balance of the consolidated budget of the 
central government sector, and the government has to present it before the budgetary session, in 
July. Once approved by the parliament, the DPEF thus constrains the balance of the financial law. 
In addition, the 1988 reform extended the scope of the financial law to the consolidated budget of 
the ‘central government sector’ which, among others, includes the social security institutions. 
Moreover, after 1988 both the DPEF and the financial law were able to affect the whole 
consolidated budget of the ‘public administration’, including the lower level governments (regions, 
provinces, municipalities) and the public health-care institutions (see Fedeli and Forte 2007: 312). 
Putting forward hypotheses regarding the budgetary process, it would seem thus reasonable to 
expect to observe more changes to financial bills before the second budgetary reform (i.e. in the 
1978-1988 period), than after it116. 
It is worth noting that, according to Zucchini (2005: 19-20), the 1988 reform, as well all the 
other changes in the Italian budgetary procedures, has strengthened the agenda setting power of the 
presidents of the chambers and of the Budget Committees, without improving so much the role of 
the executive. On the one hand, through the DPEF governments are able to limit the range of the 
parliamentary action, since they can constrain the balance of the financial law at the beginning of 
the budgetary process. On the other hand, however, the most fundamental filtering functions in the 
following stages are carried out by the parliamentary bodies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
116
 The years before 1978 cannot be considered because, as previously noted, the legislative instrument of the financial 
law was introduced in Italy only in 1978. 
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4.2 ‘EXTERNAL’ INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
4.2.1 Electoral reforms 
Two electoral reforms took place during the 1987-2006 period: the reduction of preference votes in 
the PR electoral system in 1991 and the adoption of a mixed electoral system in 1993 (see 
D’Alimonte and Chiaramonte 1995; Katz 1996).   
In investigating the role of the Italian parliament in the budgetary process, Forestiere and 
Pelizzo (2004) test the effect of the changes in the electoral rules occurred in Italy at the beginning 
of the 1990s on the legislature’s ability to influence the national budget. According to the authors, 
parliaments’ powers to shape, alter, and modify the budget are constrained by both institutional and 
political factors. On the institutional side, rules such as those concerning amendments and voting 
procedures prove to be fundamental (see, for instance, Alesina and Perotti 1999); on the political 
side, fragmentation and ideological polarization in the legislature are crucial factors (Forestiere and 
Pelizzo 2004: 2-4). As the authors put it, the Italian parliament provides a perfect setting for testing 
the effect of institutional and political factors on the parliament’s ability to amend financial 
legislation, since in Italy major reforms in both the institutional design and the party system have 
taken place over the last 20 years (Forestiere and Pelizzo 2004: 4).  
In particular, the institutional reforms included the abolition of the secret ballot in 1988 (see 
above), the 1990 revision of the parliament’s decentralized agenda setting process with the 
strengthening of the presidents of the chambers (see above), and the reduction of preference votes in 
the electoral system in 1991. As for the latter reform, in 1991 a national referendum reduced the 
number of preferences that voters could express on the ballot to only one (from a maximum of three 
or four), thus producing a proportional representation system with single preference which was 
completely revised in 1993. However, the 1991 change was important, since up to the reform the 
multiple preference voting system considerably affected the political behaviour of both voters and 
representatives. In fact, since a higher number of preference votes could make a difference for a 
legislative seat, inter-party competition was coupled with particularly strong intra-party competition: 
in order to get the highest number of preferences, individual legislators were strongly induced to 
secure benefits for their own constituencies, as well as to gain popularity and name recognition 
(Forestiere and Pelizzo 2004: 6).  
On the other hand, at the beginning of the 1990s Italy experienced changes in the party system 
associated with the 1993 electoral system reform. As Forestiere and Pelizzo (2004: 6-7) stress, 
together with strongly inducing legislators to secure benefits for their own constituencies, up to the 
1990s the Italian PR electoral system produced extensive fragmentation and polarization in the 
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party system – that is, an extremely high number of effective parties in the legislature and an 
extremely high percentage of support for the extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing parties, 
respectively. Such a highly fragmented and polarized party system resulted in a relatively 
undisciplined parliament. In particular, the high number of parties made bargaining costs within 
parliament quite high, providing individual MPs with incentives to defect from party mandates and 
from governmental discipline. Moreover, the presence of extreme ideological polarization made it 
difficult to reach encompassing collective decisions, leading individual legislators to logroll 
particularistic policies and approving bills reflecting a variety of interests. The 1993 electoral 
reform had an impact on the party system, reducing its fragmentation and polarization. 
Forestiere and Pelizzo test whether the parliamentary influence over the Italian budgetary 
process has been affected by the institutional reforms and/or the changes in the electoral and party 
system. Their empirical results show that the institutional factors (the 1988 abolition of the secret 
vote, the 1990 revision of the parliament’s decentralized agenda setting process, the 1991 reduction 
of preference votes), taken together, reduced the ability of the parliament to amend government 
budgetary bills. On the contrary, the political factors (lower legislative fragmentation and legislative 
polarization) did not prove to have any significant impact (Forestiere and Pelizzo 2004: 7-8)117. 
Thus, Forestiere and Pelizzo (2004) empirically evaluate the effect of the changes in the 
electoral rules occurred in Italy at the beginning of the 1990s on the parliament’s ability to modify 
budgetary bills. Indeed, they do it only in partial and indirect ways. Partial, because they put all the 
three institutional reforms they consider into the same index, and therefore they are not able to 
assess the specific impact of each factor (in particular the reduction of preference vote). Indirect, 
because the impact of the 1993 electoral reform is not empirically evaluated per se, but through its 
effect on legislative fragmentation and polarization. 
In any case, we can follow Forestiere and Pelizzo’s (2004) logic (at least in part) and put 
forward conjectures involving the effects of electoral systems reforms on MPs’ ability to alter 
government legislation118. In particular, we should expect the 1991 reduction of preference vote to 
make legislators less likely to scrutinize government bills119. In addition, as for the 1993 electoral 
reform leading to a (quasi)plurality system, since its introduction we expect more (presented) 
amendments from legislators elected in majoritarian districts than from those elected by the 
proportional rule. Indeed, the former must demonstrate a greater attention to the local interests of 
                                                 
117
 Incidentally, Forestiere and Pelizzo (2004: 7, 10, tab. 1) also show that the Italian parliament has not always been a 
‘rubber stamp’ on financial policy. Instead, at times it has been an important actor in determining spending prorities. 
118
 Although Forestiere and Pelizzo (2004) consider amendments on budgetary bills, their argument can be applied to 
governmental bills in general. 
119
 In any case, it is worth noting that the PR system with single preference produced by the 1991 referendum was used 
only once, in the 1992 elections. 
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their districts than the latter (Zucchini 2001: 65). In other words, the introduction of a 
(quasi)plurality electoral system increased the importance of communication between each 
representative and his own constituency (Giuliani and Capano 2001: 18-22). 
Trying to put it all together, legislators should be more likely to (try to) alter governmental 
bills before 1992 and after 1994, and in the latter case my expectation concerns only those elected 
in plurality districts. However, it seems not possible to formulate hypotheses comparing the pre-
1992 situation with the post-1994 one. Representatives elected both in the PR system with multiple 
preferences and in the majoritarian districts of the mixed system faced strong incentives to send 
signals to their own consituencies. 
 
4.1.2 Type of democracy 
According to Martin and Vanberg (2005: 105), in addition to preference divergence between 
coalition parties and the set of control variables they include in their analysis, a number of 
institutional rules and coalition-specific features may be relevant in explaining the modifications 
made to government bills: the majoritarian versus consensus nature of democracy, the presence and 
strength of legislative institutions supporting the role of legislators in the lawmaking process, and 
the type of government coalition.  
Let me now concentrate on the first factor, the other two having already been discussed in 
pevious paragraphs. Consensus democracies, with PR electoral systems and multiple parties in 
government, typically enable coalition parties to extensively revise government legislation. They do 
so by providing a number of parliamentary institutions (above all, a large number of powerful 
committees with jurisdictions that shadow those of government ministries) that strengthen the role 
of legislators during the lawmaking process. Conversely, majoritarian democracies commonly 
feature relatively few committees with policy jurisdictions that only weakly correspond to those of 
government departments and limited ability to modify government bills. The instruments at 
coalition parties’ disposal to correct their coalition partners are thus relatively weak. Therefore, in 
majoritarian systems we should expect that multiparty governments either rely more on cabinet-
level tools, or do not monitor coalition partners at all, as in a ‘ministerial autonomy’ regime120.  
Martin and Vanberg (2005: 98) cannot investigate the impact of the three above mentioned 
factors, since they hold them as fixed in their analysis. In fact, the authors control for these factors 
by choosing two very similar cases – that is, by adopting a ‘control by design’ strategy. They select 
two consensus countries (Germany and the Netherlands), with PR electoral systems, multiparty 
                                                 
120
 In any case, the type of democracy and the strength of the legislative institutions (committees) are only partially 
correlated. Indeed, as Martin and Vanberg (2005: 105) suggest, also among consensus systems there is variation in the 
strength of legislative institutions. 
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governments, and powerful legislative committees. Moreover, in the considered period (1983-94 
and 1982-94, respectively) those two countries were characterized by majority government 
coalitions only. 
Analyzing a single country, as I do, would typically make it impossible to assess the impact of 
alternative types of democracy. On the basis of Lijphart’s (1999) conceptual map, I should simply 
consider Italy as a consensus democracy121. However, as emphasized by some scholars, a number of 
changes occurring in the mid-1990s may have moved Italy more towards the majoritarian type: the 
adoption of a quasi-plurality electoral system in 1993 (see above), the establishment of a bi-polar 
party system (Newell 2000), the emergence of clear electoral majorities after elections (Bartolini 
and D’Alimonte 1998), and government alternation (Zucchini 2005, 2006)122.  Since in majoritarian 
systems executives are normally able to strictly control the passage of their bills throughout the 
legislative process,   
 
H.29 Type of democracy: Government bills should be more extensively modified in the 
First Republic than in the Second Republic.  
 
It is worth noting that such an argument leads to expectations which are opposite to those 
derived from the hypothesis dealing with government alternation (H.4). Compared to the First 
Italian Republic, in the Second Republic we should expect less changes to government legislation if 
we take into account the type of democracy, and more changes if we consider the possibility of 
alternation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121
 More precisely, on Lijphart’s bidimensional map, Italy is fairly close to the consensus ideal type of democracy in the 
dimension concerning executives and parties, which is more relevant for the purposes of this work. On the other 
dimension, the federal-unitary one, Italy is rather in the middle (Lijphart 1999: chapter 13).  
122
 See also Gundle and Parker (1996); Di Palma, Fabbrini, and Freddi (2000). For an alternative view stressing the 
persistence of consensual practices, see Capano and Giuliani (2001a,b; 2003a,b). 
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CHAPTER 5.  
DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
 
 
I will test the hypotheses outlined in the literature and discussed in the previous chapters against 
evidence from Italy. More precisely, I use a dataset tracking the legislative history of all the 
governmental laws introduced in the Chamber of Deputies during the 1987-2006 period. My 
research strategy thus involves a theoretically comprehensive specification and an extensive 
empirical design – that is, many explanatory variables and a relatively large number of cases123. 
The present chapter addresses some relevant methodological issues. In the first section, I 
motivate the selection of Italy as a case study and introduce the original dataset on Italian 
governmental legislation against which I conduct my empirical analysis of the modifications made 
to government bills. Then, in the second section, I spell out and discuss the operationalization of my 
dependent variable – government bill changes – and show some simple descriptive statistics. The 
third section, finally, is devoted to the operationalization of the independent variables derived from 
the theoretical explanations that I discussed in the previous chapters. In particular, after clarifying 
which of the discussed hypotheses cannot be tested with the present research design, I will illustrate 
in detail how I measured the right-hand-side variables included in my analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
123
 See Müller, Bergman, and Strøm (2008: 33-35). 
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5.1 THE DATASET 
 
5.1.1 The Italian case 
The choice of analyzing Italy as a single case study undoubtedly presents both advantages and 
disadvantages. As for the former, although being a single country, Italy provides considerable 
variation with regard to some of the crucial theoretical explanations of amendatory activity 
previously discussed. First of all, the sample of bills is likely to exhibit substantial variance in terms 
of ideological divergence within the cabinet. This would allow to test Martin and Vanberg’s (2005) 
hypothesis, which is currently one of the main (and most popular) theoretical explanations of the 
changes made to governmental bills during the legislative process. Given the relatively large 
number of parties traditionally involved in coalition governments and the cabinet instability typical 
of the Italian political system since the end of World War II (Verzichelli 2003: 452-456, 465), a 
considerable amount of variation in ideological divergence across government-sponsored bills is 
likely to be registered in Italy. In fact, such variation derives from two sources: ideological 
divergence can vary (1) across the policy areas addressed by different bills (for any given 
government) and (2) with changes in the party composition of the government or in the party 
controlling a particular ministry. In addition, investigating Italian government-sponsored legislation 
allows to assess the impact of two explanatory factors in terms of which most of the other 
parliamentary countries would not offer enough variation: government alternation and technical 
ministers. As for alternation, Italy is the only (West European) parliamentary country to experience 
a change from a pivotal party system to an alternational party system. Such a ‘majoritarian miracle’ 
was made possible in Italy by the adoption of a mixed electoral system in 1993 (Bartolini and 
D’Alimonte 1998)124. Therefore, in this respect, Italy is more than just a single case study: featuring 
two distinct electoral systems125 and two extremely different party systems, it can be split into a 
‘First’ Republic (up to 1994) and a ‘Second’ Republic (from 1994 onwards)126. Italy stands out 
from the other parliamentary countries concerning technical ministers, too. According to Andeweg 
and Nijzink (1995: 159), non-partisan ministers have become extremely rare in Western Europe. 
Moreover, in the few countries where non-partisan ministers are sometimes appointed, usually they 
are sooner or later enlisted by one of the governing parties. By contrast, technical ministers (and 
                                                 
124
 According to Bartolini and D’Alimonte (1998), the other majoritarian miracle was the emergence of a clear 
governmental majority in the elections from 1994 onwards.  
125
 Indeed, in 1952 the Italian electoral system was reformed in a more majoritarian way. However, the PR system was 
soon re-established. 
126
 The XI and XII legislatures (1992-1994 and 1994-1996, respectively) are commonly considered as a transition 
period between the First and Second Italian Republic (see Cotta and Isernia 1996). Here, 1994 is considered as the 
beginning of the Second Republic because in that year the new electoral system came into force, almost all the old 
governing parties disappeared and new or previously excluded parties won (or had the actual possibility to win) the 
elections (see Morlino 1996). 
 97 
even entirely technocratic cabinets) are not so rare in Italy. Leaving the various experts participating 
in ordinary partisan governments aside, a (quasi)technical government (Ciampi) was first formed in 
1993, with the prime minister and more than half ministers who were non-partisan, while a 
government entirely composed of technicians (Dini) was formed in 1995 127 . In addition, as 
Andeweg and Nijzink (1995: 160) argue with reference to the Ciampi government, many of Italian 
technical ministers are truely non-partisan. 
A second major advantage in studying Italy is the substantial variation in terms of coalitional 
attributes offered by the dataset. This would make it possible to assess the impact of different types 
of government (minority, minimum winning, oversized, technocratic) on the changes made to 
governmental legislation during the parliamentary process, thus making an original contribution to 
the literature. Indeed, the studies that acknowledge the importance of parliamentary scrutiny of 
government bills – first of all Martin and Vanberg’s (2004, 2005) works – have not considered 
minority governments yet. By definition, minority governments must depend on at least one 
‘external’ party to stay in office. Thus, if Martin and Vanberg’s (2005: 58) logic holds, as an 
extension we should expect that the external supporting parties will behave just like coalition 
partners in majority governments, making use of legislative review in order to monitor ministers 
affiliated with one of the parties in office128. Being interested in isolating the impact of preference 
divergence inside the cabinet on the level of legislative review, Martin and Vanberg select two very 
similar cases (Germany and the Netherlands) which enable them to exclude possible effects 
produced by different institutional arrangements and coalitional attributes. The choice of Italy as a 
single case study allows instead to evaluate the effects of the type of coalition. 
Moreover, analyzing the Italian case can be interesting because it represents a test for Martin 
and Vanberg’s (2005) explanatory hypothesis, which perhaps is currently the most influential one. 
As the authors point out, the institutional settings of the two countries they select resemble those of 
almost all European democracies. Their explanatory logic can hence be extended to other European 
parliamentary systems (Martin and Vanberg 2005: 98). Indeed, their argument may reasonably be 
expected to work in Italy, since the Italian legislature seems to provide a particularly powerful 
setting for engaging in parliamentary scrutiny of governmental bills. As Verzichelli (2003: 458) 
points out, the Italian parliament provides a number of important instruments for counteracting 
ministerial discretion: legislators of both chambers have at their disposal screening and investigative 
                                                 
127
 Further, also the Amato I government (1992), which came before Ciampi’s one, is not considered as fully partisan. 
Although nominated as a representative of his own party (PSI), Giuliano Amato enjoyed discretion in forming the 
cabinet, and the ‘partyness’ of his government became weaker and weaker during the mandate. Verzichelli (2000: 443) 
speaks of a ‘semi-technical government. See also Cotta and Verzichelli (1996) and Fabbrini (2000).  
128
 Concerning minority governments, the parliamentary support coalition may include the parties that supported the 
government on its formal investiture, or those that offered external support to it. See Laver’s (2006: 128) definition of 
the parliamentary support coalition for the government. 
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powers as well as tools for monitoring and requiring reports of ministers’ activities. The former 
include the investigative powers of permanent and ad hoc committees, through which members of 
parliament can extract information form the government. Also, representatives can put written and 
oral questions to the government, and initiate urgent interrogations 129 . As for the latter, both 
chambers feature a system of strong standing committees that closely correspond to ministerial 
jurisdictions (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Mezey 1993; Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 
2006)130. Committees can investigate executive actions in their area of competence (for example, 
they can invite senior and junior ministers to present periodic reports), thus enabling members of 
parties in a committee to acquire the policy expertise necessary to revise complex legislation. Italian 
legislative committees have even explicit lawmaking powers: they can give final approval to some 
legislation without having to refer it to the full parliament (Manzella 2003: 127-129). Moreover, a 
few bicameral committees (committees for vigilance and control) supervise cabinet action on 
specific issues (e.g. telecommunications, information agencies, security). A further monitoring tool 
at legislators’ disposal is the so-called ‘filter’ or ‘horizontal committees’ (the Budget committee and 
the Institutional Affairs committee), whose main task is to monitor the reliability of all proposals on 
the parliamentary agenda with the existing norms concerning budgetary and constitutional 
constraints (Verzichelli 2003: 458-459; Della Sala 1993: 162)131. As Della Sala (1993: 162-171) 
argues, the 1971 reform of the parliamentary rules of procedure enhanced the committees’ powers 
of control and oversight, producing an increase in their scrutiny activities and a parallel decrease in 
their lawmaking activities.  
Of course, the choice of the Italian case presents also certain drawbacks. Most of all, studying 
a single country makes it impossible to empirically evaluate the effect of alternative institutional 
arrangements on legislators’ ability to amend governmental bills: for example, the nature of 
democracy (consensus versus majoritarian, in Lijphart’s [1999] terms) (but see paragraph 4.1.2), or 
the type of legislative institutional arrangements (strong versus weak committee systems). 
Moreover, the units of analysis, time frame and level of analysis chosen in the present work do not 
even allow to test hypotheses concerning changes in the formal rules regulating the legislative 
process or external to it. As previously noted, the impact of different amending rules as well as that 
of reforms of the Italian budgetary process cannot be assessed since I consider only ordinary 
legislation initiated by governments. Also, neither the 1971 major reform of the standing orders nor 
                                                 
129
 As stressed by Verzichelli (2003: 458), such control mechanisms have traditionally been used very extensively, and 
even by government MPs. 
130
 In Strøm’s famous volume on minority governments, the Italian committee system is placed among the ones that 
give the opposition more influence over policy: on the index of the potential for oppositional influence based on the 
properties of parliamentary committees, Italy scores four points over five, following only Norway (Strøm 1990a: 73). 
131
 As Manzella (2003: 324) points out, more recently also the Labour committee and the European Affairs committee 
have been given similar ‘filtering’ powers. 
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the 1988 abolition of secret ballot is within the chosen time span (1987-2006). Further, the only 
‘external’ major change occurred during the period under consideration, the 1993 reform of the 
electoral system, yields expectations concerning mostly individual legislators’ behaviour, which is 
not investigated in the present work. However, since such an electoral reform led to an alternational 
party system, I can evaluate one of its fundamental, although indirect, effects (see paragraph 1.1.4). 
 
5.1.2 The time frame (1987-2006) 
As for the time frame of my empirical analysis of Italy, I chose to concentrate on the government 
legislative production between 1987 and 2006. I opted for such a time priod for having a reasonable 
amount of variation in some key explanatory factors. Indeed, longer periods of time allow more 
variance in the explanatory variables, while shorter periods of time avoid possible temporal effects. 
Therefore, in order to evaluate the effect of a pivotal versus an alternational party system, I included 
two First Republic legislatures (X and XI) and two Second Republic legislatures (XIII and XIV), 
together with the somehow ‘troublesome’ XII legislature (see below).  
In addition, testing the theoretical hypotheses based upon the conflict among the actors 
involved in the legislative process requires reliable measures of parties’ policy preferences. Taking 
a longer period (i.e., starting before 1987) would have presented problems in this respect. Indeed, 
apart those collected by the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project, I could not 
have data on the ideological positions of parties across several policy areas (for the problems of 
MRG/CMP’s data for the Italian case in this time span, see below)132. 
Finally, it is worth noting that during the 1987-2006 period no single-party government took 
office in Italy: with the exception of the non-party Dini’s government in 1995, all the Italian 
cabinets in the considered years involved more than one party (see H.14). However, extending the 
time span of my analysis in order to include at least one single-party executive would have been 
rather demanding. Since the nearest single-party government (Fanfani VI in April 1987) lasted just 
11 days, I would have needed to include the Andreotti’s IV cabinet, going back to 1978. 
 
5.1.3 The sample of governmental bills 
In order to empirically analyze the modifications made to government-sponsored legislation in the 
course of the parliamentary process, I constructed an original dataset in which the units of analysis 
are approved governmental laws.  
                                                 
132
 The expert surveys conducted before Laver and Hunt’s (1992) one considered either one or a few policy dimensions 
(Morgan 1976; Castles and Mair 1984). 
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Since the information concerning government bills introduced (as first reading) in the Senate 
is not available for the entire period investigated133, I restricted the analysis to those governmental 
laws that have been introduced in the Chamber of Deputies. In any case, analyzing just one of the 
two branches of the Italian legislature (especially the Chamber of Deputies) is a common approach 
in the literature on Italian (as well as other countries’) parliament and political system. Indeed, the 
Italian parliament is conventionally considered as a symmetrical legislature because both chambers 
perform identical functions (for our purposes, they have the same role in the legislative process). 
Moreover, although elected on a somewhat different basis, the political composition of the two 
houses has almost always been identical. Hine (1993: 189-190), for example, defines the Italian 
parliament as a case of ‘perfectly co-equal bicameralism’. 
In addition, I excluded constitutional laws, budgetary laws, annual Community Acts and laws 
ratifying international treaties and agreements, since the parliamentary dynamics leading to their 
approval are radically different from the rest of government legislation. Italian constitutional laws 
are approved with qualified majorities and after being examined twice in either chamber. During the 
budgetary process (especially after the 1988 reform), the Italian parliament has to pass a complex 
series of (mutually related) bills in a pre-determined sequence in which each any step is scheduled 
very strictly and the scope for amendatory activity is limited a priori (Manzella 2003: 344-352; 
Zucchini 2005b: 19-20; Fedeli and Forte 2007: 312-315). The Community Act (legge comunitaria) 
is a yearly government-initiated statute through which Italy is supposed to carry out all its European 
obligations. Although approved by parliament according to the ordinary process, Community Acts 
are extremely different from ordinary laws: actually they become voluminous packages containing 
delegation clauses and specifying the measures through which the cabinet will transpose each 
European directive (see Fabbrini and Donà 2003; Giuliani 2006). Finally, Italian parliament 
approves the laws ratifying international treaties and agreements without the possibility to amend 
them. This happens because, of course, national legislatures cannot alter the content of treaties on 
which the representatives of two or more countries agreed. Therefore, in this case, the same 
possibility of conflicts among actors or modifications to the bills does not exist (Manzella 2003: 
371-373)134. 
Remarkably, my dataset includes also laws converting executive decree-laws. According to 
the Italian Constitution (art. 77, cc. 2-3), in extraordinary cases of necessity and urgency, the 
government can promulgate decrees that have the immediate force of laws and have to be converted 
                                                 
133
 In particular, the texts of the bills introduced in the Senate are available in electronic format only from 1996 onward. 
See http://www.senato.it/ricerche/sDDLa/nuova.ricerca?parms.legislatura=16 (accessed April 30, 2011). 
134
 In principle, the Italian parliament has the possibility to refuse to ratify a treaty, but actually it never happens 
(Manzella 2003: 373). 
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into laws by the parliament within sixty days (otherwise, decrees would lose their effects). 
Therefore, just after issuing a decree, the government introduces to parliament a bill to convert the 
decree into law. On its turn, the parliament can either convert without modifications, amend, or 
reject the decree. Therefore, the process through which bills converting decree-laws are approved 
differs from the ordinary procedure: since decrees have to be converted into laws within sixty days, 
their discussion and approval are given top priority in the committees and on the floor. However, 
the literature on Italian legislative production seems to agree on seeing decree-laws as just 
‘reinforced bills’ (De Micheli 1997: 166; see also Manzella 2003: 359). Given the difficulties in 
controlling the ordinary legislative process, Italian governments make extensive use of decree-laws 
to legislate on ordinary matters in spite of the requirements of necessity and urgency (see. for 
example, Cazzola and Morisi 1981; Vassallo 2001).  
All that said, the final dataset used for my empirical analisys of government bill changes in 
Italy (1987-2006) consists of 716 governmental laws. 
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5.2 THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
 
Operationalizing the government bill changes, i.e. the dependent variable, requires some kind of 
comparison between the final version of the bill adopted by the legislature and the original version 
drafted by the proposer. Counting how many amendments have been approved during the 
legislative iter of a governmental bill would not be particularly useful for this purpose. One reason 
is that amendments can vary considerably in their scope: a single amendment can change just a 
small aspect of a bill as well as a major part of it. Moreover, not all the modifications made to 
government bills we observe during the parliamentary process derive from amendments. Indeed, it 
may happen that the initial text of some bill is absorbed into the text of some other bill 
(assorbimenti), or that two or more bills are unified into a new one (testi unificati). As a 
consequence, the simple number of accepted amendments could not provide a satisfactory measure 
of the overall amount of transformations undergone in parliament by government legislation.    
In their article, Martin and Vanberg (2005: 99) measure the level of legislative review as the 
number of article changes, which is the sum of all the articles altered, deleted or added to the draft 
version of the bill. According to the authors, who analyze German and Dutch legislation, this 
measure captures somehow the policy significance of modifications because bills are subdivided 
into several articles, each dealing with a specific issue. However, Martin and Vanberg’s 
operationalization does not seem to be particularly suitable for the Italian case, since it does not take 
into account some typical features of Italian parliamentary process and legislation. First of all, the 
use of the so called ‘maxi amendments’, through which a number of articles in the drafted bill are 
turned into a single article in the final law135. In an extreme case, a bill made up of a certain number 
of articles can be at last approved as a single-article law. In such a situation, while the bill is passed 
without any actual modification in the text, Martin and Vanberg’s measure would indicate a 
relatively high degree of change.  
In addition, it is not straightforward that articles are the logical policy subunits of Italian bills. 
Although bills are normally voted article by article, often more than one aspect is addressed by a 
single article. Indeed, each single article is subdivided into smaller parts called commi, which deal 
with more specific aspects of the bill. Thus, we can have an article change either because the article 
is entirely modified, or because just one comma (or a part of it) is altered. If we employ Martin and 
Vanberg’s measure, these two situations will lead to exactly the same outcome: one article change. 
By the same logic, however, a measure counting the number of modified commi would present the 
                                                 
135
 Since the 1990s, Italian cabinets made increasingly use of maxi amendments. As several works highlighted, maxi 
amendments have been employed, together with delegating laws and decree-laws, as circumventing tactics – that is, 
techniques to circumvent the ordinary legislative process  (see Zucchini 2005b).  
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same risks: although more accurate than Martin and Vanberg’s solution, it would treat partial 
changes of subsections as entire changes of subsections.  
Given the problems posed by any operationalization relying on sections or subsections of 
articles, I decided to look at the most basic units in the text of bills, and thus to measure my 
dependent variable as the number of words that are changed (i.e. added, deleted or modified) during 
the legislative process. 
A simple option is just to compare the number of words in the draft version and in the final 
version of a law. Yet, this measure would consider just words that are added or deleted, and not 
words that are substituted. In order to solve this problem, I (1) compute for each single word 
appearing in either version the absolute difference between the number of times it occurs in the 
draft bill and the number of times it occurs in the final law, and (2) sum all these absolute 
differences. This way we take account of substituted words, but we overestimate their number, 
which results to be twice as the actual value 136 . For this reason, I (3) compute the absolute 
difference between the number of words in the original bill and the number of words in the final law 
in order to get the number of added or removed words, (4) subtract this quantity from the sum of the 
absolute differences calculated in the second step and divide the result by two, thus finding the 
actual number of substituted words. Finally, I (5) add the number of substituted words to the 
number of added or removed words, and obtain the total number of changed words137. To sum up, 
the dependent variable is defined as the overall number of changed words and calculated as follows: 
 
Government bill changes = n. of added words  
+ n. of removed words  
+ n. of substituted words. 
 
Let me give a simple example to illustrate how I computed the values for the depedent 
variable (see Table 5.1). Imagine that a bill addressing some particular issue (e.g., the redefinition 
of the subjects studied in the primary school) is drafted by a certain minister (the minister of 
education) and presented to parliament for approval. Suppose that such a bill, in its original 
formulation, is made of 100 words, while the law finally approved by the parliament (after the 
amendatory activity has occurred) amounts to 170 words. Following the above mentioned steps, 
with the help of a software for content analysis I (1) count how many times each word appears in 
the drafted bill and how many times it appears in the final law (columns II and III in the table) and 
                                                 
136
 In other terms, words that are substituted would be counted twice: once as words appearing in the original text but 
not in the final one, and once as words appearing in the final text but not in the original one. 
137
 Changes in the spelling, capitalization and punctuation have not been counted as modifications.  
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then I calculate the absolute difference between these two values (column IV)138. Adding together 
all these differences (2), I achieve the sum the of absolute differences, which equals to 110. Then, I 
(3) get the number of added or removed words by calculating the absolute difference between 
number of words in the two versions: | 170 – 100 | = 70. Hence, the number of substituted words (4) 
is obtained by dividing by two the difference between the sum of the absolute differences and the 
number of added or removed words: (110 – 70)/2 = 20. Finally, I (5) add up the two quantities 
calculated in the third and fourth steps and obtain the value of government bill changes: 70 + 20 = 
90.  
 
WORD BILL LAW ABS. DIFFERENCE 
        
... ... ... ... 
Education 1 0 1 
School 0 3 3 
Teachers 5 7 2 
... ... ... ... 
        
SUM of ABS. DIFFERENCES  110 
 
Table 5.1 
Calculating the number of bill changes. An example. 
 
 
It is worth spending some words on how I measured the government bill changes in the case 
of decree-laws. As explained in the previous section, immediately after the promulgation of a 
decree-law the government presents a conversion bill in parliament. Then, the legislature has three 
options: 1) approve the conversion bill without modification, thus converting the decree in its 
original formulation; 2) approve the conversion bill with a number of possible modifications and a 
provision saying that the decree is altered (i.e., the decree is converted with amendments)139; 3) 
reject the conversion bill, which means dismissing the decree (see Cox, Heller, and McCubbins 
2005)140. Hence, with regard to my dependent variable, I need to compare two initial texts (the 
conversion bill and the original decree) with two final texts (the conversion law and the converted 
                                                 
138
 This can be done with any software for counting word frequencies. For example, Yoshikoder and Jfreq, which are 
free and can be easily found on William Lowe’s webpage (http://www.williamlowe.net/software/). 
139
 The conversion bill is typically very short, often with just one article. Most of the time, the original conversion bill 
(i.e., the text of the bill presented by the government) simply states that a certain decree-law is converted. Similarly, the 
final conversion law (i.e., the text of the law finally approved) may sometimes include some actual changes, but it 
usually says just that the decree is approved with or without modifications and refers to an enclosure for the details of 
such changes. Of course, if the decree is converted without amendments, the texts of the conversion bill and that of the 
conversion law coincide. In any case, when the parliament debates on the conversion bill, it actually discusses the 
content of the decree-law. 
140
 Since my dataset includes just approved government bills, the third option is not of the interest of this work. 
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decree). In order to do it, I calculated the number of changed words separately for the pair 
conversion bill-conversion law and for the pair original decree-converted decree, and then I added 
these two values together. 
Undoubtedly, my operationalization of the changes made to governmental bills during the 
legislative process prensents drawbacks. To begin with, there are words such as “not” that, if added 
or removed, may completely change the meaning of sentences. Moreover, my measure is subject to 
problems of language ambiguity, which are however common to all computer-based techniques of 
content analysis141. More generally, just as Martin and Vanberg (2005), I am not dealing with the 
substantive content of legislation: by counting the number of changed words, I look simply at what 
is modified in the text of bills during the legislative process, and not at the actual policy significance 
of these transformations. However, given the increasingly technical and specialized nature of 
modern legislation, understanding the actual policy impact of each change made to a certain bill 
seems to require a prohibitive effort by researchers. This is especially true when the analysis 
concerns a relatively large number of bills dealing with several policy areas, as in the present 
case142. In addition, my measure can be easily coded by other researchers. On the whole, there seem 
reasons to believe that the number of changed words is a fairly reliable measure, as well as more 
refined and appropriate for the Italian case than Martin and Vanberg’s operationalization.  
Since it counts the number of changed words, the dependent variable is an integer that is 
bounded below by zero and unbounded above143. As Table 5.2 shows, its distribution is strongly 
asymmetrical and skewed to the right (the mean is more than the median)144. While their mean 
length is 1673 words (see below, Table 5.5), government bills in my sample present on average 681 
changed words, and at least 170 words are changed in half of the bills. Moreover, most 
governmental bills in the sample are altered during the legislative process, since just 14% of them 
are passed into law without any modifications. However, as the high standard deviation indicates, 
they are modified according to very different degrees.  
 
 
                                                 
141
 For a discussion, see for example Laver and Garry (2000). 
142
 As noted in the theoretical chapters of this work, in modern parliamentary systems legislatures have increasingly 
delegated policymaking powers to cabinets, and in particular to individual ministers. As a result, only the minister 
responsible for a given policy area has the knowledge necessary to adequately understand the policy impact of a certain 
bill (Laver and Shepsle 1994, 1996; Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2006).   
143
 Having no upper limit, the variable enables to distinguish between a situation in which the whole text of a bill is 
substituted and one in which the whole text is substituted and extra words are added, that I consider as a more extensive 
change. 
144
 As Table 5.2 displays, the value of skewness is very high and positive, indicating that the distribution is strongly 
skewed to the right. Symmetric distributions such as the normal have a skewness of 0. Kurtosis measures the heaviness 
of the tails of a distribution, and in a normal distribution it is equal to 3. Being much greater than 3, the value in the 
table indicates that the distribution of the number of changed words is heavily tailed. 
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Percentile  Number of changed words 
0  0   
15  1   
30  51   
Median  169.5   
70  513   
85  1251.25   
100  21617   
     
Mean 681.0489  N. 716 
St. Dev. 1584.592    
Variance 2510933    
Skewness 7.496076    
Kurtosis 86.82006    
 
Table 5.2 
Government bill changes. Descriptive statistics. 
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Figure 5.1a,b 
Government bill changes. Distribution. 
 
 
Figure 5.1a,b displays the distribution of government bill changes through a histogram and a kernel 
density plot, respectively145. Clearly, my dependent variable is far from being normally distributed. 
As a check, I run two common statistical tests for normality: a Shapiro-Wilk W test and a 
Skewness-Kurtosis test. Both allow to safely reject the null hypothesis that government bill changes 
follows a normal distribution146. 
                                                 
145
 Unlike histograms, kernel density plots approximate the probability density of variables independently of the number 
of bins and of the choice of origin. 
146
 In the Shapiro-Wilk test, the statistic W is the ratio of the best estimator of the variance to the corrected sum of 
squares estimator of the variance. It ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating normality (Shapiro and Wilk 1965). For 
government bill changes, W is equal to 0.4326 and the p-value, which is based on the assumption that the distribution is 
normal, is 0.000. The Skewness-Kurtosis test performs three tests for normality: one based on skewness, another based 
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Interestingly, if we look at the distribution of the dependent variable across different periods, 
we can note that modifications tend to increase over time. This is observable in Table 5.3, which 
displays, for each of the legislatures that I consider, the mean and median number of changed words 
as well the mean and median degree of word change147. While the former is the dependent variable 
calculated as explained above and used in the analyses of the next chapter, the latter is the same 
variable divided by the number of words in the initial bill148. This second measure allows me to 
discuss the descriptive statistics controlling for the different length of bills: since longer texts are 
more likely to receive extensive modifications than shorter texts, we might observe an increase in 
the number of changed words over time simply because government bills tend to include more and 
more words. In any case, Table 5.3 shows that in the last two legislatures included in the sample 
(XIII and XIV) both the median number of changed words and the median degree of word change 
become twice as much as their value in the first two legislatures (X and XI). Therefore, the amount 
of changes does not seem to increase just because bills become longer (see also Figure 5.2). 
Although less pronounced because of the influence of extreme values, this is true also if we look at 
the mean. 
 
 n. 
Number of 
changed words 
(mean) 
Degree  
of word change 
(mean) 
Number of 
changed words 
(median) 
Degree  
of word change 
(median) 
 
     
1987-2006 716 681.0489 0.5051722 169.5 0.1970581 
 
     
 
     
X leg. (87-92) 233 453.103 0.4415325 110 0.1515152 
XI leg. (92-94) 80 502.1375 0.4688768 119 0.1587733 
XII leg. (94-96) 80 654.625 0.3410373 139.5 0.1090443 
XIII leg. (96-01) 185 770.7243 0.5720786 256 0.2807018 
XIV leg. (01-06) 138 1064.732 0.6391202 266.5 0.3141653 
 
     
 
     
I REPUBLIC (87-94) 313 465.6358 0.4485215 117 0.1542428 
II REPUBLIC (94-06) 403 848.3548 0.5491715 225 0.2436236 
 
     
 
Table 5.3 
Number of changed words and degree of word change. Mean and median by legislature. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
on kurtosis, and then a combination of the previous two tests. In my data, the probability of incorrecting assuming 
normality is 0.000 in all three tests.   
147
 Since the distribution of the dependent variable presents a heavy tail on the right, the median should be used instead 
of the mean. Being less sensitive to outliers, in such a situation the median is a better measure of central tendency than 
the mean.   
148
 The degree of word change has a distribution very similar to government bill changes. The results from these and the 
previous tests are available upon request. 
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Figure 5.2 
Number of changed words and number of words in draft bills. Median by Legislature. 
 
 
In other words, during the Italian Second Republic governmental legislation appears to be more 
subject to modifications than during the First Republic149. This holds if consider either the number 
of changed words or the degree of word change, and if we employ either the mean or the median 
(last two rows of Table 5.3). In order to assess whether there is a statistically significant difference 
in the distribution of government bill changes between the First and the Second Republic, I use a 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. This test allows to compare the distribution of a variable in two 
independent groups on the basis of the ranking of the observations of both groups. Unlike the 
independent samples t-test which assumes that the variable is a normally distributed interval 
variable, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is non-parametric and only requires an ordinal variable. In 
my case, the results suggest that there is a significant difference in the distribution of the number of 
changed words between the First and the Second Republic (z = -3.424 and p = 0.001), and that in 
particular government bills are altered more in the latter period than in the former one150. A test for 
equality of medians leads to the same results151. 
Remarkably, as Figure 5.2 shows, such a difference between First and Second Republic 
concerns both bills converting decree-laws and ordinary ones. The picture is the same even if we 
                                                 
149
 As previously noted, I consider the somehow exceptional XII legislature in the Second Republic. 
150
 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test ranks the observations of both groups from smallest to largest, sums the ranks 
from one group, and compares this actual rank sum to the rank sum expected under the null hypothesis of identical 
distributions between groups. In my case, the actual rank sum of the Second Republic is higher than its expected value, 
while the actual rank sum of the First Republic is lower than its expected value. I carried out the same test for the 
degree of changes and the results are the same. 
151
 It is a non-parametric test, in which the null hypothesis assumes that the samples (groups) are drawn from 
populations with the same median.  
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look at the bills introduced by each government included in our sample: as displayed in Figure 5.3, 
the legislation sponsored by the centre-right and centre-left governments of the Second Republic is 
more extensively altered than the legislation proposed by the previous governments152.   
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152
 It is worth noting that all the nine bills introduced by the Berlusconi’s III government and included in my sample are 
bills converting decree-laws.  
Figure 5.2 Degree of word change. 
Median by type of law and political system. 
 
Figure 5.3 Degree of word change. 
Median by governments. 
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5.3 THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
Let me now discuss how I operationalized the explanatory hypotheses presented in the first four 
chapters, as well as a number of control variables that I included in my empirical analysis of 
changes of government bills in Italy. As discussed in the theoretical part of this work, the 
modifications occurring in parliament may stem from three general explanatory factors: I) some 
kind of conflict between the actors involved in the legislative process induced by position taking 
incentives; II) the limited level of information at political actors’ disposal throughout the 
parliamentary process; III) institutional factors such as the rules directly regulating the legislative 
process and other institutional arrangements influencing lawmaking.  
However, as previously pointed out, my research design does not allow to empirically 
evaluate most of the hypotheses dealing with institutional rules. In particular, the decision of 
focusing on ordinary governmental legislation makes it impossible to investigate the effects of 
different amending rules as well as that of the reforms in the Italian budgetary process. Moreover, 
the chosen time span prevents from assessing the impact of the standing order reform in 1971153 and 
the abolition of secret ballot in 1988. Further, studying a single country does not allow to take into 
consideration the strength of committee systems. 
In addition, I will not test the hypotheses relying on individual legislators’ level of knowledge 
(H.27). The explanations in that set deal more with representatives’ ability to amend governmental 
bills than with the number of observed modifications.  
Concerning the array of control mechanisms highlighted in the literature on multiparty 
coalitions, in the present work I concentrate on committee chairs and (of course) scrutiny of 
government bills at the legislative level, as well as on junior ministers and prime ministers at the 
cabinet level. With regard to the other cabinet-level control instruments (H.18), my data would not 
allow enough variation: Verzichelli and Cotta (2000: 458-459, Tab. 12.5) show that from 1963 
onwards all the Italian government made use of coalition committees and party summits 154 . 
Moreover, as previously noted, coalition treaties (H.24) have almost never been used in Italy. 
Finally, the lack of data for the entire period under investigation does not allow to test the 
hypothesis concerning the relationship between the amount of changes made to government bills 
and the length of debate in the cabinet (H.6). Indeed, information on the duration of cabinet 
meetings (Consigli dei Ministri) is available only from 1996 onwards155. 
 
                                                 
153
 As for the effect of the 1997 reform of standing orders, see the next chapter. 
154
 To be precise, however, their data do not go beyond 1998. 
155
 See http://www.sitiarcheologici.palazzochigi.it/ (accessed April 30, 2011). 
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5.3.1 Independent variables based upon conflict 
With regard to the explanatory hypotheses I will test in the next chapter, let me start with the 
operationalization of those which are based upon position taking utility and some kind of conflict 
between the actors participating in the legislative process. Several explanations in this set concern 
ideological conflicts between political actors, which I measured as absolute policy distances 
between them weighted by the salience of the issue addressed by the bill. In this respect, a number 
of points deserve some clarification.  
First of all, for the position of parties on different policy dimensions I used the expert surveys 
conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006)156. An important alternative 
source of party positions is the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge, 
Robertson, and Hearl 1987; Budge et al. 2001). However, the scores provided by the MRG/CMP 
appear hardly plausible for Italian parties during the period considered here. For instance, if we use 
the left-right positions calculated according to Laver and Budge’s (1992) approach, in 1992 the 
PDS (i.e., the former Communists) is to the right of the DC and has the same position as the PLI 
(Liberals), while in 1996 the PPI (the left-wing component of the former Christian Democrats) is 
the rightist party in parliament, even to the right of Forza Italia. Therefore, I opted for Laver and 
Hunt’s (1992) and Benoit and Laver’s (2006) expert surveys. For each party, these data provide 
information on both position and saliency scores on a 20-point scale in several policy dimensions. 
In general, in order to measure the variables dealing with ideological conflict, I assigned each 
governmental law to one of the policy domains identified by the expert surveys157, and then I 
calculated the absolute difference between the positions of the relevant actors on the issue under 
consideration. This captures the fact that the degree of conflict among political actors may vary 
according to the particular policy area dealt with by government legislation.  
Second, in order to take into account the saliency of the policy area addressed by legislation 
(H.13), I weighted the ideological distances thus obtained by an issue-specific measure of salience. 
In particular, by using the saliency scores provided by Laver and Hunt’s (1992) and Benoit and 
Laver’s (2006) expert surveys I proceeded as follows. For each party in parliament, (1) I calculated 
its average saliency across all the policy dimensions. Hence, (2) I divided the party’s saliency score 
on a dimension by that party’s average saliency found in the first step and repeated this for all the 
dimensions, thus achieving the party’s relative saliency on each dimension. After this, for each 
party (3) I computed its proportion of seats in the parliament, and (4) on each policy domain I 
                                                 
156
 In the present work I assume that parties are unitary actors. For the empirical plausibility of this working assumption, 
see Laver (2002: 203). See also Laver and Schofield (1990: chapter 2). 
157
 In particular, I used Laver and Hunt’s (1992) scores for the 1987-1994 period and Benoit and Laver’s (2006) scores 
for the 1994-2006 period.  
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multiplied the party’s relative saliency by its proportion of parliamentary seats, thus obtaining the 
party’s weighted relative saliency. Then, (5) I achieved the overall saliency of a certain dimension 
by adding up the weighted relative saliency of all parties on that dimension. This measure follows 
the same logic as Martin and Vanberg’s (2005: 100, n. 18) government-specific measure of salience, 
and is constructed in such a way that relatively more salient issues in parliament present values 
greater than 1, while less salient issues display values smaller than 1158. Finally, (6) each ideological 
distance was multiplied by the salience of the issue addresed by the bill found in the fifth step.  
Third, concerning the proposers’ policy positions, each bill (in the original version submitted 
to parliament) is assumed to represent the ideal point of who decided on its content at the cabinet 
level. As argued in the introduction to the theoretical part, the hypotheses based on ideological 
conflict maintain either that each minister autonomously drafts and presents to parliament all the 
bills falling under her policy jurisdiction, or that cabinet decisions are compromises agreed upon by 
all the governing parties. The proposer’s policy position is measured in the former case as the 
policy score of the drafting minister’s party, and in the latter case as the government mid-range (see 
Tsebelis and Chang 2004).   
Fourth, the hypotheses based on ideological conflict may involve also actors for which we do 
not have policy scores. It is the case of technical ministers and technical junior ministers, who by 
definition do not belong to any party. The same can be said of ‘independent’ politicians, who – 
although not being policy experts – do not represent any party in particular (e.g., Giuliano Amato in 
the governments in office during the XIII legislature). On the basis of the available biographical 
information on the web, they have been assigned the score of the party which seems the closest to 
their policy preferences. As a last option, I gave non-partisan ministers and JMs the prime 
minister’s score and the minister’s score, respectively.      
Finally, since bills can be proposed by more than one minister, I consider the first signatory as 
the proposing minister. Moreover, as previously illustrated, my sample includes bills converting 
decree-laws. Formally, the first signatory of conversion bills is always the prime minister, 
regardless of which minister actually drafts them. Therefore, for conversion bills I consider the 
second signatory as the proposing minister. The premier is considered the proposer of a conversion 
bill only if he is the only signatory of it. 
All that said, conflict with parliamentary majority, i.e. the policy divergence between the 
proposing minister – or the government compromise – and the parliamentary median voter in 
H.3a,b has been calculated as the (saliency-weighted) absolute difference between the score of the 
                                                 
158
 Since the size of parliamentary parties varies both across legislative terms and within each legislative term, I 
recalculated this issue-specific measure of salience each time a new government was formed.  
 113 
proposing minister’s party – or the mid-range position of the government – and the score of the 
party controlling the median legislator in the Chamber.  
By the same logic, conflict with opposition in H.7a,b has been operationalized as the 
(saliency-weighted) absolute distance between the minister’s position – or the government mid-
range – and that of the farthest opposition party. In particular, among opposition parties I did not 
consider parliamentary groups with less than 20 legislators, since these parties are usually 
constrained in their ability to influence legislation (for instance, they do not take part in the 
meetings of Conference of Group Chairpersons). As an alternative, I measured conflict with 
opposition also as the distance between the minister – or the mid-range in the cabinet – and the 
largest opposition party. This would allow to take into consideration the influence of FI and 
PDS/DS when at the opposition during the Second Republic, and most of all the Communists’ 
leverage during the First Republic.   
Concerning presidents of parliament (H.11a,b), ideological conflict has been operationalized 
as the absolute difference between the proposing minister’s score – or the government mid-range – 
and that of the president of the Chamber of Deputies. I multiplied this measure by the issue-specific 
value of salience.  
Committee chair’s distance in H.23 is the (saliency-weighted) distance between the drafting 
minister and the chair of the standing committee to which the bill is referred in the Chamber (during 
the first reading). In cases where the governmental bill is jointly referred to two committees, I took 
the average between the positions of the two chairs’ parties.   
As for ideological conflict within the cabinet (H.12), which is Martin and Vanberg’s (2004, 
2005) main explanatory variable, I followed Franchino and Høyland (2009: 612) and measured it as 
the distance between the proposing minister’s party and the farthest coalition partner’s party. 
Similarly, junior minister’s distance in H.17 has been calculated as the distance between the 
minister submitting the bill and the JM who is farthest from her in the same ministry. This variable 
is equal to 0 if the proposing minister is not ‘shadowed’ – that is, either when there is not any JM in 
the drafting ministry, or when the minister and her JMs are copartisan. Deputy ministers are 
considered as junior ministers, and deputy prime ministers are treated as JMs appointed to the prime 
minister. Both variables were weighted by the issue-specific measure of salience. 
Junior minister’s presence (H.16) and Committee chair’s presence (H.22) are dummy 
variables. For any given bill proposed by a certain minister, the former is equal to 1 when a JM 
from a partner party is present in the drafting ministry, while the latter is 1 when a chair from a 
partner party heads the committee to which the bill is referred. 
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I calculated the number of signatory parties (H.19) as the number of different parties with at 
least one minister among the signatories of a bill, whereas Prime minister’s bill (H.20a,b) is a 
dummy variable whose value is 1 when the prime minister is the first signatory of the bill (for 
decree-laws, see above).  
Concerning H.5, I counted the number of coalition parties in each Italian government during 
the 1987-2006 period assuming that a coalition party is a party that has at least a representative with 
voting power in cabinet meetings (Consigli dei Ministri) (Müller, Bergman, and Strøm 2008: 6). In 
other words, I excluded those parties which have only junior ministers. The distance between 
coalition parties is instead calculated as the government ideological range – that is, the absolute 
difference between the score of the extreme coalition party on the left and that of the extreme 
coalition party on the right.  
Quite trivially, the size of the minister’s party (H.15) is the number of seats controlled by that 
parliamentary group in the Chamber of Deputies159, whereas the dummy technical minister (H.10) 
takes the value 1 when the first signatory is a minister who does not represent any party160. In order 
to identify technical ministers, I drew on Verzichelli and Cotta’s (2000) data on the distribution of 
cabinet ministerships in Italy up to 2000. For succeeding years, I identified technical ministers 
trying to follow the authors’ logic. In addition, I checked those data with two other sources: the 
information on the composition of governments (1945-1998) provided by Woldendorp, Keman, and 
Budge (2000), and the websites of the Italian government, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate 
of Republic. 
Turning now to other types of conflict among political actors, minority government (H.1) is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the government proposing the bill does not control a 
majority in the Chamber, and 0 otherwise. In my sample, only Dini and Prodi I cabinets are 
minority governments. 
As far as distributive conflict (H.2) is concerned, the variable is a dummy whose value is 1 
when the bill contains at least one pork barrel clause, and 0 otherwise. In order to build this measure, 
I checked whether the bill included benefits for particular professional categories, interest groups, 
organizations, places or persons. 
I operationalized the alternation hypothesis (H.4) with the dummy Second Republic, which is 
1 for bills presented and approved during the XII, XIII and XIV legislatures (1994-2006), and 0 for 
bills presented and approved during the X and XI legislatures (1987-1994). In other words, I 
                                                 
159
 See http://legislature.camera.it/. 
160
 In principle, technical ministers may happen to be members of some party. See, for example, Alberto Ronchey, who 
was a technical minister in Amato I and Ciampi cabinets although belonging to the PRI (the Republicans). What 
distinguishes technical ministers is that they are in the cabinet because of their policy expertise, and not because they 
are the designated representatives of some coalition party.  
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considered the Italian First Republic as a pivotal party system and the Second Republic as an 
alternational party system. 
According to the hypothesis concerning conflict over ministerial responsibility (H.8), we 
should expect more changes to bills addressing those policy issues on which more than one ministry 
may draft legislation. I constructed a measure of the degree to which a domain is shared by different 
ministries in the following way. First, I classified all the governmental laws approved in the period 
under investigation according to the micro-issues identified by the Comparative Policy Agendas 
Project 161 . Then, I computed for each of these micro-categories the Rae’s (1967) index of 
fragmentation: for every micro-issue I calculated, as a relative frequency, the number of times a 
ministry proposed a law, I squared these frequencies and add them up162. Finally, I calculated the 
complement to 1 to make the variable run in the direction I was interested in. The resulting variable 
can be considered as a measure of conflict over ministerial responsibility: the closer the value of the 
Rae index becomes to 1 (its maximum value), the more that micro-issue is disputed by different 
ministries; the more it approaches 0 (its minimum value), the more that micro-issue can be 
considered as the exclusive jurisdiction of a single ministry. Table 5.4 provides a simple example 
for the micro-category 107, “Taxation, Tax policy, and Tax Reform”. 
 
 
Drafting ministry Abs. Freq. Rel. Freq. Square of Rel. Freq. 
    
Budget 1 0.0227 0.000515 
Finance 31 0.7045 0.49632 
Justice 1 0.0227 0.000515 
Interior 1 0.0227 0.000515 
Labour 8 0.1818 0.033051 
Prime minister 1 0.0227 0.000515 
Treasury 1 0.0227 0.000515 
    
Total 44 1 0.531948 
 
Table 5.4 
Rae’s index for conflict over ministerial responsibility. An example. 
 
 
Finally, it seems particularly hard to find a measure of the degree to which ministers are 
captured by the department they head (H.9). Although this hypothesis undoubtedly deserves a more 
                                                 
161
 In building this variable, I used all the 1574 governmental laws approved in the 1987-2006 period, and not only 
those introduced in the Chamber of Deputies. However, constitutional laws and laws ratifying international treaties are 
still excluded. 
162
 To take account of the changes occurred in the number and names of Italian ministries, I calculated this variable for 
three different periods: 1987-1996; 1996-2001; 2001-2006.  
 116 
nuanced measure, as for now I built a dummy indicator of departmental capture which is based on 
the available biographical information on the proposing ministers. By looking on ministers’ 
personal pages in the institutional (and also non-institutional) websites, I checked whether the 
proposer had some work experiences or studies in the same policy area as the one which is under 
her jurisdiction. If the answer was positive – for instance, when the minister of labour worked in 
trade unions – I assigned the value 1. If it was negative, I assigned the value 0. My argument is that 
the more ministers are familiar with the issues under their jurisdiction (and hence with the relevant 
administrative agencies and interest groups in that area), the more they are likely to identify with 
the interests of the departments they head. 
   
5.3.2 Independent variables based upon the lack of information 
As for the second major explanatory factor, the informational problems confronted by political 
actors, the dummy complexity (H.25) becomes 1 if the bill includes more than one aspect regarding 
the subject at issue. For instance, the variable is equal to 1 when a bill dealing with basic education 
includes provisions about both school leaving age and the construction of new schoolhouses. 
Remarkably, a possible alternative measure is suggested by Giuliani and Capano (2001: 26-29). In 
analyzing the content and complexity of legislative initiative in Italy during the 1987-1998 period, 
the authors employ a measure of complexity which is based on how Italian parliamentary offices 
classify the content of laws. Depending on the issues it addresses, each bill is assigned a number of 
subjects. Since, as they argue, Italian parliamentary offices classify laws in an accurate manner, the 
number of subjects which are attributed to a bill can be taken as a measure of its complexity. 
However, as Giuliani and Capano (2001: 27-28) note, that classification system was modified in 
1992. Therefore, although probably more refined than mine, such a measure cannot be employed in 
the present work.  
In order to operationalize the multidimensional nature of a bill (H.26), I simply counted the 
number of consulting committees to which the bill is referred in the first reading. Reasonably, when 
a bill deals with multiple policy areas, more than one committee is in charge of discussing it. 
 
5.3.3 Independent variables based upon changes in the formal rules 
Turning now to the explanatory hypotheses which focus on changes in formal rules, my research 
design allows to test just two of these hypotheses: impatience and the type of democracy. 
Legislators’ impatience (H.28) is operationalized as the number of days between the introduction of 
a certain bill and the scheduled end of the legislative term. Let me underline that the Italian 
parliament is often dissolved before the natural end of its 5-year term, and that legislators might 
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hence be caught unawares by an early dissolution. Indeed, during the period of time I consider, two 
legislatures were dissolved before their constitutional end: the XI and the XII. In both cases, 
however, we can quite confidently assume that legislators knew when the parliament would have 
been dissolved: the last government in both the XI and the XII legislature (Ciampi’s and Dini’s 
cabinets, respectively) was expressly appointed to carry out a particular task within a precise time 
period163. 
The type of democracy (H.29) is instead a dummy taking the value 1 for bills presented and 
approved during the Second ‘majoritarian’ Republic. Remarkably, the government alternation (H.4) 
and type of democracy (H.29) are measured by the same indicator. 
 
5.3.4 Control variables  
The length of the initial bill and the policy area which the bill deals with are incorporated as control 
variables in my analyses. As for the former, which is measured as the number of words in the 
drafted version, longer bills are obviously more likely to be modified than shorter ones. Concerning 
the latter, it might be the case that bills addressing a certain policy area always face more changes 
than others. This could occur, for instance, because the issues within that policy domain are 
inherently more complex, or because in that policy area outside lobby groups and advisory bodies 
provide legislators with the information needed to propose changes to government bills164. The 
effect of the specific policy area addressed by the bill can be controlled in (at least) two ways. On 
the one hand, it is possible to create a number of separate dummy indicators, one for each policy 
domain. On the other hand, we can assume that the data are grouped into clusters (i.e. the different 
policy areas), and that data in one cluster are more similar to one another than to data belonging to 
another cluster. Hence, in the analyses we can estimate standard errors that are robust to such 
clusters. In both cases, the different policy areas can be identified following either the macro-issues 
of the Comparative Policy Agendas Project or the classification made in Laver and Hunt’s (1992) 
and Benoit and Laver’s (2006) expert surveys. 
Finally, also the type of governmental coalition could be incorporated as a control variable. In 
particular, together with the dummy for minority governments (see above), I could include in the 
empirical tests a dummy for oversized governments. This variable takes the value of 1 when the 
government coalition contains more parties than those which are strictly necessary for controlling a 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies. As displayed in Table 5.5, it happened in 9 of the 14 cabinets 
                                                 
163
 Both the Ciampi and Dini governments were temporary executives formed to introduce certain reforms before early 
elections. Economic and electoral reforms in the former case; economic and pension reforms in the latter case. 
164
 In other words, in certain policy areas external interest groups may act as ‘fire alarms’: they may provide 
parliamentary parties and legislators with information on the possible consequences of government-sponsored bills, thus  
making modifications to ministerial drafts more likely to occur. 
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which were in office in the period under investigation. The analyses, therefore, should include the 
two dummies for minority and oversized governments, leaving the minimum winning governments 
out as the reference category. However, I do not have any specific expectations about the effect of 
oversized executives on the changes made to government bills. Most of all, for the present purposes 
it does not seem really meaningful to distinguish between oversized and minimum winning. The 
only theoretically relevant distinction appears to be the one between minority and majority 
governments (see paragraph 1.1.1). Indeed, large part of Italian executives from 1987 to 2006 were 
oversized. In addition, the variable oversized governments is strongly associated with the dummy 
minority governments as well as with several measures of conflict. Therefore, in my analyses I 
include just a dummy for minority cabinets. 
 
 
 Name 
of government 
N.  
of bills 
Type 
of government 
    
X legislature Goria 61 Oversized 
 De Mita 78 Oversized 
 Andreotti VI 69 Oversized 
 Andreotti VII 25 Oversized 
    
XI legislature Amato I 44 Minimum winning 
 Ciampi 40 Minimum winning 
    
XII legislature Berlusconi I 37 Oversized 
 Dini 44 Minority 
    
XIII legislature Prodi I 118 Minority 
 D’Alema I 34 Oversized 
 D’Alema II 9 Minimum winning 
 Amato II 23 Oversized 
    
XIV legislature Berlusconi II 125 Oversized 
 Berlusconi III 9 Oversized 
  716  
 
Table 5.5 
Name and status of cabinets (Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1987-2006) 
 
 
Table 5.6 summarizes the hypotheses I will emprirically evaluate in the next chapter and 
provides descriptive statistics for the corresponding independent variables. Descriptive statistics for 
indicators of policy domains (based on Policy Agendas) are given in Table 5.7. 
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* Calculated excluding Dini's non-partisan cabinet (N = 672). 
** The size of proposing minister’s party is calculated only for non-technical ministers (N = 586). 
All ideological distances are weighted by issue-specific saliences. 
 
 
Table 5.6  
The independent variables. Descriptive statistics. 
  Variable Description Min. Median Max. Mean St. dev. 
 
       
 Conflict among actors 
      
H.1 Minority governments 1 if minority cabinet 0 0 1 0.226 0.419 
H.2 Distributive conflict 1 if at least one pork barrel clause 0 0 1 0.405 0.491 
H.3a Distance gov.midrange – parl.median 0 2.981 10.122 2.719 1.241 
H.3b 
Conflict with  
parliamentary majority Distance minister – parl.median 0 1.310 11.488 2.449 3.081 
H.4 Alternation 
H.29 Type of democracy 1 if Second Republic (1994-2006) 0 1 1 0.563 0.496 
N. of parties in the coalition * 4 4 8 4.699 1.113 H.5 Number of governing parties and range Ideological range in the coalition 0 7.15 12.5 6.419 2.553 
Distance gov.midrange – farthest opp.party 1.181 8.951 16.582 8.719 2.296 H.7a Distance gov.midrange – largest opp.party 0.027 7.766 11.790 7.509 2.727 
Distance minister – farthest opp.party 0.496 8.411 15.952 8.771 3.291 H.7b 
Conflict with opposition 
Distance minister – largest opp.party 0 7.260 13.661 6.927 3.679 
H.8 Conflict over  
ministerial responsibility 
Rae's index on Policy Agendas' micro-
categories 0 0.444 0.864 0.361 0.275 
H.9 Departmental capture 1 if minister is susceptible to be ‘captured’ 0 0 1 0.341 0.474 
H.10 Technical minister 1 if a technical minister proposes the bill 0 0 1 0.182 0.386 
Distance gov.midrange – Chamber president 0 3.935 15.634 4.724 3.349 H.11 
a,b President of the chamber Distance minister – Chamber president 0 5.277 15.634 4.789 3.230 
H.12 Ideological conflict within 
cabinet Distance minister – farthest coalition partner 0 5.830 12.350 5.924 2.831 
H.15 Size of minister's party Number of seats in the Chamber ** 3 161 234 133.759 77.841 
H.16 JM's presence 1 if JM from a coalition partner * 0 1 1 0 .949 0 .219 
H.17 JM's distance Distance minister – farthest JM 0 2.780 12.350 4.104 3.542 
H.19 Number of  
signatory parties Number of parties co-sponsoring the bill * 0 1 3 1.046 0.532 
H.20 
a,b Prime ministerial bill 1 if proposed by PM 0 0 1 0.142 0.350 
H.22 Committee chair's presence 1 if comm.chair from a coalition partner 0 1 1 0.767 0.423 
H.23 Committee chair's distance Distance minister – comm.chair 0 1.688 15.634 2.783 3.435 
 
 
      
 Lack of information 
      
H.25 Complexity 1 if the bill deals with multiple items 0 0 1 0.225 0.418 
H.26 Multidimensionality  Number of committees 0 4 13 4.226 2.483 
 
       
 Rules 
      
H.28 Impatience Number of days between introduction and end 
of legislative term 53 939 1844 961.432 534.691 
 
       
 Control variables 
      
 Length of bill Number of words in the bill 25 792 36685 1672.659 2717.392 
 Oversized governments 1 if oversized cabinet 0 1 1 0.644 0.479 
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Policy issue  
(Comparative Policy Angendas Project) Freq. Percent 
   
Agriculture 40 5.59 
Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce 45 6.28 
Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civi 16 2.23 
Community Development and Housing Issue 15 2.09 
Culture policy issues 29 4.05 
Defense 44 6.15 
Domestic Macroeconomic Issues 64 8.94 
Education 33 4.61 
Energy 16 2.23 
Environment 27 3.77 
Foreign Trade 11 1.54 
Government Operations 104 14.53 
Health 35 4.89 
Immigration 11 1.54 
International Affairs and Foreign Aid 45 6.28 
Labor, Employment 28 3.91 
Law and Crime 80 11.17 
Public Lands and Water Management 9 1.26 
Social Welfare 7 0.98 
Space, Science, Technology and Communic 11 1.54 
Transportation 46 6.42 
   
Total 716 100.00 
 
 
Table 5.7  
Policy domains (Comparative Policy Agendas Project). Descriptive statistics. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
 
In this chapter I present an empirical analysis of the changes made to Italian government bills in the 
course of the legislative process from 1987 to 2006. The first section introduces the statistical 
technique employed. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the outcome I am interested in is the 
number of words which are changed in the text of a governmental bill during the parliamentary 
process. Therefore, I use an event count model, which is the standard approach in political science 
studies concerned with the number of events that occur over a particular period of time (King 
1989a,b; Long 1997). After motivating the choice of a non-linear model, I discuss the basic logic of 
count models and illustrate the advantages of employing a particular model within this class: the 
negative binomial regression. I then show how this model can be specified and estimated.  
In the second section, I present the results of my analyses and discuss them in light of the 
theory reviewed in chapters 1-4. In particular, I first examine a set of models which empirically 
evaluate Martin and Vanberg’s (2005) argument that ideological conflict within the coalition 
increases the amount of changes made to governmental bills during the legislative process. After 
this, I turn to models which include policy distances involving the parliamentary median voter, 
under both ministerial discretion and collective cabinet responsibility. Then, I compare the results 
from the latter models with those from the previous models, trying to give an overall account of the 
changes made to government legislation during Italian parliamentary processes. 
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6.1 EVENT COUNT MODEL 
My dependent variable counts the number of words changed in governmental bills during the 
legislative process and takes only non-negative integer values (see Figure 5.1a,b). Therefore, in 
order to test the explanatory hypotheses discussed in the theoretical part of this work, I use an event 
count model. 
An event can be understood as the realization of a point process governed by some specified 
rate of occurence of the event (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; 2). The number of events (or, 
equivalently, the number of times an event has occurred) is the total number of such realizations in 
a fixed domain, and the domain can be a time interval – day, year, or some other particular interval 
– or a cross-section – a geographic unity, an individual, or else (King 1988: 838). In my case, the 
number of events is the total number of words that have been added, removed, or substituted in the 
text of a governmental bill throughout the parliamentary process. 
As King (1988) illustrates, using an ordinary least square (OLS) regression model for count 
outcomes leads to several problems. First of all, the model would be misspecified: assuming a linear 
relationship, OLS may produce also negative predictions for the number of events165. Moreover, 
any linear model would quite unrealistically assume that going from 0 to 1 event is the same as 
going from, say, 50 to 51 events, or from 200 to 201 events. Secondly, the estimators would be 
highly inefficient, insufficient, inconsistent, and biased, even in infinite samples166. Remarkably, 
neither logging the dependent variable nor taking its square root would solve such problems.   
Hence, a non-linear model is more appropriate. Indeed, the data generation process of event 
counts can be assumed to be a Poisson process (see King 1988: 860; Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 5-
6), and the most basic way for modeling count variables is the Poisson regression model (PRM). In 
the PRM, the number of events follows a Poisson distribution with a mean that is a function of the 
independent variables according to a model that forces expected counts to be positive167. More 
precisely, for observation i = 1,..., n, let yi be a random variable indicating the number of times an 
event has occurred – or, equivalently, the number of events occurred – in a fixed domain, so that 
only the values 0, 1, 2,... occur with non-zero probability. Let µi be the expected number of times 
that an event has occurred – or, equivalently, the mean of yi or expected count – in that domain. The 
                                                 
165
 Forcing negative fitted values to zero through a ‘truncated linear’ model would not be an acceptable solution, since it 
would make implausible assumptions at and near the cut-off point (King 1988: 845-846). 
166
 Let θ̂  be an estimator of the parameter θ. θ̂  is an unbiased estimator of θ if the average of the estimates generated 
across repeated experiments equals the parameter θ – that is, if E(θ̂ ) = θ. θ̂  is consistent if its sampling distribution 
collapses to a spike over the true parameter θ as the sample size approaches infinity – i.e., when θ̂  → θ in probability. If 
θ̂  and θ̃ are two consistent estimators of θ, θ̂  is more efficient than θ̃ if Var(θ̂ ) < Var(θ̃). An estimator is asymptotically 
efficient when its variance is the smallest possible among consistent estimators. Finally, an estimator is not sufficient 
when it does not use all available information in the estimation. 
167
 In the present section, I mostly follow Long’s (1997) exposition and notation. 
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PRM is defined by two equations. First, the number of events yi is drawn from a Poisson 
distribution with a conditional mean that depends on i’s observed characteristics:  
 
Pr(yi |xi) =  (6.1) 
 
Second, the expected count µi varies across observations as a function of a vector of explanatory 
variables xi according to the following structural equation: 
 
µi  = E(yi |xi) = exp(xiβ) (6.2) 
 
Where xi is a vector of k exogenous regressors that are thought to determine yi, and β is a k x 1 
vector of coefficients. Taking the exponential of xiβ ensures that µi is positive, which is necessary 
because counts can be only non-negative (for a discussion of alternative functional forms, see King 
1989a: 121-124)168.  
Remarkably, by the property of the Poisson distribution, in the PRM the conditional variance 
equals the conditional mean:  
 
Var(yi |xi) = E(yi |xi) = µi  (6.3) 
 
This is known as equidispersion, and is a consequence of two assumptions made in the PRM about 
the process generating the counts. In particular, the probability that an event occurs is assumed to be 
constant during the observation period (homogeneity), and independent of all the previous events 
occurred during that observation period (independence)169. If these assumptions do not hold, the 
variance is not equal to the mean and the count variable does not follow the Poisson distribution. 
We would have either overdispersion (variance greater than the mean) or underdispersion (variance 
lower than the mean). Although the estimates will still be consistent (and usually very similar), they 
will be inefficient, and with incosistent standard errors (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon 1984). 
Indeed, the assumptions of homogeneity and independence rarely apply, and therefore 
equidispersion is hardly found in real-world data. The conditional variance is most of the time 
greater than the conditional mean (overdispersion), and hence the PRM would very often 
underestimate the amount of dispersion in the outcome170. Overdispersion in the distribution of the 
                                                 
168
 To estimate β, the effect of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable, the method of maximum likelihood 
is used. For ease of illustration, here I do not report the (log-)likelihood function. For details, see Long (1997: 223); 
Maddala (1983: 52).   
169
 For a comprehensive discussion of all the assumptions made in the PRM concerning the process which generates 
counts, see King (1989b). 
170
 I focus on the case of overdispersion, which is more relevant for the purposes of the present chapter. For event count 
models taking into account underdispersion, see King (1989b: 769-771).   
exp(-µi)µi  yi 
yi! 
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count variable can result from the following two circumstances. The first is unobserved 
heterogeneity and violates the homogeneity assumption: individuals in the sample come from a 
heteogeneous population in which individuals have constant but different probabilities to 
experience events. The second is positive contagion and violates independence: the occurrence of 
an event increases the probability of subsequent occurrence of similar events.   
In my case, the requirements of homogeneity and independence are probably violated: most of 
all, it seems rather implausible to assume independence between the occurrence of successive 
events. Without doubt, rewriting ministerial drafts in parliament is a costly activity. If legislators 
want to propose changes to the original bill, and especially if they want these changes to be 
successful, they have to gather (at least some of) the relevant information. Moreover, they may need 
to coordinate their efforts, or reach agreements with other individuals or groups in the parliament. 
In doing so, they incur resources and opportunity costs. Reasonably, we can imagine that once a 
change has been made to the original bill, the costs of making further modifications become 
marginally lower. In other words, a process of positive contagion seems at work when legislation is 
examined in parliament. This produces overdispersion in the counts – i.e., in the number of changed 
words that we observe at the end of the legislative process.  
Using a PRM in presence of overdispersion in the outcome produces standard errors that are 
biased downward and results in spuriously large z-values and spuriously small p-values (Cameron 
and Trivedi 1986; King 1989). A standard solution to account for overdispersion is the negative 
binomial regression model (NBRM), whose distribution allows the conditional variance to exceed 
the conditional mean. In particular, the degree of overdispersion is estimated as a parameter from 
the data. 
In what follows, I derive the NBRM on the basis of unobserved heterogeneity (Greenwood-
Yule distribution). The NBRM could be derived also from positive contagion (Pólya-Eggenberger 
distribution), with exactly the same results: since both processes lead to the same probability 
distribution of counts (see Neyman 1965: 5), the resulting regression model is identical. 
While in the PRM the function relating the mean µi and the covariates xi is parametrically 
exact and no other source of stochastic variation is considered, in the NBRM such a function is 
itself stochastic. In other words, the NBRM adds a random error, εi, which is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with xi. As a consequence, whereas in the PRM the conditional mean of yi given xi is 
known and it is equal to µi  = exp(xiβ), in the NBRM µi is replaced by the random variable µĩ:  
 
µ̃i = exp(xiβ + εi) (6.4) 
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In the NBRM, therefore, variation in µ̃i has two sources. The first is observed heterogeneity – i.e., 
the observed variation in xi across sample members as in the PRM. The second is the unobserved 
heterogeneity introduced by εi. The error εi can be thought of either as the effect of some 
unobserved variables omitted from the model (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon 1984), or as other 
sources of pure randomness (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984)171. 
From equations 6.2 and 6.4, we can easily obtain 
 
µ̃i  =  exp(xiβ) exp(εi)  =  µi exp(εi)  =  µiδi   (6.5) 
 
Where δi = exp(εi). As in the linear regression, to identify the model an assumption about the mean 
of the error term is to be made. In the case of the NBRM, the assumption is  
 
E(δi) = 1 (6.6) 
 
Under this assumption172, we can easily see that the expected count in the NBRM is the same as the 
expected count in the PRM. That is, 
 
E(µĩ) = E(µiδi) = µiE(δi) = µi  (6.7) 
 
However, as previously noted, the PRM underfits the amount of dispersion in the outcome and thus 
produces standard errors which are somehow deflated. 
In the NBRM, the number of events yi given both xi and δi is still Poisson-distributed. In 
particular, the density is 
 
Pr(yi |xi, δi) =  =  (6.8) 
 
Yet, δi is unknown and therefore we cannot compute Pr(yi |xi, δi). Such a problem is solved by the 
following two steps. First, assume that δi is drawn from a gamma distribution. Second, compute 
Pr(yi |xi) as a weighted combination of Pr(yi |xi, δi) for all values of δi, where the weights are 
determined by Pr(δi) – i.e., the probability of each value of δi. In other terms, the probability of yi is 
calculated as a mixture of two probability distributions: Poisson for the outcome, and gamma for the 
unobserved individual heterogeneity. After calculations that I do not report here (for details, see 
Long 1997: 231-232; Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 70-79), the result is the negative binomial 
probability distribution: 
                                                 
171
 In the PRM, all individuals with the same values of xi have the same values of µi. In the NBRM, instead, for a given 
combination of values in xi the expected count is not unique but it is randomly distributed as µ̃i. 
172
 Remarkably, the equation 6.6 for the NBRM corresponds to the requirement that E(εi) = 0 in the linear regression 
model. 
yi! 
exp(-µ̃i)µ̃i  yi exp(-µiδi)(µiδi)     yi 
yi! 
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Pr(yi |xi) =  (6.9) 
 
 
Where Γ() is the gamma function173 and α is the dispersion parameter. α ≥ 0, and higher values of α 
determine higher values of the conditional variance of yi. While in the negative binomial 
distribution the expected value of yi is the same as in the Poisson distribution, the conditional 
variance differs depending on the value of α. In particular, 
 
E(yi |xi) = exp(xiβ) = µi      (6.10) 
 
Var(yi |xi) = µi     1 +                = µi (1 + αµi) = µi + αµi2  (6.11) 
 
Given that µi is positive (see equation 6.2) and α is non-negative, when α is different from zero the 
conditional variance of yi is always higher than the conditional mean µi. In other words, for a given 
mean, the variance of the negative binomial distribution exceeds the variance of the Poisson. This 
allows the NBRM to predict low and high counts with larger probabilities, thus fitting 
overdispersed data better than the PRM (see Long 1997: 233-234)174. 
It is worth noting that if α = 0 the NBRM reduces to the PRM: the conditional variance in 
equation 6.11 would become Var(yi |xi) = µi as in the Poisson, and the density function in equation 
6.9 would reduce to that in equation 6.1 (Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 71). 
The NBRM can be estimated by maximum likelihood. More precisely, the likelihood function 
for the NBRM is the following: 
 
     L(β | y, X) = ∏ Pr(yi |xi) 
 
 
 
      (6.12) 
 
Since µi = exp(xiβ), the log-likelihood is derived by taking the logarithms of the equation and 
substituting exp(xiβ) for each occurrence of µi. The resulting log-lokelihood equation can be 
                                                 
173
 For the definition of the gamma function, see for example Cameron and Trivedi (1998: 374-375). 
174
 As Cameron and Trivedi (1986: 32-33) show, several variance functions are possible with the NBRM. The most 
commonly used is that in equation 6.11, which is quadratic in the mean and is called NB2 by Cameron and Trivedi. 
Another option is the NB1, where Var(yi |xi) = µi + αµi. 
Γ(yi + α-1) 
yi! Γ(α-1) 
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µi     yi 
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α-1 
α-1 + µi 
µi     yi 
 N 
i = 1 
= ∏ 
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maximized with numerical methods. The gradients and Hessians of the log-likelihood are given by 
Lawless (1987). 
Remarkably, estimating the NBRM allows to test for overdispersion in the data. Since when α 
is zero the NBRM reduces to the PRM, it is possible to check for overdispersion through a one-
tailed z-test of H0 : α = 0.175 In order to test such a hypothesis, we can use a likelihood-ratio (LR) 
test. If ln LNBRM is the log-likelihood from the Negative binomial model and ln LPRM is the log-
likelihood from the Poisson model, then G2 = 2(ln LNBRM – ln LPRM) is a test of H0 : α = 0 (Long 
1997: 236-237). If the test shows significant evidence of overdispersion, the data are better 
estimated using a NBRM than a PRM176.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
175
 The test is one-tailed for the following reason. Given that α ≥ 0, all the negative values of α have a probability of 0. 
Therefore, the asymptotic distribution of α ̂ is truncated, being just half of a normal distribution. 
176
 As an alternative, Cameron and Trivedi (1990) introduce a number of tests of overdispersion which are based on 
residuals from the PRM and do not require estimation of the NBRM.   
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6.2 RESULTS 
In this section I present the results of my analyses. In order to test the hypotheses discussed in the 
first four chapters and operationalized as explained in chapter 5, I ran a set of negative binomial 
regressions. The estimates of the coefficients from these models are reported in the tables below and 
then discussed. Before turning to this task, however, let me make some preliminary remarks. 
Firstly, the models presented in the following two paragraphs incorporate at the same time 
variables based on all the three major explanatory factors of the modifications made to 
governmental bills during the legislative process: conflict among actors, lacking information and 
institutional rules. However, not all the variables measuring ideological conflict among actors can 
be simultaneously included in the same model. The reasons are both theoretical and technical. On 
the theoretical side, ‘ideological’ hypotheses rely on logics which are different: some of them 
assume that the conflict resulting in changes to the initial bill is between the proposing minister and 
other actors, while others maintan that the relevant conflict revolves around the parliamentary 
median voter. Moreover, in the latter case, we can assume that cabinet decision making follows 
either ministerial discretion or collective responsibility. On the technical side, some of the variables 
measuring idelogical conflict are strongly correlated, and therefore it is not possible to include all of 
them in a single model (see below). Given these kinds of problems, I specified three different 
models, which correspond to three different combinations of the variables dealing with ideological 
conflict. Model A, which is presented and discussed in paragraph 6.2.1, incorporates three 
ideological variables measuring distances between the proposing minister and the other relevant 
actors (coalition partners, JMs, and opposition parties). This allows to evaluate Martin and 
Vanberg’s (2004, 2005) argument about ministerial drift. The other two models, instead, test the 
hypothesis of conflict with parliamentary majority and include distances involving the median voter 
in the legislature. In particular, the initial bill is assumed to reflect the minister’s ideal point in 
model B, and the coalition compromise in model C. These last two models are examined in 
paragraph 6.2.2.   
Secondly, I ran the three models using Huber-White robust standard errors, which provide 
correct standard errors also in the presence of problems of model misspecification177. In addition, in 
order to control for the policy area addressed by the bill, I ran the same models including dummies 
for policy domains (both from the Comparative Policy Agendas Project and from expert surveys). 
Another option would be to use clustered standard errors. However, this might not be a good choice 
in the present case. Indeed, the cluster-robust standard error estimator converges to the true standard 
error as the number of clusters – and not the number of observations N – goes to infinity. Also, 
                                                 
177
 These standard errors are also known as ‘sandwich’ standard errors. See Arminger (1995: 111-113) for a 
mathematical treatment. 
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clusters should have roughly equal size. As Kezdi (2004) shows, 50 clusters (with roughly the same 
size) are often enough for accurate inference. Yet, in my case the number of cluster is rather small: 
it is 14 if I use the dimensions of expert surveys, and 23 if I follow the macro-issues of the Policy 
Angendas. Moreover, the size of clusters varies a lot according to both classifications (see Table 5.7 
for domains from Policy Agendas). Therefore, using cluster-robust estimators for my analyses may 
produce very incorrect inference: the estimates of standard errors may be highly biased downward, 
leading to over-rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficients are zero (see Wooldridge 2003; 
Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2006). For these reasons, using a fixed-effects model might be a 
better option. 
Thirdly, not all the hypotheses discussed in the theoretical part of this work can be tested 
using the full sample of government bills on which I collected information. The explanations 
concerning the number of governing parties (H.5), the number of proposing parties (H.19), and the 
presence of a hostile junior minister in the drafting ministry (H.16) assume that the executive is 
partisan. As previously noted, this is not the case with Dini’s technical cabinet. As a consequence, I 
empirically evaluated these three hypotheses in a subsample of bills which excludes those presented 
under Dini’s government. By a similar logic, the effect of the size of the minister’s party (H.15) can 
be assessed only if the proposer belongs to some party. This hypothesis has thus been tested 
excluding bills introduced by technical ministers.  
Finally, the XII legislature (April 15, 1994 – May 8, 1996) seems rather exceptional, and 
including it in the analyses could influence results concerning some of my hypotheses. Most of all, 
it could affect the estimated coefficients of alternation (H.4) and technical minister (H.10). As for 
the alternation hypothesis, the XII legislature cannot be easily placed in the Second Republic and is 
probably better understood as a transitional period. Without doubt, that legislature does not belong 
to the First Republic: in 1994 almost all the prior governing parties disappeared together with with a 
45-year long pivotal party system, and elections held under a quasi-plurality rule were won by new 
or previously excluded parties. However, the XII legislature is fairly different from the following 
ones, and undoubtedly does not present the characteristics of a true alternational system. Indeed, 
after a 8-month center-right government (Berlusconi I: May 10, 1994 – January 17, 1995), a fully 
technical executive was formed (Dini). This leads us to the hypothesis dealing with technical 
ministers, who are supposed to face lower position-taking incentives than their partisan colleagues. 
Of course, this logic does not work in the “anomalous” Dini’s government (January 17, 1995 – May 
16, 1996). For these reasons, I controlled for the effect of the “troublesome” XII legislature by 
running separate analyses which exclude it. 
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In the tables which follow, cell entries are the estimated negative binomial regression 
coefficients (with standard errors below). Since the NBRM is a non-linear model, the parameter 
estimates only provide information about the direction of the relationships, and do not allow an 
immediate interpretation of the magnitude of the effects. By looking simply at the coefficients, all 
we can say is that a positive sign implies that an increase in the level of the independent variable 
increases the number of changes made to the ministerial draft during the legislative process. 
Conversely, a negative sign implies that an increase in the independent variable decreases the 
amount of modifications.  
In order to give a substantive interpretation of my results, for the most relevant among the 
following models I also re-express the effect of the explanatory variables in terms of percentage 
changes in the expected number of word changes in a bill for a change in an independent variable. 
More precisely, let µ = E(y|x) = exp(xβ) be the expected count, as in equation (6.2). Then, the 
percentage change in the expected count for a δ unit change in xk, holding other variables constant, 
is calculated as 
 
   100 x                                                                   =  100 x [ exp(βk x δ) ]           (6.13) 
 
Where the effect of a change in xk is independent of the level of xk, and of the level of any 
other variable. I set δ equal to one unit for dummy indicators and for the number of consulting 
committees, and equal to one standard deviation for all the other variables.  
Togeher with the number of observations N and the information criteria (AIC and BIC), at the 
bottom of the tables I report the parameter α, which estimates the dispersion of the outcome variable. 
Let me recall that if this parameter is zero, then there is equidispersion in the data and the NBRM 
reduces to the simpler PRM. When it is greater than zero, there is overdispersion and the negative 
binomial model is preferred to the Poisson. 
In both the following paragraphs, the tables report results of negative binomial regressions ran 
using robust standard errors and fixed effects on the policy domains identified by the Comparative 
Policy Agendas Project (coefficients estimates for the issue-specific intercepts are available upon 
request). Results of analyses with policy dummies from expert surveys and with clustered standard 
errors are available upon request (in any case, the results remain the same). In addition, in both 
paragraphs I present the results of models estimated in particular portions of my sample. This 
allows to evaluate theoretical hypotheses that cannot be tested in the full sample of bills on which I 
collected information. Further, I also show the results of analyses excluding the XII legislature, 
which I ran as a robustness check.  
 
E(y | x,xk + δ) – E(y | x,xk) 
E(y | x,xk) 
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6.2.1 Who counteracts ministerial drift? 
In the present paragraph I discuss different specifications of model A, which tests – along with 
other relevant hypotheses – Martin and Vanberg’s (2005) argument about the (positive) impact of 
intracabinet conflict on the level of changes made to government-sponsored legislation in the course 
of parliamentary processes. In particular, I first present the general results of my analyses (Tables 
6.1a,b and 6.3a,b), and then show the results for hypotheses that can be tested only excluding non-
partisan cabinets or technical proposing ministers (Table 6.4 and 6.5).  
In their analysis on the number of article changes, Martin and Vanberg include three 
theoretically crucial variables: a variable measuring ideological division inside the coalition, a 
measure of the conflict between government and opposition, and a dummy indicating the presence 
of a hostile JM in the ministry drafting the bill. Following their logic, I initially incorporated 
conflict within cabinet, conflict with opposition, and junior minister’s distance (Model A.1). These 
variables, which are weighted by an issue-specific value of saliency, measure the distances between 
the proposing minister and the farthest party in the coalition, in the opposition, and in the drafting 
ministry, respectively.  
While the former two measures are constructed in almost the same way as Martin and 
Vanberg’s ones, the variable concerning JMs is different178. I chose JM’s distance (H.17) instead of 
JM’s presence (H.16) for a number of reasons. First of all, a continuous measure of distance is more 
accurate than a simple dichotomous indicator. Second, using the distance seems a more appropriate 
(and meaningful) way to operationalize conflict within the drafting ministry in the Italian case: in 
Italy, where the number of both coalition parties and ministries has always been relatively large, it 
is almost always the case that a JM from a partner party is present in the ministry drafting the bill 
(see Verzichelli and Cotta’s 2000 tables on the distribution of junior ministerships in Italian 
coalitions)179. Third, the effect of JM’s distance can be evaluated using the full sample of bills. By 
contrast, as previously noted, JM’s presence is a more questionable measure when a non-partisan 
executive is in office, and thus can be safely incorporated only in analyses which exclude Dini’s 
government.  
                                                 
178
 Indeed, I operationalized the variables measuring conflict within the cabinet and with the opposition in a slightly 
different way from Martin and Vanberg (2005). In particular, I considered only opposition parties with at least 20 MPs, 
and not all of them (see paragraph 5.3.1). Moreover, all my distances are weighted by an issue-specific salience, while 
Martin and Vanberg (2005: 100) use coalition-specific and opposition-specific values. I opted for an issue-specific 
weight for ease of uniformity. In fact, it would have been rather problematic to strictly follow Martin and Vanberg’s 
operationalization in the case of the ideological distances included in Models B and C – for instance, the distance 
between the proposing minister and the parliamenary median party. 
179
 For 89% of the bills in my sample there is – at least – one hostile JM in the drafting ministry. This percentage 
increases up to 95% if we exclude non-partisan Dini’s cabinet, where by definition the possibility of hostile JMs is not 
admitted (see Table 5.6). As Martin and Vanberg (2005: 99, Table 1) report, hostile JMs are fairly less frequent in 
Germany and the Netherlands (55%). 
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Model A.2 and A.3 isolate the separate effects of conflict within cabinet and junior minister’s 
distance, whereas Model A.4 is specified in order to check for some possible influence of my 
measure of departmental capture on the coefficients of technical minister. Technical ministers 
should be more inclined to departmental capture than political ministers, since by definition they are 
expert in the policy domain under their jurisdiction and they are not linked to a particular 
constituency they have to please. Indeed, these two variables are strongly associated: running a Chi-
square test, the Chi-square with one degree of freedom is 159.2623, and p is 0.000. As for models 
A.5 and A.6, they add committee chairs’ presence and president of Chamber, respectively. In the 
case of committee chairs, I opted for a dummy (H.22) instead of a continuous measure of policy 
division (H.23) because the latter is correlated with JM’s distance (0.457, p = 0.000). Moreover, 
while in Italian coalitions ministers are almost always shadowed by a hostile JM, the same is not 
true for committee chairs: for any given proposing minister, JMs can be – and usually are – more 
than one, while the chair of the committee to which the bill is referred is almost always one. Table 
6.3a,b report results of the same analyses reran excluding the observations from the XII legislature. 
Table 6.2 reports the parameters from Model A.2 (with fixed effects), which I take as a 
benchmark, re-expressed in terms of percentage changes in the expected number of words changed 
in a bill. 
All that said, a first message I draw from the following tables is that my results are rather 
stable. In particular, they prove to be robust to different model specifications, to the inclusion of 
dummy variables for policy domains, and to the exclusion of the XII legislature. In addition, in all 
the models the dispersion parameter α is positive, which implies that a Negative binomial regression 
is more appropriate than a Poisson regression180. 
Let me start with the hypotheses involving ideological conflict among actors. First of all, my 
data only partially seem to support Martin and Vanberg’s (2005) hypothesis that ideological 
divisions inside the coalition increase the amount of changes made to governmental bills during the 
legislative process (H.12). Although their variable conflict within cabinet is positive and statistically 
significant when JM’s distance is omitted (Model A.3 with fixed effects), it falls to insignificance 
once I include that measure of conflict with junior ministers (Model A.1). Indeed, these two 
variables are fairly and positively correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.660 with p = 
0.000), since they both measure ideological divisions among parties in the coalition. 
 
                                                 
180
 I also ran Poisson goodness-of-fit tests for the following models. The Chi2 is always extremely high (always around 
500,000, with p = 0.000), indicating that counts are overdispersed and therefore a PRM is not a good option. Moreover, 
let me note that the Wald chi-square statistic, testing the null hypothesis that all regression coefficients in the model are 
simultaneously equal to zero, has p = 0.000 in all the models displayed in this chapter. In other words, the null 
hypothesis is always rejected.  
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Depndent variable:  
Number of changed words MODEL A.1  MODEL A.2  MODEL A.3 
 
        
Independent variables Coeff. (robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e. ) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
 
       
Minority 0.163 0.296  0.232 0.242  0.110 0.253 
 
0.196 0.191  0.183 0.178  0.195 0.190 
Distributive conflict 0.015 -0.037  0.012 -0.034  -0.011 -0.061 
 
0.124 0.120  0.124 0.120  0.124 0.120 
Conflict within cabinet -0.025 0.019  ̶ ̶  0.010 0.048* 
 
0.031 0.032     0.024 0.025 
JM’s distance 0.052** 0.040*  0.044** 0.047**  ̶ ̶ 
 
0.023 0.023  0.018 0.018    
Conflict with opposition -0.010 -0.016  -0.015 -0.014  -0.001 -0.008 
 
0.018 0.020  0.018 0.020  0.018 0.020 
Committee chair’s presence 
        
 
  
 
  
 
  
President of Chamber 
        
 
  
 
  
 
  
Alternation 0.327** 0.368***  0.341** 0.361***  0.406*** 0.413*** 
 
0.139 0.140  0.140 0.139  0.133 0.134 
Prime ministerial bill 0.445*** 0.416**  0.431** 0.431***  0.400** 0.379** 
 
0.172 0.163  0.171 0.158  0.169 0.159 
Technical minister -0.393** -0.475***  -0.396** -0.474***  -0.426** -0.487*** 
 
0.173 0.182  0.173 0.182  0.173 0.182 
Conflict over ministerial 
responsibility -0.002 0.054  0.017 0.040  -0.023 0.043 
 
0.233 0.225  0.234 0.222  0.236 0.227 
Departmental capture -0.026 0.000  -0.033 0.008  0.007 0.016 
 
0.143 0.151  0.143 0.149  0.142 0.150 
Complexity 0.390** 0.411***  0.392** 0.410***  0.399** 0.423*** 
 
0.153 0.145  0.154 0.145  0.155 0.146 
Multidimensionality 0.166*** 0.157***  0.165*** 0.158***  0.161*** 0.154*** 
 
0.031 0.030  0.031 0.030  0.031 0.030 
Impatience -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Length of bill 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
         
Constant 4.722*** 4.569***  4.643*** 4.635***  4.608*** 4.475*** 
  
0.303 0.377   0.274 0.357  0.296 0.372 
         
 
        
Alpha 2.638 2.535  2.640 2.536  2.651 2.541 
AIC 9,552.358 9,558.058  9,550.907 9,556.305  9,554.508 9,558.004 
BIC 9,625.537 9,722.711  9,619.512 9,716.384  9,623.113 9,718.083 
N 716   716   716 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
 
Table 6.1a 
Negative binomial regressions on government bills changes. Italy 1987-2006 (all cabinets and ministers). 
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Depndent variable:  
Number of changed words MODEL A.4  MODEL A.5  MODEL A.6 
 
        
Independent variables Coeff. (robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e. ) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
        
Minority 0.233 0.242  0.240 0.245  0.237 0.253 
 
0.183 0.178  0.183 0.178  0.184 0.181 
Distributive conflict 0.014 -0.035  0.002 -0.042  0.002 -0.043 
 
0.124 0.120  0.124 0.120  0.124 0.120 
Conflict within cabinet ̶ ̶  ̶ ̶  ̶ ̶ 
 
        
JM’s distance 0.043** 0.047***  0.045** 0.048***  0.045** 0.046** 
 
0.018 0.018  0.018 0.018  0.018 0.019 
Conflict with opposition -0.015 -0.014  -0.015 -0.014  -0.015 -0.015 
 
0.018 0.020  0.018 0.020  0.018 0.020 
Committee chair’s presence 
   -0.152 -0.137  -0.150 -0.142 
 
   
0.144 0.144  0.144 0.143 
President of Chamber 
      -0.005 0.009 
 
   
  
 
0.021 0.023 
Alternation 0.342** 0.361***  0.346** 0.363***  0.330** 0.392** 
 
0.138 0.139  0.140 0.139  0.164 0.164 
Prime ministerial bill 0.441*** 0.429***  0.413** 0.413**  0.419** 0.401** 
 
0.167 0.154  0.175 0.161  0.176 0.165 
Technical minister -0.412*** -0.470***  -0.337* -0.417**  -0.324* -0.438** 
 
0.157 0.158  0.180 0.191  0.195 0.207 
Conflict over ministerial 
responsibility 0.014 0.041  -0.010 0.022  -0.010 0.023 
 
0.234 0.221  0.240 0.224  0.240 0.224 
Departmental capture ̶ ̶  -0.054 -0.008  -0.054 -0.009 
 
   0.140 0.148  0.140 0.147 
Complexity 0.390** 0.410***  0.407*** 0.419***  0.407*** 0.418*** 
 
0.153 0.145  0.154 0.145  0.155 0.144 
Multidimensionality 0.165*** 0.159***  0.163*** 0.156***  0.163*** 0.157*** 
 
0.031 0.030  0.031 0.030  0.031 0.030 
Impatience -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Length of bill 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
         
Constant 4.640*** 4.639***  4.758*** 4.733***  4.782*** 4.694*** 
  
0.274 0.353  0.292 0.368  0.307 0.374 
         
 
        
Alpha 2.640 2.536  2.637 2.534  2.637 2.534 
AIC 9,548.953 9,554.308  9,551.945 9,557.618  9,553.901 9,559.488 
BIC 9,612.984 9,709.813  9,625.124 9,722.271  9,631.654 9,728.714 
N 716   716   716 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
 
Table 6.1b 
Negative binomial regressions on government bills changes. Italy 1987-2006 (all cabinets and ministers). 
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In more than half of the laws in my sample (381 out of 716), the proposing minister’s distance from 
the farthest coalition partner and that from the farthest JM coincide181. As a consequence, keeping 
both variables in the same model could be problematic. In particular, it might reduce the precision 
of my estimates since the more two independent variables are correlated, the greater their standard 
errors will be (compare the standard errors of JM’s distance and conflict within cabinet in Models 
A.2 and A.3 to those in Model A.1). In subsequent models, I thus dropped conflict within cabinet, 
since its effect seems rather weak and unsteady: comparing Models A.3 and A.1, when we include 
JM’s distance the coefficient is no more significant, the sign switches from positive to negative (in 
the specification without fixed effects), and also the magnitude changes. In contrast, JM’s distance 
(H.17) has a much more stable effect: its coefficient is positive and significant in all the models – 
even when conflict within cabinet is included – with stable standard errors and magnitude182. This 
seems to suggest that in the Italian case it is the policy divisions inside the drafting ministry – and 
not the overall ideological conflict within the coalition – which increase the amount of 
modifications made to government bills in parliament. In particular, as Table 6.2 displays, for a 
standard deviation increase in the distance between the proposing minister and her farthest JM, 
roughly 3.5 points on the 20-point scales of expert surveys, the average number of word changes in 
a government bill increases by 18%, holding all the other variables constant. 
Remarkably, against the original expectation (H.17), the sign of the coefficient of JM’s 
distance is always positive, which implies that Italian JMs might not exactly behave as suggested by 
Martin and Vanberg. What seems to happen is that Italian JMs inform their own party about the 
policy implications of bills, allowing them to correct the initial proposals in parliament.  
With regard to the role of opposition parties, as in Martin and Vanberg’s (2005) analysis the 
ideological conflict between government and opposition (H.7b) does not have effects on the 
transformations experienced in parliament by ministerial drafts. Indeed, the coefficient has also the 
wrong sign 183 . This finding contrasts with the influence that, according to several scholars, 
opposition parites are able to exert on lawmaking in parliamentary systems (Döring 1995a; Powell 
2000; Strøm 1990a). Most of all, it does not support the idea that during the amendatory process 
Italian governments need to renegotiate the content of their bills also with opposition parties 
(Capano and Vignati 2008).    
                                                 
181
 I also reestimated Model A.1 using JM’s presence instead of JM’s distance and excluding Dini’s non-partisan 
cabinet (N = 672). The results are the same as Model A.3. The variable JM’s presence has always a positive sign but is 
never significant. Results are available upon request. 
182
 My choice is supported also by the values provided by the information criteria. Both Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian 
(BIC) criteria suggest that Model A.2 (with just JM’s distance) is the one which best fits the data. 
183
 I reran all the analyses of this chapter using the conflict with the largest opposition party instead of that with the 
farthest opposition party (see paragraph 5.3.1). This does not alter my findings (results available upon request). 
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Leaving aside Martin and Vanberg’s argument, let me now comment the results for the other 
hypotheses tested in the models. To begin with, government bills proposed and approved during the 
Italian Second Republic are altered more extensively than those passed into law in the previous 
period. This is consistent with the hypothesis that, due to farther positions of the status quo, changes 
to governmental bills should be greater in an alternational party system than in a pivotal party 
system (H.4). Table 6.2 indicates a 44% increase in the number of word changes in the Second 
Republic. This finding is at odds with the conjecture that during the Italian Second Republic 
governments should be better able to control the passage of their legislation throughout the 
parliamentary process (H.29). Such an argument assumes that a shift from a consensus to a more 
majoritarian type of democracy took place in Italy in the mid-1990s184. 
 
Independent variables 
  
Percentage change in 
the expected number 
of word changes 
    
Minority  27.4 
    
Distributive conflict  -3.4 
    
JM's distance  18.2** 
    
Conflict with opposition  -4.4 
    
Alternation  43.5*** 
    
Prime ministerial bill  53.9*** 
    
Technical minister  -37.8*** 
    
Conflict over ministerial 
responsibility  1.1 
    
Departmental capture  0.8 
    
Complexity  50.6*** 
    
Multidimensionality  17.2*** 
    
Impatience  -4.1 
    
Length of bill  87.9*** 
   
 
Table 6.2 
Percentage change in the expected number of word changes. 
(coefficients from Model A.2 – fixed effects) 
 
 
                                                 
184
 This result contrasts also with the hypothesis that less changes should occur after the 1997 reform of the Italian 
standing orders (see paragraph 4.1.2). 
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Quite surprisingly, the bills which are intoduced by the prime minister are more extensively 
altered than those proposed by line ministers (the expected number of word changes increases by 
more than 50%). This contrasts with the expectation that prime ministers should ensure 
coordination among governing parties at the executive level (Andeweg 2000), such that prime 
ministerial bills should represent coalition agreed-upon compromises (H.20a). On the contrary, my 
data suggest that, instead of pursuing coalition-wide goals, prime ministers are the members of 
cabinet who are most susceptible to position taking incentives, and hence are most likely to present 
legislation that will be modified in parliament (H.20b). Indeed, prime ministers are the cabinet 
members who mostly receive media attention.  
Conversely, as expected the bills drafted by technical ministers prove to be the least likely to 
be amended in parliament (H.10). There is about a 38% reduction in the number of word changes in 
bills which are introduced by technicians. Since such ministers do not use legislation in order to 
send signals to the electorate, they propose policies which are the closest to the coalition agreed-on 
compromise among the set of the technically feasible options. For this reason, coalition parties 
refrain from revising the initial proposals in parliament.  
Taken together, the last two results provide enticing insights into Italian cabinets. If they want 
to implement the agreed-upon compromise, the members of Italian multiparty governments cannot 
safely rely on prime ministers, who prove to be the most risky agents for the entire coalition and are 
thus the subject of extensive monitoring activity. Indeed, prime ministers do not seem to behave as 
intracoalitional monitoring mechanisms (see Müller and Meyer 2010). However, the parties 
participating in Italian executives can place the highest trust in technical ministers, who use their 
expertise in order to pursue the goals of the coalition and hence are the least risky agents for the 
entire government.   
Concerning Models A.5 and A.6, two prominent parliamentary figures whose role has been 
depicted as crucial in the legislative process (especially in Italy) do not seem to influence the 
amount of transformations undergone by governmental bills. In particular, neither the presence of a 
hostile chair in the committee to which the bill is referred (H.22) nor the preferences of the 
president of the Chamber where the bill is introduced (H.11) have an impact on the level of changes. 
Therefore, committee chairs in Italy are not effective legislative-level monitoring mechanisms as in 
other countries (see Kim and Loewenberg 2005; Carroll and Cox 2005). Moreover, Italian 
presidents of the Chamber do not manage to – or, simply, do not want to – alter the amending rules 
employed, thus biasing the legislative outcome in favour of the alternative they most prefer. In line 
with Di Palma’s (1978) argument, the presidents of the Italian Chamber do not seem to exploit their 
powers for the political purposes of their own party. Rather, they behave as neutral officers.  
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Turning now to the hypotheses dealing with non-ideological types of conflict, I found no 
systematic evidence that the government bills which have been submitted by minority governments 
(H.1) or have a distributive nature (H.2) receive more modifications in parliament than other types 
of bills185. As for the former result, in analyses I do not report here I also found that the external 
parties supporting Italian minority executives do not behave following Martin and Vanberg’s (2005: 
104-105) logic: they do not revise government bills in order to monitor ministers affiliated with one 
of the parties in office. Concerning the latter result, the Italian parliament is traditionally considered 
as an appropriate setting for the application of a distributive perspective (see Cantelli, Mortara and 
Movia 1974; Bonanni 1983; Motta 1985; Hine and Finocchi 1991; Cotta 1994), and the pork-barrel 
nature of Italian legislation is emphasized also in recent studies (see, for example, Golden and Picci 
2008). However, my analyses suggest that the amount of changes made to government-sponsored 
bills does not depend on legislators’ will to add clauses which secure benefits for particularistic 
constituencies186.  
My analyses show that neither the bills which address issues that are disputed among different 
ministers (H.8), nor those which are presented by ministers inclined to be ‘captured’ by department-
specific interests (H.9) are altered more than other types of bills. As previously noted, the latter 
variable is strongly associated with the indicator of technical proposing ministers. Hence, although 
never statistically significant, it increases the standard errors of technical minister, which leads to 
wider confidence intervals for the coefficients and smaller t statistics (see Model A.4).   
As for the second major factor explaining the parliamentary modifications made to 
government legislation, my findings provide strong support for both the hypotheses based upon the 
lack of information that I included. In particular, government bills dealing with complex subjects 
(H.25) or with many policy dimensions (H.26) are more extensively amended than other bills. That 
is, the limited level of information at ministers’ disposal when they draft legislation systematically 
increases the transformations undegone by governmental bills during the legislative process. The 
increase in the expected number of changed words is approximately 51% for complex bills and 17% 
for each additional committee which is consulted. 
 
 
                                                 
185
 Indeed, in Model 7 the coefficient of minority government is statistically significant (at the 90% level and with a 
positive sign) if we use fixed effects for the domains of the Policy Agendas and exclude the XII legislature (Table 6.3a). 
Remarkably, dropping the XII legislature means excluding one of the two minority cabinets in my sample: the Dini’s 
government. 
186
 In any case, testing the distributive hypothesis probably deserves a better operationalization than my dummy 
indicator. In addition, more importantly, we may also think that distributive bills are changed no more than other bills 
because of logrolling (Tullock 1981). Due to an exchange of mutual support, it might be the case that a number of 
particularistic pieces of legislation are passed without observable modifications. For a discussion of the problems 
plaguing vote trading in legislatures, see Weingast and Marshall (1988).  
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Dependent variable:  
Number of changed words MODEL A.7  MODEL A.8  MODEL A.9 
 
        
Independent variables Coeff.  (robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
–  
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
–  
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
–  
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Minority 0.212 0.380*  0.254 0.314 
 
0.138 0.314 
 
0.202 0.200 
 
0.193 0.194 
 
0.198 0.196 
Distributive conflict 0.025 0.008  0.021 0.011  -0.014 -0.027 
 
0.124 0.118 
 
0.124 0.118 
 
0.124 0.118 
Conflict within cabinet -0.018 0.027  ̶ ̶  0.022 0.068*** 
 
0.032 0.032 
 
  
 
0.025 0.024 
Conflict with JM 0.058** 0.053**  0.052*** 0.063***  ̶ ̶ 
 
0.023 0.024 
 
0.018 0.019 
 
  
Conflict with opposition -0.006 -0.013  -0.010 -0.010  0.003 -0.003 
 
0.018 0.020 
 
0.018 0.020 
 
0.018 0.020 
Committee chair presence 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
President of Chamber 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Alternation 0.399*** 0.465***  0.405*** 0.459***  0.479*** 0.522*** 
 
0.141 0.142 
 
0.141 0.141 
 
0.135 0.136 
Prime ministerial bill 0.505*** 0.477***  0.493*** 0.505***  0.454*** 0.418** 
 
0.176 0.170 
 
0.175 0.162 
 
0.172 0.164 
Technical minister -0.415** -0.532***  -0.429** -0.517***  -0.490*** -0.580*** 
 
0.174 0.178 
 
0.171 0.178 
 
0.168 0.175 
Conflict over ministerial 
responsibility 0.126 0.154  0.134 0.139  0.081 0.137 
 
0.245 0.225 
 
0.246 0.223 
 
0.248 0.228 
Departmental capture -0.083 -0.070  -0.092 -0.052  -0.049 -0.049 
 
0.144 0.152 
 
0.144 0.151 
 
0.141 0.151 
Complexity 0.390** 0.408***  0.392** 0.405***  0.401** 0.420*** 
 
0.155 0.148 
 
0.156 0.148 
 
0.158 0.152 
Multidimensionality 0.147*** 0.131***  0.147*** 0.132***  0.141*** 0.126*** 
 
0.032 0.031 
 
0.032 0.031 
 
0.032 0.032 
Impatience -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Length of bill 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 4.665*** 4.436***  4.600*** 4.534***  4.532*** 4.300*** 
  
0.315 0.386 
 
0.276 0.365 
 
0.303 0.380 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Alpha 2.484 2.383  2.485 2.385  2.500 2.393 
AIC 8,521.242 8,529.624  8,519.524 8,528.084  8,524.107 8,530.806 
BIC 8,592.526 8,690.011  8,586.352 8,684.016  8,590.935 8,686.738 
N 636  636  636 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
 
  
 
Table 6.3a 
Negative binomial regressions on government bills changes. Italy 1987-2006 (all cabinets and ministers). 
(XII legislature excluded) 
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Dependent variable:  
Number of changed words MODEL A.10  MODEL A.11  MODEL A.12 
 
        
Independent variables Coeff. (robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Minority 0.254 0.314  0.254 0.312  0.233 0.322 
 
0.194 0.194 
 
0.194 0.195 
 
0.196 0.198 
Distributive conflict 0.024 0.011  0.011 0.007  0.014 0.005 
 
0.124 0.118 
 
0.122 0.118 
 
0.123 0.119 
Conflict within cabinet ̶ ̶  ̶ ̶  ̶ ̶ 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Conflict with JM 0.049*** 0.062***  0.052*** 0.063***  0.055*** 0.062*** 
 
0.018 0.018 
 
0.018 0.019 
 
0.019 0.019 
Conflict with opposition -0.011 -0.010  -0.010 -0.010  -0.008 -0.011 
 
0.019 0.020 
 
0.018 0.020 
 
0.018 0.020 
Committee chair presence 
  
 
-0.101 -0.066  -0.094 -0.069 
 
  
 
0.145 0.141 
 
0.144 0.140 
President of Chamber 
  
 
  
 
-0.013 0.004 
 
  
 
  
 
0.021 0.023 
Alternation 0.412*** 0.460***  0.409*** 0.460***  0.368** 0.473*** 
 
0.139 0.141 
 
0.142 0.142 
 
0.165 0.167 
Prime ministerial bill 0.521*** 0.522***  0.481*** 0.495***  0.497*** 0.491*** 
 
0.168 0.158 
 
0.178 0.165 
 
0.179 0.168 
Technical minister -0.475*** -0.548***  -0.398** -0.495***  -0.365* -0.507** 
 
0.153 0.153 
 
0.178 0.184 
 
0.193 0.198 
Conflict over ministerial 
responsibility 0.126 0.134  0.106 0.126  0.108 0.126 
 
0.248 0.224 
 
0.251 0.226 
 
0.251 0.226 
Departmental capture ̶ ̶  -0.104 -0.058  -0.104 -0.057 
 
  
 
0.142 0.150 
 
0.143 0.150 
Complexity 0.386** 0.405***  0.400** 0.408***  0.406*** 0.408*** 
 
0.156 0.148 
 
0.156 0.148 
 
0.156 0.147 
Multidimensionalità 0.145*** 0.131***  0.145*** 0.131***  0.145*** 0.131*** 
 
0.032 0.031 
 
0.032 0.031 
 
0.032 0.031 
Impatience -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Length of bill 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 4.596*** 4.508***  4.681*** 4.583***  4.723*** 4.565*** 
  
0.277 0.359 
 
0.287 0.372 
 
0.301 0.376 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Alpha 2.486 2.385  2.484 2.384  2.483 2.384 
AIC 8,517.856 8,526.169  8,521.110 8,529.928  8,522.853 8,531.903 
BIC 8,580.229 8,677.646  8,592.393 8,690.315  8,598.592 8,696.745 
N 636  636  636 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
 
  
 
Table 6.3b 
Negative binomial regressions on government bills changes. Italy 1987-2006 (all cabinets and ministers). 
(XII legislature excluded) 
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By contrast, I found no evidence that legislators’ impatience matters (H.28). In other words, 
even when the end of their tenure approaches, representatives do not refrain from changing 
ministerial proposals.   
Finally, it is worth noting that all the above mentioned results hold also when we exclude the 
XII legislature (Table 6.3a,b). Indeed, they become stronger. This confirms the peculiar nature of 
that legislature, whose exceptionality seems to disturb the ‘true’ effect of the explanatory factors. 
Let us now turn to those explanatory hypotheses that cannot be tested using the entire sample 
of government bills on which I collected information. These are the number of governing parties 
(H.5), the number of signatory parties (H.19), and the size of the minister’s party (H.15). While the 
former two require only partisan cabinets, the latter assumes that the proposing minister is affiliated 
to some party. In Table 6.4 I evaluate the impact of those variables by taking Model A.2 as a 
benchmark187. I initially exclude Dini’s non-partisan government (N = 672) and incorporate either 
the number of governing parties (Model A.13), or the coalition ideological range (Model A.14). 
Then, I further restrict the sample to the bills introduced just by partisan ministers (N = 586) and I 
add the number of proposing parties (Model A.15) and the size of the minister’s party (Model 
A.16)188. In Table 6.5 I reran the same analyses excluding the XII legislature. 
Looking at the tables, first of all the results from the previous models appear to be very robust 
to the inclusion of these additional variables. The ideological conflict within the drafting ministry, 
the shift to an alternational party system and prime ministerial bills have still a strong and positive 
impact on the amount of modifications made to government-sponsored legislation during the 
parliamentary process. As before, the bills introduced by technicians are less amended than other 
types of bills, while legislation dealing with particularly complex or multidimensional issues is 
more subject to corrections in parliament. By contrast, neither the other variables included in 
previous models nor the variables added here are statistically significant – the only partial exception 
being the dummy for minority governments. 
More precisely, as models A.13 and A.14 show, the number of governing parties do not 
significantly increase the level of changes in parliament, and the same holds for the ideological 
range of the coalition (H.5)189.  
                                                 
187
 In other words, I do not include committee chair’s presence and president of Chamber in order to avoid some 
possible disturbance effect on the variables I am mostly interested in. As shown before, these two variables never affect 
the amount of modifications made to government bills. In addition, the variable president of Chamber is fairly 
correlated with my measure of alternation (the correlation coefficient is -0.4630 and p is 0.000). In any case, including 
these two variables do not change my results in any appreciable way.    
188
 Let me precise that the information criteria reported in the tables can be compared only among models with the same 
number of observations. 
189
 In model A.14 I dropped my measure of conflict within the drafting ministry because it is strongly correlated with 
the ideological range of the coalition. The correlation coefficient is 0.567, with p = 0.000. 
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In addition, neither the number of signatory parties (H.19) nor the size of the proposing 
minister’s party (H.15) significantly reduce the amount of transformations undergone by 
governmental bills (Models A.15 and A.16). 
Let me note that in model A.15 I excluded all technical proposing ministers, and not just the 
Dini’s government. One reason is that the indicator for technical proposing ministers is strongly 
associated with the number of signatory parties. Indeed, when the proposing minister is technical, 
this number is most of the time equal to 0 (running a Chi-square test, the Chi-square with three 
degrees of freedom is 611.241, and p is 0.000). Another reason is that an increase from 1 to 2, 3, 4 
signatory parties is expected to decrease the level of modifications, while an increase from 0 (i.e., 
technical proposer) to 1 signatory party is expected to increase the level of modifications. Therefore, 
the relationship between the number of proposing parties and technical proposers should be 
modeled in a more accurate way. For simplicity, here I exclude bills proposed by technical 
ministers. 
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Dependent variable: 
Number of changed 
words 
MODEL A.13  MODEL A.14  MODEL A.15  MODEL A.16 
 
           
Indepedent variables Coeff. (robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
–  
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
–  
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
–  
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
–  
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Minority 0.294 0.357*  -0.031 0.043  0.391 0.437*  0.361 0.416* 
 
0.205 0.197 
 
0.207 0.210 
 
0.239 0.230 
 
0.242 0.235 
Distributive conflict 0.027 0.011  -0.004 -0.034  -0.001 0.006  0.011 0.009 
 
0.125 0.121 
 
0.122 0.120 
 
0.136 0.128 
 
0.134 0.129 
Conflict with JM 0.048** 0.059***  ̶ ̶  0.059*** 0.070***  0.059*** 0.069*** 
 
0.019 0.019 
 
  
 
0.021 0.022 
 
0.021 0.022 
Conflict with opposition -0.013 -0.015  0.012 0.007  -0.034 -0.036  -0.035 -0.038 
 
0.018 0.020 
 
0.018 0.019 
 
0.022 0.024 
 
0.022 0.024 
N. of governing parties 0.014 0.023  ̶ ̶  0.036 0.051  0.016 0.039 
 
0.052 0.052 
 
  
 
0.056 0.055 
 
0.058 0.057 
Id. Range of coalition    -0.041 -0.010  ̶ ̶  ̶ ̶ 
 
  
 
0.036 0.038 
 
  
 
  
N. of proposing parties       0.065 0.111  0.050 0.098 
 
  
 
  
 
0.130 0.127 
 
0.131 0.127 
Size on minister's party          -0.001 -0.001 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
0.001 0.001 
Alternation 0.311** 0.337**  0.393*** 0.430***  0.357** 0.367**  0.331** 0.355** 
 
0.151 0.146 
 
0.130 0.134 
 
0.165 0.156 
 
0.162 0.156 
Prime ministerial bill 0.486*** 0.475***  0.463*** 0.447***  0.469*** 0.454***  0.527*** 0.487*** 
 
0.176 0.160 
 
0.167 0.159 
 
0.182 0.170 
 
0.179 0.174 
Technical minister -0.379** -0.432**  -0.410** -0.463**  ̶ ̶  ̶ ̶ 
 
0.186 0.195 
 
0.175 0.187 
 
  
 
  
Conflict over ministerial 
responsibility -0.008 -0.014  -0.085 -0.068  0.038 -0.050  0.051 -0.042 
 
0.244 0.225 
 
0.237 0.228 
 
0.271 0.257 
 
0.266 0.256 
Departmental capture -0.023 -0.015  0.037 0.041  0.068 0.054  0.096 0.072 
 
0.145 0.153 
 
0.142 0.150 
 
0.160 0.164 
 
0.160 0.166 
Complexity 0.455*** 0.444***  0.460*** 0.450***  0.423** 0.390**  0.438*** 0.398** 
 
0.156 0.147 
 
0.156 0.149 
 
0.169 0.157 
 
0.169 0.155 
Multidimensionality 0.153*** 0.148***  0.145*** 0.144***  0.130*** 0.120***  0.128*** 0.120*** 
 
0.032 0.031 
 
0.031 0.031 
 
0.033 0.032 
 
0.033 0.032 
Impatience -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Length of bill 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 4.569*** 4.580*** 
 
4.880*** 4.766*** 
 
4.469*** 4.458*** 
 
4.737*** 4.629*** 
  
0.402 0.448 
 
0.355 0.418 
 
0.491 0.530 
 
0.547 0.566 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Alpha 2.545 2.441  2.556 2.458  2.611 2.494  2.607 2.493 
AIC 9,002.946 9,008.936  9,004.247 9,012.553  7,861.086 7,868.667  7,861.910 7,870.323 
BIC 9,075.110 9,171.305  9,071.901 9,170.412  7,931.059 8,026.107  7,936.256 8,032.136 
N 672  672  586  586 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
 
 
 
Table 6.4 
Negative binomial regressions on government bills changes. Italy 1987-2006 (excluding Dini and then technical ministers). 
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Dependent variable: 
Number of changed 
words 
MODEL A.17  MODEL A.18  MODEL A.19  MODEL A.20 
 
           
  
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Minority 0.244 0.315  -0.014 0.104  0.301 0.304  0.254 0.260 
 
0.205 0.201 
 
0.205 0.203 
 
0.237 0.230 
 
0.240 0.236 
Distributive conflict 0.022 0.011  -0.018 -0.037  0.052 0.080  0.068 0.086 
 
0.124 0.118 
 
0.123 0.119 
 
0.137 0.128 
 
0.136 0.129 
Conflict with JM 0.051*** 0.063***     0.062*** 0.072***  0.062*** 0.070*** 
 
0.019 0.019 
 
  
 
0.021 0.022 
 
0.021 0.022 
Conflict with opposition -0.010 -0.010  0.013 0.011  -0.022 -0.018  -0.023 -0.021 
 
0.018 0.020 
 
0.017 0.019 
 
0.022 0.024 
 
0.021 0.024 
N. of governing parties -0.008 0.001     0.006 0.020  -0.023 -0.004 
 
0.051 0.052 
 
  
 
0.055 0.056 
 
0.058 0.057 
Id. Range of coalition    -0.021 0.017       
 
  
 
0.034 0.035 
 
  
 
  
N. of proposing parties       0.040 0.088  0.017 0.062 
 
  
 
  
 
0.127 0.125 
 
0.127 0.123 
Size on minister's party          -0.001 -0.001 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
0.001 0.001 
Alternation 0.412*** 0.458***  0.489*** 0.548***  0.461*** 0.511***  0.432*** 0.494*** 
 
0.153 0.148 
 
0.134 0.136 
 
0.164 0.156 
 
0.161 0.155 
Prime ministerial bill 0.490*** 0.505***  0.471*** 0.468***  0.486*** 0.489***  0.563*** 0.553*** 
 
0.175 0.163 
 
0.168 0.163 
 
0.181 0.172 
 
0.177 0.173 
Technical minister -0.434** -0.517***  -0.480*** -0.568***       
 
0.177 0.183 
 
0.168 0.175 
 
  
 
  
Conflict over ministerial 
responsibility 0.133 0.139  0.045 0.083  0.192 0.149  0.206 0.166 
 
0.246 0.224 
 
0.243 0.228 
 
0.276 0.258 
 
0.269 0.257 
Departmental capture -0.093 -0.052  -0.020 0.015  -0.007 0.003  0.034 0.039 
 
0.143 0.150 
 
0.142 0.150 
 
0.156 0.161 
 
0.155 0.164 
Complexity 0.389** 0.405***  0.400** 0.415***  0.403** 0.380**  0.422*** 0.395** 
 
0.153 0.147 
 
0.157 0.152 
 
0.162 0.155 
 
0.162 0.154 
Multidimensionality 0.146*** 0.132***  0.138*** 0.127***  0.126*** 0.105***  0.124*** 0.104*** 
 
0.032 0.031 
 
0.031 0.031 
 
0.033 0.032 
 
0.033 0.033 
Impatience -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Length of bill 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 4.645*** 4.529*** 
 
4.735*** 4.445*** 
 
4.515*** 4.448*** 
 
4.891*** 4.778*** 
  
0.383 0.454 
 
0.356 0.419 
 
0.472 0.532 
 
0.527 0.563 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Alpha 2.485 2.385  2.501 2.405  2.521 2.411  2.514 2.407 
AIC 8,521.508 8,530.084  8,524.360 8,534.493  7,529.422 7,539.251  7,529.382 7,540.089 
BIC 8,592.791 8,690.471  8,591.188 8,690.425  7,598.641 7,694.993  7,602.926 7,700.157 
N 636  636  559  559 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Table 6.5 
Negative binomial regressions on government bills changes. Italy 1987-2006 (excluding Dini and then technical ministers). 
(XII legislature excluded) 
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6.2.2 Does the parliamentary median voter actually prevail? 
In this paragraph I present models which include ideological distances involving the median voter 
in the legislature. In other words, while Martin and Vanberg’s (2004, 2005) argument maintains that 
the relevant conflict is that in the cabinet, the hypotheses tested here allow the final equilibrium in 
parliament to be different from the equilibrium reached – or, that is supposed to be reached – in the 
cabinet. In particular, if we hold that the parliamentary median voter will prevail in the legislative 
arena, there can be conflict between governmental proposers and parliamentary majority under both 
types of decision making in the cabinet. If individual ministers enjoy discretion in their jurisdiction, 
they may want to introduce bills in order to signal their own ideal point to their constituency 
although they know in advance that those bills will be amended to the parliamentary median voter. 
If, instead, collective responsibility is the rule for cabinet decisions, coalition partners may agree to 
propose a certain bill which represents a symbolic message of internal unity – and corresponds, for 
instance, to the cabinet median voter – but is different from the equilibrium in parliament. Such a 
bill will then be changed until an equilibrium in the legislature is reached.  
In the following pages I examine first model B, which assumes ministerial discretion, and then 
model C, which presupposes collective responsibility within the cabinet. As in the previous section, 
I initially present models which isolate the effect of certain theoretically crucial factors, and then 
sequentially incorporate the remainig variables.  
Models B.1-3 show the impact of the proposing minister’s conflict with the parliamentary 
median voter (H.3b) and the farthest opposition party (H.7b). Since these two variables are 
correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.564 with p = 0.000), I show both their joint and 
separate effect. Taking Model B.3 as a benchmark190, Model B.4 incorporates the distance between 
the drafting minister and the president of Chamber (H.11b), while the following three specifications 
add hypotheses which are testable only restricting the sample of bills. In particular, the number of 
coalition parties and the government range (H.5) are alternatively included in Models B.5 and B.6, 
where Dini’s technical cabinet is excluded, whereas the number of proposing parties (H.19) and the 
size of minister’ party (H.15) are added in Model B, in which I exclude all technical proposing 
ministers (see above).  
As Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show, I find no support for the hypothesis that the dissimilarity between 
the preferences of the proposing minister – reflected in the drafted bill – and those of the 
parliamentary majority results in observable changes to the initial proposal during the legislative 
process. In none of the specifications reported the conflict between the minister and the median 
                                                 
190
 In other words, for reasons of correlation in subsequent model I drop conflict with opposition. However, the results 
would be the same if I took Model B.1 as a benchmark. 
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voter in parliament has a statistically significant coefficient, and this holds true also if we exclude 
the XII legislature (results available upon request). 
With regard to all the other variables included in these models, my results are the same as in 
the previous section. For a certain bill, being passed into law under an alternational party system 
increases the amount of changes it will receive in parliament191. The level of modifications is higher 
for bills introduced by prime ministers, and lower for bills drafted by technical ministers. Complex 
and multidimensional legislation is more extensively altered in the course of the parliamentary 
process. Just as in Models A, the remaining variables – including the minister’s distance from the 
opposition and from the president of Chamber – do not have significant effects.    
The same can be said for hypotheses added in Models B.5-7. Neither a higher number of 
parties in the coalition, nor a wider government range result in more changes in parliament. 
Similarly, the level of modifications is not reduced when the signatory parties are many or the size 
of the drafting minister’s party is large (Tables 6.7; analyses excluding the XII legislature are 
available upon request). 
On the whole, these results do not contrast with those from Model A. Focusing on ideological 
variables, as for now my findings seem to suggest that the legislation drafted and submitted by 
ministers is not altered in parliament because the proposers’ preferences are distant from those of 
the parliamentary majority. Not even – or not precisely – because the ministers’s preferences are far 
from those of their coalition partners. Ministerial bills seem instead to be modified because they are 
not acceptable to those coalition members which have junior ministers in the drafting ministry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
191
 Let me note that, once we include conflict with president of Chamber (Model B.4), the coefficient of alternation is 
slightly less significant. The reason is that the two variables are correlated (correlation coefficient is -0.463 with p = 
0.000). 
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MODEL B.1  MODEL B.2  MODEL B.3  MODEL B.4 
Dependent variable:            
Number of changed 
words  
 
 
Independent variables 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Minority 0.093 0.113  0.067 0.037  0.090 0.097  0.091 0.088 
 
0.195 0.194  0.162 0.156  0.178 0.173  0.178 0.171 
Distributive -0.012 -0.069  -0.012 -0.070  -0.011 -0.069  -0.011 -0.069 
 
0.123 0.120  0.123 0.120  0.122 0.120  0.122 0.119 
Conflict minister - 
parliamentary majority 0.007 0.018     0.006 0.014  0.007 0.007 
 
0.025 0.026     0.020 0.019  0.026 0.024 
Conflict with opposition -0.001 -0.005  0.002 0.005       
 
0.022 0.025  0.017 0.019       
President of Chamber          -0.002 0.012 
 
         0.026 0.027 
Alternation 0.395*** 0.389***  0.407*** 0.423***  0.396*** 0.395***  0.390** 0.440** 
 
0.141 0.139  0.132 0.134  0.137 0.138  0.180 0.179 
Prime ministerial bill 0.402** 0.403**  0.404** 0.408***  0.401** 0.403**  0.402** 0.392** 
 
0.167 0.157  0.167 0.157  0.168 0.157  0.168 0.159 
Technical minister -0.437** -0.513***  -0.429** -0.494***  -0.437** -0.514***  -0.434** -0.533*** 
 
0.177 0.186  0.173 0.181  0.176 0.186  0.187 0.199 
Conflict over ministerial 
responsibility -0.036 -0.011  -0.037 -0.012  -0.035 -0.005  -0.034 -0.007 
 
0.234 0.225  0.234 0.224  0.236 0.227  0.236 0.226 
Departmental capture 0.016 0.051  0.015 0.048  0.015 0.049  0.015 0.048 
 
0.140 0.146  0.140 0.145  0.140 0.146  0.140 0.145 
Complexity 0.396** 0.413***  0.398** 0.421***  0.396** 0.416***  0.396** 0.416*** 
 
0.154 0.144  0.155 0.146  0.154 0.144  0.154 0.144 
Multidimensionality 0.159*** 0.154***  0.161*** 0.157***  0.159*** 0.155***  0.159*** 0.156*** 
 
0.031 0.030  0.031 0.030  0.031 0.030  0.031 0.030 
Impatience -0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  -0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Length of bill 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 
           
Constant 4.670*** 4.725*** 
 
4.641*** 4.642*** 
 
4.660*** 4.672*** 
 
4.669*** 4.613*** 
  
0.292 0.385  0.274 0.357  0.212 0.309  0.244 0.337 
 
           
 
           
Alpha 2.651 2.546  2.651 2.547  2.651 2.546  2.651 2.546 
AIC 9,554.576 9,559.772  9,552.633 9,558.105  9,552.578 9,557.810  9,554.574 9,559.651 
BIC 9,623.181 9,719.850  9,616.665 9,713.610  9,616.609 9,713.315  9,623.180 9,719.730 
N 716  716  716  716 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Table 6.6 
Negative binomial regressions on government bills changes. Italy 1987-2006 (all cabinets and ministers). 
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MODEL B.5  MODEL B.6  MODEL B.7 
Dependent variable:         
Number of changed words  
 
 
 
Independent variables 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
– 
Fixed eff. 
Policy Agenda 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Minority 0.133 0.174  0.039 0.108  0.082 0.087 
 
0.204 0.196  0.203 0.205  0.222 0.214 
Distributive -0.001 -0.033  -0.008 -0.034  -0.006 -0.030 
 
0.122 0.120  0.121 0.120  0.131 0.129 
Conflict minister - parliamentary 
majority 0.010 0.022  0.018 0.023  0.002 0.009 
 
0.022 0.020  0.021 0.020  0.023 0.023 
N. of governing parties -0.002 0.010     -0.012 0.012 
 
0.054 0.056     0.058 0.059 
Ideological range of coalition    -0.041 -0.018    
 
   0.037 0.040    
N. of proposing parties       0.067 0.118 
 
      0.131 0.128 
Size on minister's party       -0.001 -0.001 
 
      0.001 0.001 
Alternation 0.378** 0.382***  0.361*** 0.385***  0.389** 0.394** 
 
0.152 0.147  0.135 0.137  0.169 0.162 
Prime ministerial bill 0.450*** 0.434***  0.459*** 0.439***  0.489*** 0.462*** 
 
0.171 0.157  0.166 0.158  0.175 0.171 
Technical minister -0.434** -0.493**  -0.426** -0.489***    
 
0.182 0.192  0.177 0.188    
Conflict over ministerial 
responsibility -0.067 -0.061  -0.090 -0.063  -0.022 -0.081 
 
0.246 0.231  0.237 0.230  0.268 0.260 
Departmental capture 0.026 0.039  0.044 0.042  0.113 0.107 
 
0.142 0.148  0.143 0.150  0.156 0.163 
Complexity 0.455*** 0.445***  0.457*** 0.441***  0.456*** 0.419*** 
 
0.155 0.146  0.155 0.146  0.171 0.160 
Multidimensionality 0.146*** 0.141***  0.141*** 0.141***  0.126*** 0.118*** 
 
0.031 0.031  0.031 0.031  0.033 0.032 
Impatience -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Length of bill 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
         
Constant 4.701*** 4.693*** 
 
4.984*** 4.867*** 
 
4.802*** 4.692*** 
  
0.374 0.413 
 
0.346 0.405  0.489 0.507 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
        
Alpha 2.559 2.456  2.555 2.456  2.626 2.513 
AIC 9,005.170 9,011.932  9,004.062 9,011.798  7,865.022 7,874.098 
BIC 9,072.824 9,169.791  9,071.716 9,169.657  7,934.996 8,031.538 
N 672  672  586 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
 
  
 
Table 6.7 
Negative binomial regressions on government bills changes. Italy 1987-2006. 
(excluding Dini and then technical ministers) 
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Let us now turn to Model C. This tests the hypothesis that, if government decisions are taken 
collectively and the parliamentary majority will eventually prevail, the changes that are made to the 
initial bill reflect the distance between the compromise reached in the cabinet and the preferences of 
the median voter in the legislature. Model C.1 includes the conflict between the government mid-
range and both the parliamentary median voter (H.3a) and the farthest opposition party (H.7a). The 
conflict with the president of Chamber (H.11a) is incorporated in Model C.2 and then dropped in 
subsequent models for reasons of correlation with my indicator of alternation. I add the number of 
governing parties (H.5) in Model C.3, and the number of signatory parties (H.19) in Model C.4. 
As Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show, my results provide some support for the hypothesis that the 
changes made to government bills during the legislative process depend on the distance between a 
compromise position in the cabinet (the goverment mid-range) and the preferences of the 
parliamentary majority. The coefficients of conflict with parliamentary majority are positive and 
statistically significant in all the models with fixed effects, and both their magnitude and 
significance increase if we exclude the XII legislature. As Table 6.10 indicates, a standard deviation 
increase in the distance between the government mid-range and parliamentary median voter – about 
1.2 points on the policy scale – is expected to increases the average number of word changes in 
governmental bills by 14%192. 
Moreover, although with a lower significance, sporadically I find evidence that also minority 
governments and the conflict between government mid-range and opposition have an impact. 
Unexpectedly, and quite unexplainably, in the latter case the effect is negative.   
As for all the other variables, their impact is the same as in the previous models A and B. The 
amount of changes is reduced in case of technical proposers, and increased when the bill is 
sponsored by the prime minister, when it deals with complex or multidimensional issues, and when 
it is examined under an alternational party system. Concerning the latter variable, let me stress that 
its coefficient loses its significance once we add the conflict with president of Chamber. However, 
these two measures are highly collinear (a correlation of -0.845 with p = 0.000), and hence cannot 
be included in the same model in any meaningful way. The remaining regressors have no significant 
effects. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
192
 The values reported in Table 6.10 are percentage changes in the expected number of word changes, computed on the 
basis of the coefficients from Model C.1. Let me underline that the substantive effects of the independent variables 
displayed in Table 6.10 are very similar to those in Table 6.2. 
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MODEL C.1  MODEL C.2  MODEL C.3  MODEL C.4 
Dependent variable:            
Number of changed 
words  
 
 
 
 
Independent variables 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Minority 0.171 0.345*  0.211 0.363*  0.235 0.463*  0.297 0.515** 
 
0.212 0.206 
 
0.211 0.203 
 
0.240 0.238 
 
0.266 0.258 
Distributive conflict -0.006 -0.023  -0.015 -0.026  0.009 0.022  -0.009 0.022 
 
0.124 0.120 
 
0.125 0.120 
 
0.125 0.120 
 
0.135 0.127 
Conflict gov.midrange   
– parliamentary 
majority 
0.022 0.107*  0.034 0.103*  0.033 0.125*  0.036 0.144** 
 
0.059 0.062 
 
0.059 0.061 
 
0.062 0.066 
 
0.068 0.069 
Conflict gov.midrange 
– opposition -0.027 -0.051 
 
-0.042 -0.066*  -0.029 -0.064*  -0.039 -0.069* 
 
0.029 0.033 
 
0.030 0.036 
 
0.030 0.035 
 
0.032 0.039 
President of Chamber    -0.068 -0.048       
 
  
 
0.045 0.046 
 
  
 
  
N. of governing parties       -0.009 -0.009  0.011 0.020 
 
  
 
  
 
0.051 0.052 
 
0.055 0.055 
N. of proposing parties          0.068 0.112 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
0.129 0.125 
Alternation 0.383*** 0.376***  -0.015 0.089  0.376** 0.385***  0.395** 0.395** 
 
0.140 0.136 
 
0.307 0.317 
 
0.149 0.143 
 
0.166 0.156 
Prime ministerial bill 0.418** 0.383**  0.430** 0.394**  0.465*** 0.406**  0.457** 0.405** 
 
0.169 0.159 
 
0.168 0.159 
 
0.172 0.160 
 
0.178 0.169 
Technical minister -0.437** -0.495***  -0.363** -0.447**  -0.415** -0.452**    
 
0.177 0.186 
 
0.182 0.192 
 
0.187 0.196 
 
  
Conflict over 
ministerial 
responsibility 
-0.061 -0.036  0.013 0.017  -0.080 -0.088  -0.057 -0.155 
 
0.227 0.221 
 
0.231 0.224 
 
0.242 0.229 
 
0.270 0.262 
Departmental capture 0.025 0.027  0.031 0.031  0.032 -0.010  0.107 0.062 
 
0.141 0.149 
 
0.143 0.150 
 
0.141 0.153 
 
0.155 0.163 
Complexity 0.395** 0.403***  0.419*** 0.409***  0.448*** 0.423***  0.419** 0.367** 
 
0.156 0.144 
 
0.161 0.145 
 
0.156 0.144 
 
0.169 0.154 
Multidimensionality 0.159*** 0.153***  0.151*** 0.147***  0.145*** 0.139***  0.121*** 0.108*** 
 
0.031 0.030 
 
0.032 0.030 
 
0.032 0.031 
 
0.033 0.033 
Impatience -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Length of bill 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
Constant 4.876*** 4.940*** 
 
5.549*** 5.504*** 
 
4.946*** 5.167*** 
 
4.838*** 4.876*** 
  
0.395 0.504 
 
0.573 0.723 
 
0.461 0.553 
 
0.550 0.656 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Alpha 2.649 2.535  2.641 2.532  2.556 2.441  2.626 2.495 
AIC 9,553.885 9,556.138  9,553.313 9,557.094  9,006.410 9,009.084  7,864.986 7,868.861 
BIC 9,622.490 9,716.217  9,626.492 9,721.746  9,078.574 9,171.454  7,934.959 8,026.301 
N 716  716  672  586 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Table 6.8 
Negative binomial regressions on government bills changes. Italy 1987-2006. 
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MODEL C.5  MODEL C.6  MODEL C.7  MODEL C.8 
Dependent variable:            
Number of changed 
words  
 
 
 
Independent variables 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy 
Agenda 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Minority 0.217 0.440*  0.104 0.399*  0.173 0.395*  0.167 0.334 
 0.223 0.225  0.225 0.226  0.237 0.236  0.257 0.256 
Distributive conflict -0.013 0.003  -0.029 -0.000  -0.009 0.008  0.025 0.082 
 0.125 0.118  0.124 0.119  0.125 0.118  0.137 0.128 
Conflict gov.midrange 
- parliamentary 
majority 
0.035 0.130**  0.063 0.133**  0.036 0.133**  0.046 0.179*** 
 0.060 0.062  0.060 0.062  0.061 0.063  0.068 0.069 
Conflict gov.midrange 
– opposition -0.029 -0.057*  -0.029 -0.061*  -0.026 -0.054  -0.026 -0.041 
 0.028 0.034  0.029 0.035  0.029 0.035  0.031 0.039 
President of Chamber    -0.089* -0.035       
    0.053 0.054       
N. of governing parties       -0.032 -0.034  -0.026 -0.018 
       0.051 0.053  0.054 0.056 
N. of proposing parties          0.037 0.083 
          0.127 0.124 
Alternation 0.454*** 0.480***  -0.060 0.271  0.480*** 0.510***  0.521*** 0.575*** 
 0.142 0.138  0.355 0.368  0.154 0.146  0.166 0.156 
Prime ministerial bill 0.484*** 0.443***  0.493*** 0.444***  0.470*** 0.431***  0.471*** 0.418** 
 
0.172 0.163  0.171 0.164  0.171 0.163  0.177 0.171 
Technical minister -0.475*** -0.523***  -0.445*** -0.512***  -0.491*** -0.542***    
 
0.169 0.177  0.171 0.178  0.174 0.181    
Conflict over 
ministerial 
responsibility 
0.038 0.052  0.082 0.069  0.042 0.065  0.081 0.057 
 0.243 0.227  0.240 0.227  0.245 0.229  0.276 0.261 
Departmental capture -0.022 -0.031  -0.030 -0.035  -0.032 -0.041  0.042 0.003 
 0.141 0.151  0.142 0.151  0.140 0.150  0.151 0.159 
Complexity 0.392** 0.396***  0.445*** 0.406***  0.377** 0.384***  0.405** 0.362** 
 0.159 0.148  0.162 0.148  0.153 0.145  0.164 0.154 
Multidimensionality 0.137*** 0.124***  0.130*** 0.122***  0.137*** 0.124***  0.117*** 0.093*** 
 0.032 0.032  0.032 0.031  0.032 0.032  0.033 0.033 
Impatience -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Length of bill 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Constant 4.899*** 4.894***  5.518*** 5.224***  5.036*** 5.022***  4.882*** 4.680*** 
  0.421 0.523  0.600 0.705  0.453 0.546  0.548 0.660 
 
           
 
           
Alpha 2.500 2.391  2.492 2.390  2.499 2.390  2.539 2.414 
AIC 8,524.010 8,529.979  8,523.585 8,531.664  8,525.759 8,531.694  7,534.173 7,540.120 
BIC 8,590.838 8,685.911  8,594.868 8,692.052  8,597.042 8,692.081  7,603.391 7,695.862 
N 636  636  636  559 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Table 6.9 
Negative binomial regressions on government bills changes. Italy 1987-2006. 
(XII legislature excluded) 
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Independent variables 
 
Percentage change in 
the expected number 
of word changes 
    
Minority 
 41.2* 
    
Distributive conflict 
 -2.3 
    
Conflict gov.midrange   
– parliamentary majority 
 14.2* 
    
Conflict gov.midrange  
– opposition 
 -11.1 
    
Alternation 
 45.6*** 
    
Prime ministerial bill 
 46.7** 
    
Technical minister 
 -39.1*** 
    
Conflict over ministerial 
responsibility 
 -1 
    
Departmental capture 
 2.7 
    
Complexity 
 49.7*** 
    
Multidimensionality 
 16.5*** 
    
Impatience 
 -4.2 
    
Length of bill 
 91.2*** 
    
 
Table 6.10 
Percentage change in the expected number of word changes. 
(coefficients from Model C.1 – fixed effects) 
 
 
Reasonably, the result concerning the conflict between government mid-range and 
parliamentary median voter seems somehow in contrast with what I found about the conflict with 
junior ministers inside the drafting ministry. In the previous paragraph, the different specifications 
of Model A provided strong support for the hypothesis that greater divisions between the proposing 
minister and the JMs in her ministry result in greater modifications to government legislation during 
the parliamentary process. However, as several specifications of Model C suggest, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that changes in paliament depend on how much the coalition agreed-on proposal is 
distant from the ideal point of the median voter in the legislature. Although considerably weaker 
than that of JM’s distance, the effect of conflict between government mid-range and parliamentary 
median voter in some cases present. 
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The two hypotheses follow rather different logics. In one case, the drafting minister proposes 
something that she knows will be changed in the legislature by the coalition parties which have JMs 
in her ministry. Parliament thus appears as a second arena where the same actors that are in the 
cabinet – or, better, in the relevant ministry – have the opportunity to correct the initial proposal. 
Conversely, in the other case it is the entire cabinet that jointly introduce bills, and these bills are 
amended until they are acceptable to the parliamentary majority. Hence, the assembly and the 
committees seem more independent of the cabinet, and actors not involved at the executive level 
may play some role.    
Trying to make sense of these two contrasting results, I incorporate both hypotheses in a 
single model (Tables 6.11 and 6.12). This allows to assess which factor is robust to the inclusion of 
the other. Model D.1 incorporates, as the only ideological variables, JM’s distance and conflict 
between government mid-range and parliamentary median voter. Models D.2 and D.3 alternatively 
add two variables taking into account the preferences of  the opposition: the distance between the 
government mid-range and the farthest opposition party, and that between the proposing minister 
and the farthest opposition party, respectively. These last two specifications control for possible 
effects of omitting one – or both – of the ideological variables concerning opposition. Models D.4-6 
display the same analyses reran excluding the XII legislature. 
As Tables 6.11 and 6.12 show, the effect of conflict within the drafting ministry seems to 
prevail. Once we include it, the conflict between government mid-range and parliamentary majority 
loses all its significance, and in all the specification without fixed effects its sign even switches 
from positive to negative. On the contrary, the impact of JM’s distance proves to be robust to the 
inclusion of conflict with parliamentary majority: its coefficient is significant and positive in almost 
all specifications. The only exception is the analysis with fixed effects in Model D.2, although if we 
exclude the XII legislature all the coefficients for JM’s distance are significant at least at the 95% 
level193.   
Of course, the comparison between the results concerning conflict within the drafting ministry 
and those regarding conflict with parliamentary majority deserves further investigation. In any case, 
my analyses suggest that the conflict between the proposing ministers and her JMs is a much more 
robust explanatory factor of the changes made to Italian government bills during the legislative 
process. The data support the hypothesis that parliament is a place where coalition partners can 
correct the legislation that is autonomously drafted by the responsible ministers. However, not all 
the members of the governmental coalition are able to do it. Undoubtedly, in order to prepare 
                                                 
193
 Let me note that, once we incorporate JM’s distance, we do not have any more the unexpected result found in Model 
C: the coefficient of conflict between goverment mid-range and the farthest opposition party is not significant (Models 
D.2 and D.5).   
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amendments a sufficient knowledge of the policy implications of ministerial proposals is needed, 
and only those coalition partners which have junior ministers in the drafting ministry may have such 
information. By contrast, provided also that committee chairs do not prove to be effective 
monitoring instruments in Italy, the governing parties that cannot rely on these executive-level 
‘informers’ may not be completely aware of the consequences of the minister’s draft. The 
ideological conflict which may result in observable modifications to the initial bills is therefore that 
between the proposing minister and the JMs in her ministry. 
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 MODEL D.1 
 
MODEL D.2  MODEL D.3 
Dependent variable:         
Number of changed words  
 
 
 
Independent variables 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy Agenda 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Minority 0.175 0.266  0.230 0.395*  0.197 0.298 
 
0.179 0.176 
 
0.211 0.205 
 
0.187 0.182 
Distributive conflict 0.009 -0.033  0.013 -0.012  0.007 -0.029 
 
0.123 0.119 
 
0.123 0.119 
 
0.124 0.120 
Conflict gov.midrange - 
parliamentary majority -0.054 0.055  -0.044 0.066  -0.046 0.061 
 
0.069 0.069 
 
0.069 0.070 
 
0.069 0.069 
Conflict gov.midrange – 
opposition   
 
-0.017 -0.044    
 
  
 
0.028 0.034 
 
  
JM's distance 0.047** 0.034*  0.045** 0.030  0.050** 0.040* 
 
0.020 0.020 
 
0.020 0.021 
 
0.020 0.021 
Conflict with opposition       -0.010 -0.016 
      
 0.018 0.020 
Alternation 0.335** 0.370***  0.322** 0.339**  0.333** 0.369*** 
 
0.138 0.140 
 
0.142 0.140 
 
0.138 0.139 
Prime ministerial bill 0.429** 0.410**  0.438*** 0.403**  0.438*** 0.417*** 
 
0.169 0.160 
 
0.169 0.160 
 
0.170 0.160 
Technical minister -0.427** -0.485***  -0.436** -0.503***  -0.415** -0.461** 
 
0.172 0.180 
 
0.173 0.184 
 
0.173 0.182 
Conflict over ministerial 
responsibility 0.035 0.052 
 0.017 0.014  0.022 0.034 
 
0.229 0.221 
 
0.226 0.219 
 
0.231 0.222 
Departmental capture -0.035 0.007  -0.025 0.006  -0.030 0.005 
 
0.143 0.149 
 
0.143 0.152 
 
0.143 0.150 
Complexity 0.387** 0.418***  0.385** 0.399***  0.391** 0.414*** 
 
0.153 0.144 
 
0.153 0.143 
 
0.153 0.144 
Multidimensionality 0.165*** 0.156***  0.164*** 0.155***  0.165*** 0.157*** 
 
0.031 0.030 
 
0.031 0.030 
 
0.031 0.030 
Impatience -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Length of bill 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
   
 
  
 
  
Constant 4.654*** 4.372*** 
 
4.804*** 4.859*** 
 
4.714*** 4.499*** 
  
0.278 0.346 
 
0.386 0.506 
 
0.311 0.385 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Alpha 2.639 2.535  2.638 2.531  2.638 2.534 
AIC 9,550.619 9,556.125  9,552.324 9,556.698  9,552.425 9,557.690 
BIC 9,619.224 9,716.204  9,625.503 9,721.351  9,625.604 9,722.342 
N 716  716  716 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Table 6.11 
Negative binomial regressions on government bills changes. Italy 1987-2006. 
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 MODEL D.4 
 
MODEL D.5  MODEL D.6 
Dependent variable:         
Number of changed words  
 
 
 
Independent variables 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy Agenda 
 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(robust s.e.) 
- 
Fixed eff. 
Policy Agenda 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Minority 0.215 0.326*  0.269 0.490**  0.228 0.356* 
 0.186 0.186  0.222 0.225  0.194 0.195 
Distributive conflict 0.021 0.018  0.022 0.027  0.019 0.018 
 0.124 0.117  0.123 0.117  0.124 0.117 
Conflict gov.midrange - 
parliamentary majority -0.056 0.056  -0.050 0.061  -0.052 0.060 
 0.072 0.072  0.072 0.072  0.073 0.072 
Conflict gov.midrange - 
opposition    -0.013 -0.043    
    0.028 0.035    
JM's distance 0.058*** 0.051**  0.056*** 0.047**  0.059*** 0.055*** 
 0.020 0.020  0.021 0.021  0.021 0.021 
Conflict with opposition       -0.005 -0.012 
       0.018 0.020 
Alternation 0.400*** 0.468***  0.388*** 0.430***  0.399*** 0.466*** 
 0.140 0.141  0.144 0.142  0.141 0.141 
Prime ministerial bill 0.501*** 0.474***  0.508*** 0.476***  0.506*** 0.482*** 
 
0.173 0.166  0.173 0.166  0.173 0.166 
Technical minister -0.454*** -0.516***  -0.457*** -0.522***  -0.449*** -0.499*** 
 
0.169 0.175  0.169 0.175  0.171 0.180 
Conflict over ministerial 
responsibility 0.155 0.142  0.148 0.125  0.149 0.128 
 0.242 0.224  0.241 0.224  0.244 0.225 
Departmental capture -0.083 -0.064  -0.078 -0.068  -0.081 -0.065 
 0.144 0.151  0.144 0.152  0.144 0.151 
Complexity 0.389** 0.410***  0.385** 0.395***  0.389** 0.407*** 
 0.155 0.147  0.155 0.147  0.155 0.148 
Multidimensionality 0.146*** 0.131***  0.145*** 0.129***  0.146*** 0.131*** 
 0.032 0.031  0.032 0.031  0.032 0.031 
Impatience -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000*  -0.000 -0.000 
 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Length of bill 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Constant 4.652*** 4.314***  4.772*** 4.771***  4.684*** 4.407*** 
  0.285 0.352  0.410 0.524  0.318 0.389 
 
        
Alpha 2.483 2.384  2.483 2.381  2.483 2.383 
AIC 8,519.013 8,527.812  8,520.880 8,528.781  8,520.967 8,529.580 
BIC 8,585.841 8,683.744  8,592.163 8,689.168  8,592.250 8,689.967 
N 636   636   636  
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Table 6.12 
Negative binomial regressions on government bills changes. Italy 1987-2006. 
(XII legislature excluded) 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Although hardly explainable within standard rational choice models, we actually observe 
modifications to government legislation in the course of parliamentary processes. As this work 
shows, three crucial considerations can help in accounting for these observable changes, thus 
increasing the explanatory power of the basic models. Firstly, the presence of position taking utility 
may induce political actors to propose policies that appeal to their own voters even when they know 
in advance that such bills will be amended during the legislative process. Secondly, due to the 
limited information at their disposal at the cabinet level, governmental actors may introduce bills 
which are altered in parliament because actors learn aspects which were previously unknown. 
Thirdly, under at least one of the two above mentioned circumstances, the amount of modifications 
made to bills in parliament may be affected by the particular institutions that regulate the legislative 
process. 
These considerations are at the basis of the three major sets of theoretical explanations of the 
changes made to governmental legislation that I introduced and discussed in chapters 1-4. In 
particular, in the first two chapters I examined hypotheses based upon position taking and conflict. 
Since when governmental actors draft legislation they propose the ideal point of their respective 
constituencies, the amount of modifications made to the initial bill indicates true conflict among the 
actors participating in the lawmaking process. According to Martin and Vanberg (2004, 2005), 
whose influential hypothesis is discussed in detail in the second chapter, the conflict which explains 
the modifications made to governmental proposals stems from the ideological divisions among the 
parties forming coalition cabinets. More precisely, their argument is that legislative review serves as 
a means of monitoring the behaviour of ministers belonging to different coalition partners. Other 
monitoring mechanisms – both at the legislative and at the executive level – may be combined with 
parliamentary scrutiny, thus increasing or decreasing the number of observable changes. In the third 
chapter I discussed hypotheses based upon the lack of knowledge, whereby parliamentary 
modifications to government bills are driven by an improvement of the decision makers’ knowledge. 
Whereas, in the cabinet, ministers rarely have complete information about other actors’ preferences 
and perfect information about the actual implications of the laws, the variety of origins and 
competences of the legislators and the specialization of the parliamentary committees may provide 
the information needed to scrutinize governmental legislation (see Krehbiel 1991). Then, in the 
fourth chapter, I reviewed hypotheses based upon institutional rules. Parlamentarians’ ability to 
modify ministerial drafts is influenced by the type of amending rule employed as well as by a 
number of other institutional arrangements. Generally speaking, more restrictive rules reduce the 
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possibility of changing bills in the legislature. Remarkably, these three types of explanations are not 
mutually exclusive at all. Rather, in real-world politics they are intertwined in complex ways. 
Importantly, information problems seem crucial in several of the explanations that I classified as 
based upon conflict and position taking. 
I empirically evaluated these three sets of explanatory hypotheses against evidence from Italy. 
In particular, as I spelled out in the fifth chapter, I built and used a dataset tracking the legislative 
history of all the laws introduced by governments in the Chamber of Deputies during the 1987-2006 
period. As far as I know, no research has ever studied successful amendatory activity in Italy as a 
dependent variable, testing a set of alternative explanations. In any case, although being a single 
country, Italy provides substantial variation in terms of several theoretically crucial explanations: 
most of all ideological divergence within the coalition varies a lot across and inside cabinets, the 
party systems has shifted from a pivotal to an alternation type, and technical ministers are not really 
exceptional in Italian cabinets. Concerning my dependent variable, I proposed an operationalization 
in terms of word changes (the number of words that are added, deleted or modified during the 
legislative process), arguing that such a measure seems more refined and suitable for the Italian case 
than Martin and Vanberg’s one. 
As shown in the sixth chapter, I tested the impact of the hypotheses discussed in the 
theoretical chapters (and operationalized as illustrated in chapter 5) using an event count model. 
This seems to be the appropriate technique for studying the number of events that occur over a 
particular period of time. More precisely, I employed the Negative binomial regression model, 
whose distributional form allows to take into account the degree of overdispersion in the number of 
words modified in the course of the parliamentary process.  
My analyses show that what happens to ministerial drafts during the legislative process 
depends on a mix of factors related to position taking, conflict and lack of information. In particular, 
the results have a number of possible implications for how we understand policymaking in Italian 
multiparty governments. 
First of all, importantly, Martin and Vanberg’s (2004, 2005) argument is not fully rejected. 
Rather, it is somehow refined. My result show that the conflict which actually affects the number of 
modifications made to government bills in the Italian parliament is not that among all parties in the 
coalition, but just that among those partners which are represented in the drafting ministry, and 
hence have the relevant information needed to revise ministerial proposals in the legislature. By 
contrast, coalition members without junior ministers in the relevant executive department suffer 
from an informational disadvantage about the policy consequences of the ministerial proposal. Let 
me stress that Martin and Vanberg consider indeed just coalitions made of two parties. In two-party 
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coalitions, provided that a sufficient number of ministers are shadowed, when ministers initiate 
legislation the entire coalition is likely to be informed about the policy consequences of their 
proposals. Hence, all (the two) coalition partners are able to amend legislation. In this case, the 
ideological divergence inside the whole government coalition is an appropriate measure. In Italy, 
instead, even if the proposing minister is shadowed, not all coalition partners are informed: only 
those with a JM in the relevant ministry are informed and thus able to modify governmental bills. In 
this case, the ideological divergence inside the drafting ministry seems more appropriate.   
Second, Italian JMs do not seem to behave following the logic suggested by Martin and 
Vanberg. They do not solve intracoalitional problems at the cabinet level, but they seem to inform 
their party about the implications of ministerial poposals.  
Third, information plays a crucial role in the course of the legislative process. On the one hand, 
the limited level of knowledge at ministers’ disposal when they prepare bills systematically 
increases the amount of changes to governmental legislation during the parliamentary process. On 
the other hand, as previously noted, information problems within the coalition are at the basis of the 
use of junior ministers.   
Fourth, as far as this work is concerned, Italian parliament appears to be a ‘government arena’, 
where a second round of the decision making process that involves government members is played. 
Indeed, I found no support for a significant role of opposition parties in the amendatory process, and 
the explanatory hypothesis dealing with the parliamentary median voter does not prove to be robust 
once we control for the degree of ideological conflict within the drafting ministry.  
My results also tell us something about the members of Italian cabinets. Facing rather strong 
position taking incentives, Italian prime ministers are not reliable for the implementation of the 
coalition agreed-upon compromise. However, the parties forming Italian coalition governments can 
safely resort to technical ministers. The behaviour of technicians is strategic as they are able to 
anticipate the possible behaviours of other legislative actors, but not ‘political’ as they ignore the 
utility to take positions in front of some constituencies.   
In addition, the 1994 shift from a pivotal to an alternational party system seems to represent an 
actual structural break: when government alternation is a real possibility, government bills are 
largely changed in parliament. If a political system combines more than one government party and a 
status quo that is not really controversial (as it is very bad for all government parties), then the 
distance between the initial minister’s proposal and the final legislative outcome can be very large. 
Finally, let me precise that the present research strategy has not allowed me to test most of the 
explanations relying on changes in institutional rules. Of course, future research might engage in 
more comprehensive analyses by taking longer time periods or investigating more than one country. 
 161 
REFERENCES 
 
Aghion, Philippe, and Jean Tirole. 1997. “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations.” Journal of 
Political Economy 105: 1-29.  
Alesina, A., and R. Perotti. 1995. The political economy of budget deficits. IMF Staff Papers 42 
(March): 1-31. 
Alesina, A., and R. Perotti 1999, Budget Deficits and Budgets Institutions, in Fiscal Institutions 
and Fiscal Performance (1999), James M. Poterba and , editors (p. 13 - 36). Published in 
January 1999. 
Allum, P.A. 1973. Italy: republic without a government? Norton, New York 
Amorim Neto, Octavio, Gary W. Cox, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2003. "Agenda Power in 
Brazil's Câmara dos Deputados, 1989 to 1998." World Politics 55(4): 550-578. 
Andeweg, Rudy B. 2000. “Ministers as Double Agents? The Delegation Process Between Cabinet 
and Ministers.” European Journal of Political Research 37 (May): 377–95. 
Andeweg, Rudy B., and Lia Nijzink. 1995. “Beyond the Two-Body Image: Relations between 
Ministers and MPs.” In Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe, ed. Herbert Döring. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Andeweg R.B., and Timmermans A. 2008. “Conflict management in coalition government.” See 
Strøm et al. 2008, pp. 269–300. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks (1990) ‘Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy 
Portfolios’, American Political Science Review, 84:3, 891–906. 
Austen-Smith, David, and William H. Riker (1987) ‘Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of 
Legislation’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 897-918. 
Bartolini, Stefano, and Chiaramonte, Roberto. 1998. ‘Majoritarian miracles and the question of 
party system change’, European Journal of Political Research 34: 151–169. 
Bagehot, Walter. [1872] 2001. The English Constitution. Edited by Paul Smith. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University press. 
Baron, D. 1989. ‘A non-cooperative theory of legislative coalitions.’ American Journal of Political 
Science 33: 1048-84. 
Baron, D. 1991. ‘Majoritarian incentives, pork barrel programs, and procedural control.’ American 
Journal of Political Science 35 57-90. 
Baron, D., and J. Ferejohn. 1989. ‘Bargaining in legislatures.’ American Political Science Review 
83: 1181-1206. 
Becker, R. and T. Saalfeld. 2004. ‘The Life and Times of Bills.’ In Döring H. and M. Hallerberg 
2004, eds., Patterns of Parliamentary Behavior. Aldershot: Ashgate. pp. 57-90. 
Bendor J., A. Glazer, and T. Hammond. 2001. “Theories of Delegation.” Annual Review of Political 
Science 4: 235-69. 
Benoit, Kenneth and Michael Laver. 2006. Party Policy in Modern Democracies. London: 
Routledge. 
Bergman T, Müller WC, Strøm K, Blomgren M. 2003. Democratic delegation and accountability: 
crossnational patterns. In Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, ed. K 
Strøm, WC Müller,T Bergman, pp. 109–220. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press. 
Binder, Sarah (1996). ‘The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in 
the House, 1789-1990’, American Political Science Review. 90:1, 8-20. 
Black, Duncan. 1958. The Theory of Committee and Elections. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Blondel, J. 1970. (1990) ‘Legislative Behaviour: Some Steps Toward a Cross-National 
Measurement.’ In P. Norton (ed.), Legislatures. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
 162 
Blondel, J. 1988. Western European cabinets in comparative perspective. In: Blondel J. and Müller-
Rommel F. (eds.), Cabinets in Western Europe. Macmillan, London. 
Blondel, J. 1995. Comparative Government, London: Prentice Hall. 
Bonanni M. (1983). ‘Il governo nel sistema politico italiano (1948-82)’, Rivista Trimestrale di 
Scienza dell’Amministrazione, 33, pp. 1-46. 
Brennan G. and A. P. Hamlin. 2000. Democratic Devices and Desires. Cambridge University Press.  
Bryce, Lord James. 1921. Modern Democracies. New York: Macmillan. 
Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: Univ. Michigan Press. 
Budge, I. and M. Laver. 1986. ‘Office seeking and policy pursuit in coalition theory.’ Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 11: 485-506. 
Budge, Ian, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl, eds. 1987. Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: 
Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Budge, Ian, et al. 2001. Mapping Preferences: Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1945-1998,  
London: Oxford University Press. 
Camera dei Deputati. 2003. Regolamento della Camera dei Deputati Camera dei Deputati, 2003 
[cited September 16 2003]. Available from 
http://www.camera.it/index.asp?content=%2Fdeputati%2Ffunzionamento%2F05%2Eregolam
ento%2Easp. 
Cameron, Colin A., Gelbach, Jonah and Miller, Douglas L. 2006. “Bootstrap-Based Improvements 
for Inference with Clustered Errors,” NBER Technical Working Paper No. 344. 
Cameron, C. and K. Trivedi. 1986. ‘Econometric Models Based on Count Data: Comparisons and 
Applications of Some Estimators and Tests.’ Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 1, No. 1 
(Jan., 1986), pp. 29-53. 
Cameron, C. and K. Trivedi. 1986. ‘Regression-based Tests for Overdispersion in the Poisson 
Model.’ Journal of Econometrics, Volume 46, Issue 3, December 1990, Pages 347-364. 
Cameron, C. and K. Trivedi. 1998. Regression Analysis of Count Data. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Cantelli, F., V. Mortara, and G. Movia. 1974. Come lavora il Parlamento, Milano, Giuffrè, 1974. 
Capano, G. and M. Giuliani (2001a) (Eds.). Parlamento e processo legislativo in Italia. Bologna: Il 
Mulino. 
Capano and Giuliani (2001b), ‘Governing without surviving? An Italian paradox: Law-making in 
Italy, 1987-2001.’ Journal of Legislative Studies 7 (4): 13-36 
Capano and Giuliani (2003a), ‘The Italian Parliament twixt the logic of government and the logic of 
institutions (much also about something, but what exactly?).’ In Italian Politics 2002. The 
second Berlusconi Government, eds. J. Blondel and P. Segatti 
Capano and Giuliani (2003b), ‘The Italian parliament: In search of a new role?’ Journal of 
Legislative Studies, 9 (2): 8-34 
Capano, G. and R. Vignati (2008), 'Casting Light on the Black Hole of the Amendatory Process in 
Italy', South European Society and Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 35 - 59. 
Carroll, Royce, and Gary W. Cox. 2005. Shadowing Ministers. Unpublished typescript, University 
of California, San Diego. 
Castles, Francis G., and Peter Mair. 1984. “Left-Right Political Scales: Some 'Expert' Judgments.” 
European Journal of Political Research 12 (1): 73-88. 
Cazzola F. 1975. Governo e opposizione nel parlamento italiano. Giuffrè, Milan. 
Cazzola, F. and Morisi, M. 1981. L’alluvione dei decreti: Il processo legislativo tra settima e ottava 
legislatura. Milano: Giuffrè. 
Coase, R. H. 1937. ‘The Nature of the Firm.’ Economica 4: 386-405. 
Coase, R. H. 1960. ‘The Problem of Social Cost.’ Journal of Law and Economics 3 (Oct): 1-44. 
Cocozza, Francesco. 1989. Il Governo nel Procedimento Legislativo. Milan: Dott. A. Giuffrè. 
 163 
Collie, Melissa P. 1988. ‘The Legislature and Distributive Policy Making in Formal Perspective.’ 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Nov., 1988), pp. 427-458 
Collie, M., and J. Cooper. 1989. ‘Multiple Referral and the “New” Committee System in the House 
of Representatives.’ In Congress Reconsidered, 4th ed., ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer, 245-72. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
Collier, David and James E. Mahon, Jr. 1993. ‘Conceptual "Stretching" Revisited: Adapting 
Categories in Comparative Analysis’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 4 
(Dec., 1993), pp. 845-855.  
Cotta M. 1979. Classe politica e parlamento in Italia 1946-1976. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Cotta M. 1987. “Il sotto-sistema governo-parlamento.” Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica  17: 241-
283. 
Cotta, Maurizio. 1988. “Italy”. In Cabinets in Western Europe, eds. Jean Blondel and Ferdinand 
Müller-Rommel. London: MacMillan. 
Cotta, Maurizio. 1990. "The Centrality of Parliament." In Parliament and Democratic 
Consolidation in Southern Europe, edited by M. Cotta and U. Liebert, pp. 249-272. London 
and New York: Printer Publishers. 
Cotta, Maurizio. 1994, “The Rise and Fall of the ‘Centrality’ of the Italian Parliament: 
Transformations of the Executive-Legislative Subsystem After the Second World War”. In 
Copeland and Patterson (eds), Parliaments in the Modern World. Changing Institutions, 59-84. 
Cotta, M.,  and P. Isernia (eds.). 1996. Il gigante dai piedi di argilla. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Cotta, Maurizio, and Verzichelli, Luca. 1996. “Italy: Sunset of a Particracy”, Jean Blondel and 
Maurizio Cotta (eds.), Party in Government. London: Macmilla. 
Cox, Gary W. 1987. The Efficient Secret. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cox, Gary W. 2006. ‘The Organization of Democratic Legislatures’, in Weingast, Barry R. and 
Donald A. Wittman (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 141-61. 
Cox, Gary W., William B. Heller, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. “Agenda Power in the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies: 1988 to 2000.” Working Paper. 
Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1990. Parties and Committees in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the 
House. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party 
Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Criscitiello, Annarita. 1993. “Majority Summits: Decision-making Inside the Cabinet and Out: Italy, 
1970-1990.” West European Politics 16 (4): 581-94. 
Criscitiello, Annarita. 1994. “The Political Role of Cabinet Ministers in Italy”. In Laver, Michael, 
and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds. Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
D’Alimonte, Roberto, and Chiaramonte, Alessandro. 1995. ‘Il nuovo sistema elettorale italiano: 
Quali opportunità?’, in Stefano Bartolini and Roberto D’Alimonte (eds.), Maggioritario ma 
non troppo: Le elezioni del 27 marzo 1994. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
D’Onofrio, F. 1979. ‘Committees in the Italian parliament’, in M. Shaws & J. Lees (eds.), 
Committees in legislatures. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
De Micheli, Chiara. 1997. “L’attività legislativa dei governi al tramonto della Prima Repubblica”, 
Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica anno XXVII, n. 1: 151-187. 
De Micheli, C. and L.Verzichelli. 2003. Il Parlamento in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
De Winter, Lieven, Timmermans, Arco and Patrick Dumont (2000). ‘Belgium: On Government 
Agreements, Evangelists, Followers, and Heretics’, in Wolfgang Müller and Kaare Strøm 
(eds.) Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 300-55. 
 164 
Della Sala, V. 1988. ‘Government by decree: The Craxi Government and the use of decree 
legislation in the Italian parliament’, in R. Nanetti, R. Leonardi & P. Corbetta (eds.), Italian 
politics. London: Pinter. 
Della Sala,V. 1993. The permanent committees of the Italian chamber of deputies: Parliament at 
work?, Legislative Studies Quarterly 18/2. 
Della Sala, V. 1998. The Italian Parliament: Chambers in a Crumbling House? In Parliaments and 
Governments in Western Europe, edited by P. Norton. London: Frank Cass. 
Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1976. "Institutional Rules and Legislative Outcomes in the Italian Parliament." 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 1:147-179. 
Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1978. Sopravvivere senza governare: i partiti politici nel parlamento italiano. 
Il Mulino, Bologna. 
Di Palma, G. and M. Cotta. 1986. “Cadres, Peones and Entrepreneurs: Professional Identities in a 
Divided Parliament.” In Parliaments and Parliamentarians in Democratic Politics, 41-78, 
Suleiman (ed.) 1986. 
Di Palma, G., S. Fabbrini and G. Freddi (eds.). 2000. Condannata al successo: L’Italia nell’Europa 
integrata. Bologna: il Mulino. 
Dion, Douglas. 1997. Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew : Minority Rights and Procedural 
Change in Legislative Politics. Ann Arbor, M.I.: University of Michigan Press. 
Dixit, Avinash. 1996. The making of economic policy. MA: MIT Press. 
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper Collins. 
Döring, Herbert, ed. 1995. Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
Döring, Herbert. 1995c. "Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda." In 
Herbert Döring, ed. Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe, p. 223-246. New York: 
St Martin's Press. 
Fabbrini, Sergio, and Donà, Alessia. 2003. ‘Europeanisation as Strengthening of Domestic 
Executive Power? The Italian Experience and the Case of the "Legge Comunitaria"’, Journal 
of European Integration, Volume 25, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 31–50. 
Fedeli Forte 2007, ‘Measures of the Amending Power of Government and Parliament. The Case of 
Italy 1988-2002.’ In Economics of Governance (2007) 8:309-338. 
Fenno, Richard F. 1966. Power of the Purse. Boston: Little, Brown.  
Fenno, Richard F. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Fenno, Richard F. 1978. Home Style. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Fenno, Richard F. 1989. Dan Quayle: The Making of a U.S. Senator. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Press. 
Ferejohn, John A. 1974. Pork Barrel Politics. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Ferejohn, J., and K. Krehbiel. 1987. ‘The budget process and the size of the budget.’ American 
Journal of Political Science 3 1:296-320. 
Fiorina, M. 1974. Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies. Lexington, Mass., Lexington 
Books. 
Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. ‘Universalism, Reciprocity, and Distributive Policymaking in Majority 
Rule Institutions.’ In John P. Crecine, eds., Research in Public Policy Analysis and 
Management. Vol. 1. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Forestiere, C. and R. Pelizzo. 2004. Does the Parliament Make a Difference? The Role of the 
Italian Parliament in Financial Policy. On web: 
https://mercury.smu.edu.sg/rsrchpubupload/4790/Forestiere_Pelizzo_SPSA_2005.pdf 
Franchino, Fabio, and Bjørn Høyland. 2009. ‘Legislative Involvement in Parliamentary Systems: 
Opportunities, Conflict, and Institutional Constraints.’ American Political Science Review 103 
(4):607-621. 
Froman, Lewis A. 1967. The Congressional Process. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Furlong, P. 1990. Parliament in Italian politics. West Eur Polit 13:52–67 
 165 
Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair. 2006. Representative Government in Modern 
Europe. 4th ed. Boston: McGraw–Hill. 
Gamm, Gerald, and John D. Huber. 2002. “Legislatures as Political Institutions: Beyond the 
Contemporary Congress.” In Political Science: State of the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and 
Helen V. Milner. New York: Norton. 
Giannetti, Daniela, and Michael Laver. 2005. “Policy Positions and Jobs in the Government”. 
European Journal of Political Research 44, no. 1: 1-30. 
Gianniti L. & Nicola Lupo (2004). “La fuga verso la decretazione delegata non basta”. In Ceccanti 
S. and Salvatore Vassallo (Eds). Come chiudere la transizione. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. "Collective Decision-Making and Standing 
Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures." Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Organization 3:287-335. 
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1989. "Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules 
with a Heterogeneous Committee." American Journal of Political Science 33:459-90. 
Gilligan, Thomas W. and Keith Krehbiel. 1990. ‘Organization of Informative Committees by a 
Rational Legislature’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 
531-564. 
Giuliani, Marco. 2006. Le politiche pubbliche in Italia. La politica Europea. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Giuliani M. and G. Capano. 2001. “I labirinti del legislativo”, in Capano e Giuliani (2001a), 
Parlamento e processo legislativo in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Golden, Miriam A., and Lucio Picci. 2008. ‘Pork-Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-94’. 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Apr., 2008), pp. 268-289. 
Gourieroux, C., A. Monfort, and A. Trognon. 1984. ‘Pseudo maximum likelihood methods: 
Applications to Poisson models.’ Econometrica, 52:701-20. 
Grilli, V., D. Masciandaro, and G. Tabellini. 1991. ‘Political and monetary institutions and public 
finance policies in the industrial democracies.’ Economic Policy 13: 341-92. 
Gundle, S. and S. Parker, eds. 1996. The New Italian Republic. London: Routledge. 
Hallerberg, Mark. 2000. “The Role of Parliamentary Committees in the Budgetary Process within 
Europe.” In Strauch, Rolf, and Jürgen von Hagen, Eds. Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy. 
Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer, 87-106. 
Hallerberg, M., and J. von Hagen. 1997a. Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget 
Deficits within the European Union. CEPR Working Paper. London: Centre for Economic 
Policy Research. 
Hallerberg, M., and J. von Hagen. 1997b. The budgetary process and the size of the budget: A 
reexamination. CEPR Working Paper. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
Hagevi, Magnus. 2000. “Nordic Light on Committee Assignments.” In P. Esaiasson and K. Heidar, 
eds. Beyond Westminster and Congress: The Nordic Experience. Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press. 
Hahm, Sung Deuk. 1994. ‘The Political Economy of Deficits Spending: A Cross Comparison of 
Industrialized Democracies, 1955-1990.’ Unpublished manuscript. September. 
Hausman, J., B. H. Hall and Z. Griliches (1984), ‘Econometric models for count data with an 
application to the patents-R&D relationship’, Econometrica, 52, 909-938. 
Heller, William B. 2000. Policy Sticks: Government Control of Legislative Content in Italy. Mimeo. 
Heller, William B. 2001. “Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in 
Multiparty Parliaments.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (October): 780–98. 
Hine, David. 1993. Governing Italy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hine, David, and Renato Finocchi. 1991. “The Italian minister.” In West European Politics 14/2. 
Huber 1992. Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States. American Political 
Science Review, Vol.86, No.3, September. 
Huber, John D. 1996a. Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in 
France. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 166 
Huber, John D. 1996b. “The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies.” American 
Political Science Review 90 (June): 269–82. 
Huber JD, Martinez-Gallardo C. 2008. “Replacing cabinet ministers: patterns of ministerial stability 
in parliamentary democracies”. American Political Science Review 102:169–80. 
Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations 
of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jenny, M. and W. C. Müller 1995, ‘Presidents of Parliament: Neutral Chairmen or Assets of the 
Majority?’ in Döring, Herbert, ed. 1995. Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. 
New York: St Martin's Press. 
Johnson, C. 1982. MITI and the Japanese miracle: The growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975. Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Jogerst, M. A. 1990. “Select Committees of the British House of Commons and the Changing Role 
of MPs.” Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Washington, DC. 
Katz, Richard S. 1996. ‘Electoral Reform and the Transformation of Party Politics in Italy’, Party 
Politics, January 1996 2: 31-53. 
Katz R. and L. Bardi. 1979. Voti di preferenza e ricambio del personale parlamentare. Rivista 
Italiana di Scienza Politica 9: 71-96. 
Kezdi, Gabor. 2004. “Robust Standard Error Estimation in Fixed-Effects Panel Models,” 
Hungarian Statistical Review Special, Vol. 9, pp. 96-116. 
Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew McCubbins. 1991. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional 
Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kim, Dong-hun and Gerhard Loewenberg. 2005. “The Role of Parliamentary Committees in 
Coalition Government: Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the Germany Bundestag.” 
Comparative Political Studies 39 (November): 1104-1129. 
King, Gary. 1988. ‘Statistical models for political science event counts: Bias in conventional 
procedures and evidence for the exponential Poisson regression model’, American Journal of 
Political Science, 32:838-63. 
King, Gary. 1989a. Unifying Political Methodology: The Likelihood Theory of Statistical Inference. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
King, Gary. 1989b. ‘Variance Specification in Event Count Models: From Restrictive Assumptions 
to a Generalized Estimator’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Aug., 
1989), pp. 762-784. 
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Krehbiel, Keith. 2004. ‘Legislative Organization’, Journal of Economic Perspectives. 18:1, 113-28. 
Kreppel, Amie. 1997. “The impact of parties in government on legislative output in Italy”. In 
European Journal of Political Research 31: 327-350. 
Kreps, David M. 1990. A course in Microeconomic Theory. New York, NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Krutz, Glen S. 2001. Tactical Maneuvering on Omnibus Bills in Congress. American Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan., 2001), pp. 210-223 
Lasswell, Harold D. 1958. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How? New York: Meridian. 
Laver, Michael. 2002. “Divided Parties, Divided Government.” In Legislatures: Comparative 
Perspectives on Representative Assemblies, eds. Gerhard Loewenberg, Peverill Squire, and D. 
Roderick Kiewiet. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press: 201-222. 
Laver, Michael. 2006. "Legislatures and Parliaments in Comparative Context." In Barry R. 
Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, p. 121-140. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Laver, Michael, and Ian Budge (eds.). 1992. Party Policy and Government Coalitions, Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: The MacMillan Press. 
 167 
Laver, Michael, and John Garry. 2000. “Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts.” 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Jul., 2000), pp. 619-634. 
Laver, Michael, and W. Ben Hunt. 1992. Policy and Party Competition. New York: Routledge. 
Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds. 1994. Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary 
Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1996. Making and Breaking Governments. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lawless, Jerald F. 1987. ‘Negative Binomial and Mixed Poisson Regression.’ The Canadian 
Journal of Statistics / La Revue Canadienne de Statistique. Vol. 15, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 
209-225. 
Lees, J. D., & Shaw, M. 1979. Committees in legislatures: A comparative analysis. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press. 
Leonardi, Robert, Raffaella Nanetti, and Gianfranco Pasquino. 1978. Institutionalization of 
Parliament and Parliamentarization of Parties in Italy. Legislative Studies Quarterly 3 (1):161-
186. 
Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Loewenberg, G. and S. C. Patterson. 1979. Comparing Legislatures. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Long, J. S. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. Thousand 
Oaks; London; New Dehli: Sage Publications. 
Lowi, Theodore J. 1964. American Business, Public Policy, Case-studies, and Political Theory. 
World Politics, 16:677-715. 
Lupia, Arthur. 2003. “Delegation and Its Perils.” In Delegation and Accountability in 
Parliamentary Democracies, eds. Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press: 33-54. 
Lupia, Arthur, and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1994. ‘Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and 
Police Patrol Reconstructed’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 10:1, 96–125. 
Lupia, Arthur and Mathew McCubbins. 2000. “Representation or Abdication? How Citizens Use 
Institutions to Help Delegation Succeed.” European Journal of Political Research 37 (May): 
291–307. 
Lupo, N. 1998. “Politiche pubbliche e poteri normativi tra governo e parlamento.” In V. Attipaldi et 
al. (eds.), Governi ed economia. La transizione istitutionale nella XI legislatura, Padova, 
Cedam, pp. 121-161. 
Maass, Arthur. 1951. Muddy Waters. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Maddala, G. S. 1983. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. New York: 
McGraw–Hill. 
Manley, John. 1970. The Politics of Finance. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Manow P, and Zorn H. 2004. Office versus policy motives in portfolio allocation: the case of junior 
ministers. MPIfG Disc. Pap. 04/9, Max Planck Inst. Stud. Soc. 
Manzella A. 2003. Il parlamento. Il Mulino, Bologna. 
March, J.C. and J.P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics. 
New York: Free Press. 
Martin, Lanny W. 2004. “The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies.” American 
Journal of Political Science 48 (July): 445-461. 
Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg. 2004. “Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and 
Parliamentary Scrutiny.” American Journal of Political Science 48 (January): 13–27. 
Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg. 2005. “Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review” 
American Journal of Political Science 99 (1): 93–106. 
Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg. 2008. “Coalition Government and Political 
Communication.” Forthcoming, Political Research Quarterly. 
Martin, Shane, and Depauw, Sam. 2009. Coalition Government and the Internal Organization of 
Legislatures. Unpublished typescript. 
 168 
Masciandaro, D. 1996. “La non emendabilita’ delle leggi di spesa e di bilancio:analisi teorica e 
profili istituzionali.” In: Monorchio A. (ed) La finanza pubblica italiana dopo la svolta del 
1992. Il Mulino, Bologna. 
Mattson 1995, Private Members’ Iniziative and Amendments, in Döring, Herbert, ed. 1995. 
Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. New York: St Martin's Press. 
Mattson, Ingvar, and Kaare Strøm. 1995. “Parliamentary Committees.” In Herbert Döring, ed., 
Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. New York: St. Martin’s. 
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political Science 28: 165-79.  
McKelvey, Richard D. (1976): “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting  Models and Some 
Implications for Agenda Control”, Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472-482.   
Mershon, Carol. 1996. ‘The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments.’ 
American Political Science Review 90, 534–554. 
Mershon, Carol. 1999. ‘The Costs of Coalition: A Five-Nation Comparison.’ In Shaun Bowler, 
David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz (eds.), Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government. 
Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 227–268. 
Mershon, Carol. 2001. ‘Party Factions and Coalition Government: Portfolio Allocation in Italian 
Christian Democracy.’ Electoral Studies 20, 555–580. 
Mershon, Carol. 2002. The Costs of Coalitions. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Mezey, Michael L. 1979. Comparative Legislatures. Duke University Press, Durham (NC). 
Mezey, Michael L. 1993. “Legislatures: Individual Purpose and Institutional Performance.” In 
Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, ed. Ada Finifter. Washington, DC: American 
Political Science Association. 
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts. 1991. Economics, Organization, and Management. New York: Prentice 
Hall. 
Moe, T. 1984. The New Economics of Organizations. American Journal of Political Science 
28(Nov.): 739-77. 
Moe, T. 1989. The Politics of Structural Choice. Stanford University. Mimeo. 
Morgan, M.J. 1976, The Modelling of Government Coalition Formation: A Policy-Based Approach 
with Interval Measurement, Doctoral Thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
Morlino, Leonardo. 1996. ‘Crisis of Parties and Change of Party System in Italy’, Party Politics 
January 1996 2: 5-30. 
Mortara, Vittorio. 1970. L'Analisi Quantitativa del Processo Legislativo. Bologna: I1 Mulino. 
Motta, R. 1985. L’attività legislativa dei governi (1948-83), Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, a. 
XV, n. 2, agosto 1985. 
Müller, Wolfgang C. 2000. “Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation 
and Accountability Work.” European Journal of Political Research 37 (May): 309–33. 
Müller, Wolfgang C., Torbjörn Bergman, and Kaare Strøm. 2003. “Parliamentary Democracy: 
Promise and Problems.” In Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, eds. 
Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 3-
32.  
Müller, Wolfgang C., Torbjörn Bergman, and Kaare Strøm. 2008. “Coalition Theory and Cabinet 
Governance: An Introduction”. In Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life 
Cycle in Western Europe, eds. Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-50. 
Müller, Wolfgang C. and Meyer, Thomas M. 2010. 'Meeting the Challenges of Representation and 
Accountability in Multi-party Governments', West European Politics, 33: 5, 1065-1092. 
Müller, W.C., Philipp, W. and Gerlich, P. 1993. Prime ministers and cabinet decisionmaking 
processes, pp. 223–258, in J. Blondel and F. Müller-Rommel (eds.), Governing together. The 
extent and limits of joint decision-making in Western European cabinets. London: Macmillan. 
 169 
Müller, Wolfgang C., and Kaare Strøm, eds. 2000. Coalition Governments in Western Europe. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Müller WC, Strøm K. 2008. “Coalition agreements and cabinet governance”. In Cabinets and 
Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe, eds. Kaare Strøm, 
Wolfgang Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 159–99. 
Newell, J.L. 2000, ‘Turning Over a New Leaf? Cohesion and Discipline in the Italian Parliament’, 
Journal of Legislative Studies, 6/4 (2000), pp.29–52. 
Neyman, Jerzy. 1965. ‘Certain chance mechanisms involving discrete distributions.’ In Ganapati P. 
Patil, ed., Classical and contagious discrete distributions. Calcutta: Statistical Publishing 
Society. 
North, D. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton. 
North, Douglass. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Norton, P. 1994. ‘The Legislative Powers of Parliament’, in C. Flinterman, A.W. Hering and L. 
Waddington (eds.), The Evolving Role of Parliaments in Europe (Aperldoorn: Maklu, 1994), 
pp.15–32. 
O’Malley, Eoin. 2007. ‘The Power of Prime Ministers: Results of an Expert Survey’, International 
Political Science Review, 28:1, 7–27. 
Olson, David M. 2002. "Institutionalization of Parliamentary Committees: the experience of post-
communist democracies." Paper prepared for ECPR Joint Sessions. Turin, Italy. 
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Olson, M. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social 
Rifidities. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. 
Peltzman, Sam. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation."J. Law and Econ. 19 (August 
1976): 211-40. 
Persson, T., and L. Svensson. 1989. “Why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit: Policy with 
time in consistent preferences.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104: 325-45. 
Plott, Charles R. 1967. ‘A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule, in 
American Economic Review, 57, pp. 787-806.  
Plott, Charles R. 1968. ‘Some Organizational Influences on Urban Renewal Decisions’. American 
Economic Review, 58, pp. 306-311. 
Plott, Charles R. 1976. ‘ Axiomatic Social Choie Theory: An Overview and Interpretation’, in 
American Journal of Political Science, 20, pp. 511-595. 
Powell, G. Bingham. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional 
Visions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Prata, Adriana. 2006. “Government Domination, Consensus or Chaos? A Study of Party Discipline 
and Agenda Control in National Legislatures”. Doctoral Dissertation in Political Science, 
University of California San Diego, accepted December 2006. 
Predieri, A. 1963. ‘La produzione legislativa’, in S. Somogyi, L. Lotti, A. Predieri and G. Sartori, Il 
Parlamento italiano 1946-1963, Napoli, ESI.  
Predieri, A. 1975. ‘Parlamento 1975’. In: Predieri A (ed) Il Parlamento nel sistema politico italiano. 
Edizioni di Comunità, Milano. 
Pridham, Geoffrey. 1988. Political Parties and Coalitional Behaviour in Italy. London: Routledge. 
Rae, D. 1967. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Rasch, Bjørn Eric. 1995. "Parliamentary Voting Procedures." In Parliaments and Majority Rule in 
Western Europe, edited by H. Döring, pp. 488-527. Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag 
and St. Martin's Press. 
Rasch, Bjørn Eric. 2000. "Parliamentary Floor Voting Procedures and Agenda Setting in Europe." 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 25:3-23. 
Riker, William H. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 170 
Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism. San Francisco, California, Freeman. 
Roubini, N., and J. Sachs. 1989. Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the 
industrial democracies. European Economic Review 33 (May): 903-33. 
Rundquist, Barry S. 1973. Congressional Influences on the Distribution of Prime Mili- tary 
Contracts. Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Stanford University 
Saalfeld, Thomas. 1990. “The West German Bundestag After Forty Years: The Role of Parliament 
in a Party Democracy”. In Parliaments in Western Europe, ed. Philip Norton. London: Frank 
Cass and Co. 
Saalfeld, Thomas. 2000. “Members of Parliament and Governments in Western Europe: Agency 
Relations and Problems of Oversight.” European Journal of Political Research 37 (May): 
353–76. 
Sartori, Giovanni. 1963. "Dove Va il Parlamento?" in S. Somogyi, et al., Parlamento Italiano 1946-
1963. Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, pp. 281-386. 
Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’, The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Dec., 1970), pp. 1033-1053. 
Scharpf, F. W. 1997. Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. 
Westview, Boulder, Colorado. 
Schattschneider, E. E. 1935. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Schmidt, Manfred G. 1997. Demokratietheorien. Leske and Budrich, Opladen. 
Schofield, N. 1978. ‘Instability of Simple Dynamic Games’, Review of Economic Studies, 45, pp. 
575-594. 
Senato della Repubblica. Regolamento del Senato. 2007. 
http://www.senato.it/istituzione/29377/articolato.htm 
Shepsle, K. 1978. The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press. 
Shepsle, K. 1979a. ‘Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models.’ 
American Journal of Political Science 23:26-59. 
Shepsle, K. 1979b. ‘The role of institutional structure in the creation of policy equilibrium.’ In 
Public policy and public choice, ed. D. Rae and T. J. Eisinuier. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage. 
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Bonchek, Mark S. 1997. Analyzing politics: rationality, behavior, and 
institutions. New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Weingast, Barry R. 1981. "Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A 
Generalization." In American Journal of Political Science 25 (February 1981): 96-111. 
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Weingast, Barry R. 1987. The Institutional Foundations of committee 
power. American Political Science Review 81. 
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Weingast, Barry R. 1995. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. 
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
Sinclair, Barbara. 1997. Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Process in the U.S. Congress. 
Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.  
Smith, Steven S. 1989. Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate. Washington, D.C., 
Brookings Institution. 
Spotts, Frederic, and Theodor Wieser. 1986. Italy: A Difficult Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Stockman, David. 1975. ‘The Social Pork Barrel.’ Public Interest, 39:3-30. 
Strøm, Kaare. 1990a. Minority Governments and Majority Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Strøm, Kaare. 1990b. “A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties.” American Journal of 
Political Science 34: 565-98. 
Strøm K. 1994. “The political role of Norwegian cabinet ministers”. In Cabinet Ministers, ed. M 
Laver, KA Shepsle, pp. 35–55. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Strøm, Kaare. 1995, Parliamentary Government and Legislative Organisation, in Döring, Herbert, 
ed. 1995. Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. New York: St Martin's Press. 
 171 
Strøm, Kaare. 2000. “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies.” European 
Journal of Political Research 37 (May): 261–90. 
Strøm, Kaare. 2003. “Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation.” In Delegation and Accountability 
in Parliamentary Democracies, eds. Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press: 55-106.  
Strøm, Kaare, and Wolfgang C. Müller. 1999a. “The Keys to Togetherness: Coalition Agreements 
in Parliamentary Democracies.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 5:3, 255-282. 
Strøm, Kaare and Wolfgang C. Müller 1999b: “Political Parties and Hard Choices”. In: Wolfgang C. 
Müller/Kaare Strøm (eds.), Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe 
Make Hard Choices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–35. 
Strøm K, Müller WC, and Bergman T, eds. 2003. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary 
Democracies. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press. 
Strøm K, Müller WC, and Bergman T, eds. 2008. Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The 
Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press. 
Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Daniel Markham Smith. 2010. “Parliamentary Control of 
Coalition Governments”, Annual Review of Political Science 2010. 13:517–35. 
Strøm, Kaare and Stephen M. Swindle. 2002. “Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution.” The American 
Political Science Review Vol. 96, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 575-591. 
Tabellini, Guido, and Alberto Alesina. 1990a. “Voting on the budget deficit.” In The American 
Economic Review 80:37–49. 
Tabellini, Guido, and Alberto Alesina. 1990b. “A positive theory of budget deficits and public 
debt.” In The Review of Economic Studies 57: 403–414. 
Terzi, Ettore. 1968. "Presidente d'Assemblea, Governo e Gruppi Politici nell'Organizzazione del 
Lavoro Parlamentare," Studi Parlamentari e di Politica Costituzionale 1 (No. 1, 1968): 35-60. 
Thies, Michael F. 2001. “Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition 
Governments.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (July): 580–98. 
Tsebelis, George. 1995. “Decisionmaking in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, 
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartitism.” British Journal of Political Science 
25: 289-325. 
Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players: An Introduction to Institutional Analysis. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Tsebelis, George, and Eric C.C. Chang. 2004. ‘Veto players and the structure of budgets in 
advanced industrialized countries.’ European Journal of Political Research 43: 449–476.  
Tullock, Gordon. 1981. ‘Why So Much Stability?’ Public Choice 37, no. 2: 189-202. 
Vassallo, S. 2001. “Le leggi del governo.Come gli esecutivi della transizione hanno superato i veti 
incrociati”. In G. Capano and M. Giuliani (Eds). Parlamento e processo legislativo nella 
transizione. Bologna: Il Mulino, pp. 85-126. 
Vassallo, S. 2007. ‘Government under Berlusconi: The functioning of the core institutions in Italy’, 
West European Politics, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 692–710. 
Verzichelli, L. 1999. La Legge Finanziaria. Bologna: Il Mulino.  
Verzichelli, Luca. 2003. “Italy: Delegation and Accountability in a Changing Parliamentary 
Democracy.” In Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, eds. Kaare 
Strøm, Wolfgang Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 445-73. 
Verzichelli Cotta 2000, “Italy. From ‘Constrained’ Coalitions to Alternatine Governments?” In 
Muller Strom 2000, (eds.) Coalition Governments in Western Europe, pp. 433-497. 
Verzichelli, L. and S. Vassallo. 2004. Il processo di bilancio nel sistema politico italiano. 
Unpublished manuscript. 
Weingast, Barry R. 1979. "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms." American 
Journal of Political Science 23 (May 1979): 245-63. 
Weingast, Barry R. 1984. The congressional-bureaucratic system: A principal-agent perspective 
(with applications to the SEC). Public Choice 44: 147-91. 
 172 
Weingast, B.R. 1990. Restrictive rules and committee floor success in the postreform House. 
Unpublished mahuscript. Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 
Weingast, B.R. 1992. “Fighting Fire with Fire: Amending Activity and Institutional Change in the 
Postreform Congress”. In Roger H. Davidson (Ed.). The Postreform Congress. New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 
Weingast, Barry R. 2002. “Rational-Choice Institutionalism.” In Political Science: State of the 
Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner. New York: Norton. 
Weingast, Barry R., and William J. Marshall. 1988. “The Industrial Organization of Congress.” In 
Journal of Political Economy 96:1, 132-163. 
Weingast, B., K. Shepsle, and C. Johnsen. 1981. “The political economy of benefits and costs: A 
neoclassical approach to distributive politics.” Journal of Political Economy 89:642-64. 
Wheare, K. C. 1963. Legislatures. London: Oxford.  
Wiberg M. 1995. ‘Parliamentary questioning: control by communication?’ In Parliaments and 
Majority Rule in Western Europe, ed. H. Döring, pp. 179–222. New York: St. Martin’s. 
Williamson, O. 1985. Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press. 
Wilson, James Q. 1973. Political Organizations. New York: Basic Book, Inc., Publishers.  
Woldendorp, Jaap, Hans Keman, and Ian Budge. 2000. Party Government in 48 Democracies 
(1945–1998). Amsterdam: Kluwer. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2003. “Cluster-Sample Methods in Applied Econometrics,” The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 93 (2), pp. 133-138 
Zangani, Marcovalerio. 1998. “I recenti sviluppi delle procedure parlamentari di bilancio: la terza 
fase dell'evoluzione in atto”. In Silvio Traversa and Antonio Casu (Eds). Il Parlamento nella 
transizione. Milano: Giuffrè, pp. 137-174; Senato: p. 137-164. 
Zucchini, F. 2001, “Arena elettorale, arena parlamentare e arena legislativa.” In Capano e Giuliani 
2001a, Parlamento e processo legislativo in Italia. 
Zucchini, F. 2005. "The Legislative Agenda Setting Power in a Changing Parliamentary 
Democracy: the Italian Puzzle." Unpublished typescript, Università degli studi di Milano. 
Zucchini, F. 2006. ‘Government alternation and legislative process. Some lessons from Italian 
politics’, paper available at: 
http://www.sociol.unimi.it/ricerca/parlamento/papers/Zucchini_Alternation.pdf 
Zuckerman, A. 1979. The Politics of Faction: Christian Democratic Rule in Italy. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
